I would Boycott this company for promoting DOWRY and corrupting womens minds. This advertisement is nothing more then HYPOCRACY in action. One side the Feminazi are crying to stop Dowry and on the other side they sit back and watch quietly as companies openly promote Dowry giving, this is unfortunat, very bad taste in promoting.
This is Tanishq's new jewellery ad. This is the real reason for justifying the existence of laws like IPC 498A and DV Act.
The reality is that most Indian parents push their reluctant daughters into marriages.
The reality is that most women get married for the love of jewellery and riches.
The reality is that it takes a promise of gold for most women to agree to get married.
The reality is that an average woman in India agrees to get married because her parents promises her jewellery and property rights. THIS is the real 'Dowry'.
The reality is that most Indian women get married for all the wrong reasons.
Dowry is popularly imagined to be inducement to the groom for marrying the daughter. But the actual explanation of Dowry is clearly shown in this ad. And this is what is happening in India.
As soon as the glamour of the marriage ceremony wears off and the glitter of the gold fades to the reality of life, these gold-digging daughters of India start dreaming of escaping the drudgery of marriage. And they do it in style, aided by the Mengele of our time, the NCW.
The rest is the reality of false criminal cases against husbands and their families.
The rest is legally aided butchery of men.
The rest is legally aided torment of fatherless children.
And the concentration camps of Indian Family Courts where the poisonous fumes of bias and oppression kills all voices of reason, conscience and the last whimpers of justice.
And all this for these women's lust for gold.
Mr.Rebates
Sunday, June 6, 2010
Veerappa Moily wants child custody cases decided within six months
May 27, 2010 1:34 IST
New Delhi: M Veerappa Moily wants to play godfather to children caught in the crossfire between warring parents locked in custody battles.
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Upset at long litigations that leave a damaging impression on children, the law and justice minister wants all custody matters to be disposed of within six months.
“Custody matters should be decided faster and if possible, in less than six months because there is a lot of anxiety among parents and children. It is the children who suffer most as they go through a lot of trauma when such cases drag on,” Moily told the media in an exclusive interview.
The minister intends to write to all high court chief justices seeking intervention for speedy disposal of custody cases in the interest of children.
He had earlier advocated speedy divorces and said the number of family courts was being increased substantially, so that matrimonial disputes are settled in quick time. “In fact, all women- and children-related matters should be decided in fast-track courts,” Moily had said shortly after taking over as law minister.
While efforts are on to fast-track cases involving heinous crime such as rape, courts still have not picked up speed in matters related to children.
Custody battles are most fiercely contested and invariably dragged on for years, during which children grow up in the shadow of uncertainty and insecurity.
The minister believes since children are at a crucial stage of mental development during such battles, it is not fair to make them go through uncertainty which causes trauma. He wants custody cases to be dealt with sensitively.
Of late, there has been a growing demand for speedy disposal of custody matters, due to which the number of family courts in metros is being increased.
“This is fantastic news for litigating parents and children. At least keeping in mind children, custody matters should be disposed of faster. There is a need for separate guardian courts for such cases. Courts must also give more importance to shared parenting, so that children get the care and attention of both parents,” Kumar Jagirdar, who has been embroiled in a long litigation with his former wife over the custody of their daughter, said.
“The minister [Moily] is absolutely right. However, it is also important that custody matters are decided in a cordial atmosphere. Children are often called in courts, where under trials and convicts are also present. Such atmosphere is not healthy,” Supreme Court lawyer Priya Hingorani said.
New Delhi: M Veerappa Moily wants to play godfather to children caught in the crossfire between warring parents locked in custody battles.
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Procedure to appoint judges in higher courts could be changed
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Upset at long litigations that leave a damaging impression on children, the law and justice minister wants all custody matters to be disposed of within six months.
“Custody matters should be decided faster and if possible, in less than six months because there is a lot of anxiety among parents and children. It is the children who suffer most as they go through a lot of trauma when such cases drag on,” Moily told the media in an exclusive interview.
The minister intends to write to all high court chief justices seeking intervention for speedy disposal of custody cases in the interest of children.
He had earlier advocated speedy divorces and said the number of family courts was being increased substantially, so that matrimonial disputes are settled in quick time. “In fact, all women- and children-related matters should be decided in fast-track courts,” Moily had said shortly after taking over as law minister.
While efforts are on to fast-track cases involving heinous crime such as rape, courts still have not picked up speed in matters related to children.
Custody battles are most fiercely contested and invariably dragged on for years, during which children grow up in the shadow of uncertainty and insecurity.
The minister believes since children are at a crucial stage of mental development during such battles, it is not fair to make them go through uncertainty which causes trauma. He wants custody cases to be dealt with sensitively.
Of late, there has been a growing demand for speedy disposal of custody matters, due to which the number of family courts in metros is being increased.
“This is fantastic news for litigating parents and children. At least keeping in mind children, custody matters should be disposed of faster. There is a need for separate guardian courts for such cases. Courts must also give more importance to shared parenting, so that children get the care and attention of both parents,” Kumar Jagirdar, who has been embroiled in a long litigation with his former wife over the custody of their daughter, said.
“The minister [Moily] is absolutely right. However, it is also important that custody matters are decided in a cordial atmosphere. Children are often called in courts, where under trials and convicts are also present. Such atmosphere is not healthy,” Supreme Court lawyer Priya Hingorani said.
‘Step to protect men from wives’ fake complaints not enough’
Tue Nov 17 2009
Centre’s directive to states say no arrests be made without proper investigation
Taking cognisance of the increasing number of false complaints being filed under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Central Government recently issued directives to the state governments not to make any immediate arrests but conduct thorough investigations before taking any action. However, family court lawyers and activists feel that unless women are punished for lodging false complaints, this directive would not help.
“Though the directive is welcome, unless the women are punished by law for filing false cases under Section 498A, its misuse cannot be stopped,” said Mahesh Kalge, a representative of Save Indian Family Foundation (SIFF), who runs a helpline for men in distress caused by domestic disputes.
Mahesh (name changed), an IT professional from Chinchwad, had to spent a week in the lock-up after his wife filed a harassment complaint with the police.
“In most cases, the investigating officer immediately arrests the husband, mother-in-law and sister-in-law, as per the statement given by the wife. However, when the allegations prove false, the investigating officer is never held at fault. It is time the judiciary take this into account,” said Mahesh.
“This directive, if implemented strictly, will surely put a tab on the misuse of this section. Of the total cases filed under this section in one year, 85 per cent turn out to be bogus,” said advocate Shailaja Kelkar, matrimonial counselor who practiced in the family court for 20 years. There should be a provision in the law where husbands can sue their wives for making false allegations. Women take to filing such false complaints with an eye on compensation or husband’s property, Kelkar observed.
In a letter to state chief secretaries, the Ministry of Home Affairs has asked the state governments to issue directives to the police not to arrest the husband and his relatives without checking the genuineness of the anti-dowry complaint.
The MHA wants the arrests to be the last resort and has asked the state police to ensure that the law doesn’t become a tool in the hands of disgruntled women to settle scores with their husbands and in-laws.
Centre’s directive to states say no arrests be made without proper investigation
Taking cognisance of the increasing number of false complaints being filed under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Central Government recently issued directives to the state governments not to make any immediate arrests but conduct thorough investigations before taking any action. However, family court lawyers and activists feel that unless women are punished for lodging false complaints, this directive would not help.
“Though the directive is welcome, unless the women are punished by law for filing false cases under Section 498A, its misuse cannot be stopped,” said Mahesh Kalge, a representative of Save Indian Family Foundation (SIFF), who runs a helpline for men in distress caused by domestic disputes.
Mahesh (name changed), an IT professional from Chinchwad, had to spent a week in the lock-up after his wife filed a harassment complaint with the police.
“In most cases, the investigating officer immediately arrests the husband, mother-in-law and sister-in-law, as per the statement given by the wife. However, when the allegations prove false, the investigating officer is never held at fault. It is time the judiciary take this into account,” said Mahesh.
“This directive, if implemented strictly, will surely put a tab on the misuse of this section. Of the total cases filed under this section in one year, 85 per cent turn out to be bogus,” said advocate Shailaja Kelkar, matrimonial counselor who practiced in the family court for 20 years. There should be a provision in the law where husbands can sue their wives for making false allegations. Women take to filing such false complaints with an eye on compensation or husband’s property, Kelkar observed.
In a letter to state chief secretaries, the Ministry of Home Affairs has asked the state governments to issue directives to the police not to arrest the husband and his relatives without checking the genuineness of the anti-dowry complaint.
The MHA wants the arrests to be the last resort and has asked the state police to ensure that the law doesn’t become a tool in the hands of disgruntled women to settle scores with their husbands and in-laws.
One year is Limitation for 498a
ARUN VYAS & ANR. V ANITA VYAS
PETITIONER: ARUN VYAS & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT: ANITA VYAS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/05/1999
BENCH: K.Venkataswami, Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri
JUDGMENT:
S.SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI,J
Leave is granted.
This appeal is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jabalpur in S.B.Crl.Revision No.316/96 dated March 17, 1998 setting aside the order of discharge passed in favour of the appellants by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur on April 23, 1996.
The facts giving rise to this appeal may briefly be noted here.
Appellant No.1 married the respondent in accordance with the Hindu rites on May 20, 1986. They were blessed with a girl on January 2, 1988. The respondent, in the complaint filed before the Court on October 18, 1995, alleged that she was beaten up by her husband, mother-in-law and sisters-in- law as her parents failed to satisfy the demand of dowry and ultimately she was pushed out of the house on October 13,1988. The complaint was filed against the appellants under Sections 498-A, 406 IPC read with Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act before Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur, under Section 190(1) Cr.P.C., who ordered investigation by police. The police investigated the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and submitted charge-sheet (final report) under Section 498-A IPC on December 22, 1995. On that report the learned Magistrate took cognizance of offence under Sections 498-A as well as 406 IPC and issued summons to the appellants. The case was posted on April 23, 1996 for framing charges. On that day it was submitted on behalf of the accused that the complaint was barred by limitation and that referring the case for investigation to the police itself was bad, therefore, no charges could be framed against the accused. That plea of the appellants found favour from the learned Magistrate who discharged the appellants by his order dated April 23, 1996. The respondent challenged the validity of that order of the learned Magistrate before the High Court of Rajasthan in S.B.Cr.No.316 of 1966. On March 17,1998, the High Court set aside the order of the learned Magistrate and directed him to proceed with the case from the stage where he had discharged the accused and decide the same in accordance with law. It is that order of the High Court which is the subject-matter of this appeal.
Mr.Adarsh Goel, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the High Court has committed illegality in holding that there was no delay in filing the complaint and in observing that even if there was delay in view of Section 468 Cr.P.C. the learned Magistrate should not have overlooked the provisions of Section 473 Cr.P.C. He argued that no provision in Cr.P.C. provides that after taking cognizance, the learned Magistrate could not have discharged the appellants and that the reasons given by the High Court in setting aside the order of the learned Magistrate are erroneous in law.
Mr.Pallav Shishodia, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that the respondent was subjected to cruelty and harassed for the demand of dowry and she was sent out of the matrimonial home, therefore, the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of the learned Magistrate who did not take note of Section 473 Cr.P.C. and directing him to proceed with the case.
On this above submissions, two questions arise for consideration, namely :
(i) whether the learned Magistrate can discharge an accused after taking cognizance of an offence by him but before the trial of the case; and
(ii) whether the learned Magistrate was right in discharging the appellants on the grounds that the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C.
Point No.(i) :
The answer to this point can be found in Section 239 Cr.P.C. which is in the following terms : "239. When accused shall be discharged - If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing."
A perusal of the aforementioned section shows that the Magistrate has to discharge the accused : if (1) on consideration of
(a) the police report,
(b) the documents filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C.; and
(2) making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary; and
(3) after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, he considers charge against the accused to be groundless.
This section, however, casts an obligation on the Magistrate to record his reasons for holding that the charge is groundless and discharging the accused.
Section 239 has to be read along with Section 240 Cr.P.C.
If the Magistrate finds that there is prima facie evidence or the material against the accused in support of the charge (allegations) he may frame charge in accordance with Section 240 Cr.P.C.
But if he finds that the charge (the allegations or imputations) made against the accused do not make out a prima facie case and do not furnish basis for framing charge, it will be a case of charge being groundless, so he has no option but to discharge the accused.
Where the Magistrate finds that taking cognizance of the offence itself was contrary to any provision of law, like Section 468 Cr.P.C., the complaint being barred by limitation, so he cannot frame the charge, he has to discharge the accused.
Indeed in a case where the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence without taking note of Section 468 Cr.P.C., the most appropriate stage at which the accused can plead for his discharge is the stage of framing the charge. He need not wait till completion of trial. The Magistrate will be committing no illegality in considering that question and discharging the accused at the stage of framing charge if the facts so justify.
Point No.(ii) :
The new Code of Criminal Procedure Code contains Chapter XXXVI, (Sections 467 to 473) which deals with limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. Section 467 defines that the period of limitation for the purposes of that Chapter, to mean the period specified in Section 468 for taking cognizance of offence. Bar to taking cognizance on the expiry of period of limitation and extension of period of limitation, are dealt in by Sections 468 and 473 respectively.
The point of commencement of period of limitation in the case of continuing offence is embodied in Section 472 and in the case other than a continuing offence is contained in Section 469.
The provisions for exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation are incorporated in Sections 470 and 471.
It may be noted here that the object of having Chapter XXXVI in Cr.P.C. is to protect persons from prosecution based on stale grievances and complaints which may turn out to be vexatious. The reason for engrafting rule of limitation is that due to long lapse of time necessary evidence will be lost and persons prosecuted will be placed in a defenseless position. It will cause great mental anguish and hardship to them and may even result in miscarriage of justice.
At the same time it is necessary to ensure that due to delays on the part of the investigating and prosecuting agencies and the application of rules of limitation the criminal justice system is not rendered toothless and ineffective and perpetrators of crime are not placed in advantageous position.
The Parliament obviously taking note of various aspects, classified offences into two categories, having regard to the gravity of offences, on the basis of the punishment prescribed for them. Grave offences for which punishment prescribed is imprisonment for a term exceeding three years are not brought within the ambit of Chapter XXXVI.
The period of limitation is prescribed only for offences for which punishment specified is imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and even in such cases wide discretion is given to the Court in the matter of taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation.
Section 473 provides that if any Court is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice, it may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation.
This section opens with a non obstante clause and gives overriding effect to it over all the other provisions of Chapter XXXVI.
It is useful to read Section 468 Cr.P.C. here :
"468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation -
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be -
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment."
A perusal of the provision, extracted above, shows that Sub-section (1) of Section 468 enjoins that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the categories specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation mentioned therein. This rule is, however, subject to the other provisions of the Code.
Sub-section (2) specifies the period of limitation of six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; of one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and of three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
Sub-section (3) which is inserted by Act 45 of 1978, deals with a situation where offences, are tried together and directs that for the purposes of that section the period of limitation shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.
The essence of the offence in Section 498-A is cruelty as defined in the explanation appended to that section. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation.
The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on October 13, 1988 when, on the allegation made by the respondent in the complaint to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period of limitation commenced for offences under Sections 406 and 498-A from October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991. But the charge-sheet was filed on December 22, 1995, therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c ) Cr.P.C. It may be noted here that Section 473 Cr.P.C. which extends the period of limiation is in two parts. The first part contains non obstante clause and gives overriding effect to that section over Sections 468 to 472. The second part has two limbs. The first limb confers power on every competent court to take cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained and the second limb empowers such a court to take cognizance of an offence if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.
It is true that the expression `in the interest of justice' in Section 473 cannot be interpreted to mean in the interest of prosecution. What the Court has to see is `interest of justice'. The interest of justice demands that the Court should protect the oppressed and punish the oppressor/offender.
In complaints under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, having been subjected to cruelty by the husband and the in-laws. It is, therefore, appropriate for the Courts, in case of delayed complaints, to construe liberally Section 473 Cr.P.C.in favour of a wife who is subjected to cruelty if on the facts and in the circumstances of the case it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. When the conduct of the accused is such that applying rule of limitation will give an unfair advantage to him or result in miscarriage of justice, the Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period of limitation in the interests of justice. This is only illustrative not exhaustive. Any finding recorded by a Magistrate holding that the complaint to be barred by limitation without considering the provisions of Section 473 Cr.P.C will be a deficient and defective finding, vulnerable to challenge by the aggrieved party. In this case the complaint was clearly barred by limitation and no explanation was offered for inordinate delay; this is what the learned Magistrate took note of and concluded that the complaint was barred by limitation. This is correct insofar as the offence under Section 406 is concerned.
Therefore, in regard to Section 406 the order of the learned Magistrate discharging the appellants cannot be faulted with.
But regarding offence under Section 498-A the learned Magistrate did not advert to the second limb of the second part in Section 473 Cr.P.C. referred to above. The order of the learned Magistrate on this aspect was unsustainable so the High Court has committed no illegality in setting aside that part of the order of the learned Magistrate.
In Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.) vs. Vanka Venkata Reddy & Ors. [(1993) 3 SCC 4], the wife who was subjected to cruelty left the matrimonial home in 1985. In 1990 she filed the complaint alleging cruelty and maltreatment against the husband and mother-in-law and further stating that the husband had remarried. The Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 498-A and 494 IPC. On the petition of the husband under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court quashed the complaint. This Court, on appeal from the judgment of the High Court, held that the High Court erred in quashing the complaint as Section 468 Cr.P.C. could not be applied to offence under Section 494 IPC (for it is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years) and even in respect of offence under Section 498-A, the attention of the High Court was not drawn to Section 473 Cr.P.C.
While setting aside the impugned order of the High Court this Court observed : "As such, courts while considering the question of limitation for an offence under Section 498-A i.e. subjecting a woman to cruelty by her husband or the relative of her husband, should judge that question, in the light of Section 473 of the Code, which requires the Court, not only to examine as to whether the delay has been properly explained, but as to whether "it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice"."
For the reasons stated above the High Court was not correct insofar as the order of Magistrate relates to Section 406 IPC.
But in regard to offence under Section 498-A IPC no exception can be taken to the impugned order under appeal as the learned Magistrate did not take note of Section 473 Cr.P.C., while ordering discharge of the appellants.
Now the learned Magistrate shall consider the question of limitation taking note of Section 473 Cr.P.C. in the light of observations made hereinabove. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part.
PETITIONER: ARUN VYAS & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT: ANITA VYAS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/05/1999
BENCH: K.Venkataswami, Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri
JUDGMENT:
S.SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI,J
Leave is granted.
This appeal is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jabalpur in S.B.Crl.Revision No.316/96 dated March 17, 1998 setting aside the order of discharge passed in favour of the appellants by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur on April 23, 1996.
The facts giving rise to this appeal may briefly be noted here.
Appellant No.1 married the respondent in accordance with the Hindu rites on May 20, 1986. They were blessed with a girl on January 2, 1988. The respondent, in the complaint filed before the Court on October 18, 1995, alleged that she was beaten up by her husband, mother-in-law and sisters-in- law as her parents failed to satisfy the demand of dowry and ultimately she was pushed out of the house on October 13,1988. The complaint was filed against the appellants under Sections 498-A, 406 IPC read with Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act before Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur, under Section 190(1) Cr.P.C., who ordered investigation by police. The police investigated the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and submitted charge-sheet (final report) under Section 498-A IPC on December 22, 1995. On that report the learned Magistrate took cognizance of offence under Sections 498-A as well as 406 IPC and issued summons to the appellants. The case was posted on April 23, 1996 for framing charges. On that day it was submitted on behalf of the accused that the complaint was barred by limitation and that referring the case for investigation to the police itself was bad, therefore, no charges could be framed against the accused. That plea of the appellants found favour from the learned Magistrate who discharged the appellants by his order dated April 23, 1996. The respondent challenged the validity of that order of the learned Magistrate before the High Court of Rajasthan in S.B.Cr.No.316 of 1966. On March 17,1998, the High Court set aside the order of the learned Magistrate and directed him to proceed with the case from the stage where he had discharged the accused and decide the same in accordance with law. It is that order of the High Court which is the subject-matter of this appeal.
Mr.Adarsh Goel, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the High Court has committed illegality in holding that there was no delay in filing the complaint and in observing that even if there was delay in view of Section 468 Cr.P.C. the learned Magistrate should not have overlooked the provisions of Section 473 Cr.P.C. He argued that no provision in Cr.P.C. provides that after taking cognizance, the learned Magistrate could not have discharged the appellants and that the reasons given by the High Court in setting aside the order of the learned Magistrate are erroneous in law.
Mr.Pallav Shishodia, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that the respondent was subjected to cruelty and harassed for the demand of dowry and she was sent out of the matrimonial home, therefore, the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of the learned Magistrate who did not take note of Section 473 Cr.P.C. and directing him to proceed with the case.
On this above submissions, two questions arise for consideration, namely :
(i) whether the learned Magistrate can discharge an accused after taking cognizance of an offence by him but before the trial of the case; and
(ii) whether the learned Magistrate was right in discharging the appellants on the grounds that the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C.
Point No.(i) :
The answer to this point can be found in Section 239 Cr.P.C. which is in the following terms : "239. When accused shall be discharged - If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing."
A perusal of the aforementioned section shows that the Magistrate has to discharge the accused : if (1) on consideration of
(a) the police report,
(b) the documents filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C.; and
(2) making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary; and
(3) after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, he considers charge against the accused to be groundless.
This section, however, casts an obligation on the Magistrate to record his reasons for holding that the charge is groundless and discharging the accused.
Section 239 has to be read along with Section 240 Cr.P.C.
If the Magistrate finds that there is prima facie evidence or the material against the accused in support of the charge (allegations) he may frame charge in accordance with Section 240 Cr.P.C.
But if he finds that the charge (the allegations or imputations) made against the accused do not make out a prima facie case and do not furnish basis for framing charge, it will be a case of charge being groundless, so he has no option but to discharge the accused.
Where the Magistrate finds that taking cognizance of the offence itself was contrary to any provision of law, like Section 468 Cr.P.C., the complaint being barred by limitation, so he cannot frame the charge, he has to discharge the accused.
Indeed in a case where the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence without taking note of Section 468 Cr.P.C., the most appropriate stage at which the accused can plead for his discharge is the stage of framing the charge. He need not wait till completion of trial. The Magistrate will be committing no illegality in considering that question and discharging the accused at the stage of framing charge if the facts so justify.
Point No.(ii) :
The new Code of Criminal Procedure Code contains Chapter XXXVI, (Sections 467 to 473) which deals with limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. Section 467 defines that the period of limitation for the purposes of that Chapter, to mean the period specified in Section 468 for taking cognizance of offence. Bar to taking cognizance on the expiry of period of limitation and extension of period of limitation, are dealt in by Sections 468 and 473 respectively.
The point of commencement of period of limitation in the case of continuing offence is embodied in Section 472 and in the case other than a continuing offence is contained in Section 469.
The provisions for exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation are incorporated in Sections 470 and 471.
It may be noted here that the object of having Chapter XXXVI in Cr.P.C. is to protect persons from prosecution based on stale grievances and complaints which may turn out to be vexatious. The reason for engrafting rule of limitation is that due to long lapse of time necessary evidence will be lost and persons prosecuted will be placed in a defenseless position. It will cause great mental anguish and hardship to them and may even result in miscarriage of justice.
At the same time it is necessary to ensure that due to delays on the part of the investigating and prosecuting agencies and the application of rules of limitation the criminal justice system is not rendered toothless and ineffective and perpetrators of crime are not placed in advantageous position.
The Parliament obviously taking note of various aspects, classified offences into two categories, having regard to the gravity of offences, on the basis of the punishment prescribed for them. Grave offences for which punishment prescribed is imprisonment for a term exceeding three years are not brought within the ambit of Chapter XXXVI.
The period of limitation is prescribed only for offences for which punishment specified is imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and even in such cases wide discretion is given to the Court in the matter of taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation.
Section 473 provides that if any Court is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice, it may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation.
This section opens with a non obstante clause and gives overriding effect to it over all the other provisions of Chapter XXXVI.
It is useful to read Section 468 Cr.P.C. here :
"468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation -
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be -
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment."
A perusal of the provision, extracted above, shows that Sub-section (1) of Section 468 enjoins that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the categories specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation mentioned therein. This rule is, however, subject to the other provisions of the Code.
Sub-section (2) specifies the period of limitation of six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; of one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and of three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
Sub-section (3) which is inserted by Act 45 of 1978, deals with a situation where offences, are tried together and directs that for the purposes of that section the period of limitation shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.
The essence of the offence in Section 498-A is cruelty as defined in the explanation appended to that section. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation.
The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on October 13, 1988 when, on the allegation made by the respondent in the complaint to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period of limitation commenced for offences under Sections 406 and 498-A from October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991. But the charge-sheet was filed on December 22, 1995, therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c ) Cr.P.C. It may be noted here that Section 473 Cr.P.C. which extends the period of limiation is in two parts. The first part contains non obstante clause and gives overriding effect to that section over Sections 468 to 472. The second part has two limbs. The first limb confers power on every competent court to take cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained and the second limb empowers such a court to take cognizance of an offence if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.
It is true that the expression `in the interest of justice' in Section 473 cannot be interpreted to mean in the interest of prosecution. What the Court has to see is `interest of justice'. The interest of justice demands that the Court should protect the oppressed and punish the oppressor/offender.
In complaints under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, having been subjected to cruelty by the husband and the in-laws. It is, therefore, appropriate for the Courts, in case of delayed complaints, to construe liberally Section 473 Cr.P.C.in favour of a wife who is subjected to cruelty if on the facts and in the circumstances of the case it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. When the conduct of the accused is such that applying rule of limitation will give an unfair advantage to him or result in miscarriage of justice, the Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period of limitation in the interests of justice. This is only illustrative not exhaustive. Any finding recorded by a Magistrate holding that the complaint to be barred by limitation without considering the provisions of Section 473 Cr.P.C will be a deficient and defective finding, vulnerable to challenge by the aggrieved party. In this case the complaint was clearly barred by limitation and no explanation was offered for inordinate delay; this is what the learned Magistrate took note of and concluded that the complaint was barred by limitation. This is correct insofar as the offence under Section 406 is concerned.
Therefore, in regard to Section 406 the order of the learned Magistrate discharging the appellants cannot be faulted with.
But regarding offence under Section 498-A the learned Magistrate did not advert to the second limb of the second part in Section 473 Cr.P.C. referred to above. The order of the learned Magistrate on this aspect was unsustainable so the High Court has committed no illegality in setting aside that part of the order of the learned Magistrate.
In Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.) vs. Vanka Venkata Reddy & Ors. [(1993) 3 SCC 4], the wife who was subjected to cruelty left the matrimonial home in 1985. In 1990 she filed the complaint alleging cruelty and maltreatment against the husband and mother-in-law and further stating that the husband had remarried. The Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 498-A and 494 IPC. On the petition of the husband under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court quashed the complaint. This Court, on appeal from the judgment of the High Court, held that the High Court erred in quashing the complaint as Section 468 Cr.P.C. could not be applied to offence under Section 494 IPC (for it is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years) and even in respect of offence under Section 498-A, the attention of the High Court was not drawn to Section 473 Cr.P.C.
While setting aside the impugned order of the High Court this Court observed : "As such, courts while considering the question of limitation for an offence under Section 498-A i.e. subjecting a woman to cruelty by her husband or the relative of her husband, should judge that question, in the light of Section 473 of the Code, which requires the Court, not only to examine as to whether the delay has been properly explained, but as to whether "it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice"."
For the reasons stated above the High Court was not correct insofar as the order of Magistrate relates to Section 406 IPC.
But in regard to offence under Section 498-A IPC no exception can be taken to the impugned order under appeal as the learned Magistrate did not take note of Section 473 Cr.P.C., while ordering discharge of the appellants.
Now the learned Magistrate shall consider the question of limitation taking note of Section 473 Cr.P.C. in the light of observations made hereinabove. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part.
HC (Delhi): 498a wife, father, brother beat husband in court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Bail Appln. No. 821/2007
Date of Reserve: 4.10.2007
Date of judgment: 08.10.2007
Archana Singh and Ors. ... Petitioners
Through: Mr. S.P.Singh, Advocate with
Mr. K.B.B.Singh, Advocate
Versus
The State ... Respondent
Through: Mr. Amit Sharma, Advocate
Mr. Jitender Chaudhary, Advocate for complainant
CORAM JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not ?
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest ?
ORDER:
This application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. has been made for anticipatory bail by the applicants, who are involved in a case under Section 323/341/506/34 IPC. A perusal of the FIR would show that the complainant was facing trial in FIR under Section 498A/406/34 IPC lodged by his wife.
2. A criminal complaint under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for grant of maintenance was filed by the petitioner no. 1. On the date of incident, the complainant had gone to the Court of Ms. Navita Kumari, MM in the morning where his father-in-law Amar Pal Singh pounced upon him and started giving beatings to him with fist and blows, at the same time his brother-in-law Deepak joined his father in giving beating to him. Archana Singh took out her shoes and gave beatings to the applicant. It is apparent from the complaint that tempers of the accused persons flared up in the Court premises itself and they took law in their own hands. They thought of teaching a lesson to the complainant themselves, instead of depending on the decision of the Court under Section 498A/406 IPC. The complainant was rescued by an advocate. PCR Van had taken him first to police station and then to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital. It is stated by the complainant that he started vomiting and blood came out from his mouth in the Court premises. He alleged that a threat to his life was given to him by the accused persons.
3. It is argued by the counsel for the applicants that the complaint was false and lodged as a counter blast. The FIR was delayed FIR and no report was made to the Court concerned. However, these allegations are rebutted by the complainant, who stated that he lodged the complaint to the Court of ACMM on the very next day, who marked the same to SHO for registration of FIR and an order was made by the ACMM under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for registration of FIR. The police, despite order of the ACMM for registration of FIR, registered the FIR only on 25th March, 2007 and he cannot be blamed for this.
4. Assault of the accused by the complainant side within the Court premises is a serious matter. Nobody can be allowed to take law in his own hands. Such acts cannot be looked upon lightly. If they are looked upon lightly, the Court premises would become a ground for vengeance by the accused and the complainant side. Considering the highhanded manner in which the complainant was beaten, I consider that it is not a fit case for grant for anticipatory bail. The application is hereby dismissed.
October 08, 2007 SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA J
Bail Appln. No. 821/2007
Date of Reserve: 4.10.2007
Date of judgment: 08.10.2007
Archana Singh and Ors. ... Petitioners
Through: Mr. S.P.Singh, Advocate with
Mr. K.B.B.Singh, Advocate
Versus
The State ... Respondent
Through: Mr. Amit Sharma, Advocate
Mr. Jitender Chaudhary, Advocate for complainant
CORAM JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not ?
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest ?
ORDER:
This application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. has been made for anticipatory bail by the applicants, who are involved in a case under Section 323/341/506/34 IPC. A perusal of the FIR would show that the complainant was facing trial in FIR under Section 498A/406/34 IPC lodged by his wife.
2. A criminal complaint under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for grant of maintenance was filed by the petitioner no. 1. On the date of incident, the complainant had gone to the Court of Ms. Navita Kumari, MM in the morning where his father-in-law Amar Pal Singh pounced upon him and started giving beatings to him with fist and blows, at the same time his brother-in-law Deepak joined his father in giving beating to him. Archana Singh took out her shoes and gave beatings to the applicant. It is apparent from the complaint that tempers of the accused persons flared up in the Court premises itself and they took law in their own hands. They thought of teaching a lesson to the complainant themselves, instead of depending on the decision of the Court under Section 498A/406 IPC. The complainant was rescued by an advocate. PCR Van had taken him first to police station and then to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital. It is stated by the complainant that he started vomiting and blood came out from his mouth in the Court premises. He alleged that a threat to his life was given to him by the accused persons.
3. It is argued by the counsel for the applicants that the complaint was false and lodged as a counter blast. The FIR was delayed FIR and no report was made to the Court concerned. However, these allegations are rebutted by the complainant, who stated that he lodged the complaint to the Court of ACMM on the very next day, who marked the same to SHO for registration of FIR and an order was made by the ACMM under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for registration of FIR. The police, despite order of the ACMM for registration of FIR, registered the FIR only on 25th March, 2007 and he cannot be blamed for this.
4. Assault of the accused by the complainant side within the Court premises is a serious matter. Nobody can be allowed to take law in his own hands. Such acts cannot be looked upon lightly. If they are looked upon lightly, the Court premises would become a ground for vengeance by the accused and the complainant side. Considering the highhanded manner in which the complainant was beaten, I consider that it is not a fit case for grant for anticipatory bail. The application is hereby dismissed.
October 08, 2007 SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA J
SC Judgement: How to demolish 498a evidence to shreds
CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 81 of 1998
PETITIONER:
Sakatar Singh & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
State of Haryana
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/04/2004
BENCH:
N.Santosh Hegde & B.P.Singh.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
SANTOSH HEGDE,J.
The first appellant before us is the father of the second
appellant and the third appellant is the wife of the first appellant.
These appellants and three others who are sisters of second
appellant herein were charged for offences punishable under
Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 IPC before the
Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala who after trial acquitted
accused Nos. 4 to 6 while convicted the appellants herein for
offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC
read with Section 34 IPC. The first appellant Sakatar Singh was
sentenced for offence punishable under Section 306 for four
years RI and a fine of Rs.500/- and in default in payment of
fine to undergo further RI for three months, while he was
sentenced for an offence punishable under Section 498A for
two years RI and a fine of Rs.200/- and in default in payment of
fine to undergo further RI for one month. The second appellant
Kirpal Singh was sentenced for seven years RI for offence
punishable under Section 306 IPC and a fine of Rs.500/- and in
default of payment of fine to undergo further RI for three
months, he was also sentenced to two years RI under Section
498A IPC and a fine of Rs. 200/- and in default in payment of
fine to undergo further RI for one month. The third appellant
Smt. Joginder Kaur was sentenced to undergo three years RI for
offence under Section 306 and a fine of Rs.200/- and in default
in payment of fine to undergo further RI for one month. While
for offence under Section 498A IPC, she was sentenced to
undergo RI for two years and a fine of Rs.100/- and in default
in payment of fine to undergo RI for one month.
The appellants herein preferred an appeal before the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh against the
judgment and conviction of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge,
Ambala being Criminal Appeal No. 322-SB/87 and the said
appeal having been dismissed confirming the conviction and
sentence awarded on the appellants by the Sessions Court the
appellants are now before us in this appeal.
The prosecution case briefly stated is as follows:-
Deceased Devinder Kaur was married to second appellant
Kirpal Singh in the year 1982 and they had two issues from the
aid marriage a girl by name Gurdip Kaur who was two years
old and a boy named Bablu aged nine months on the date of
incident. The accused persons with their unmarried daughters
and said Devinder Kaur with her children were living at
Layalpur Basti in Ambala City. The prosecution alleges within
two months of the marriage of the second appellant to said
Devinder Kaur the appellants and their daughters started making
unlawful demand for TV, scooter and fridge which was not
fulfilled by the parents of said Devinder Kaur. It is also stated
that after the birth of the second child none from the family of
her in-laws i.e. family of the accused had come to see her at her
maternal home situated at Landran because they were not happy
with the family of Devinder Kaur for not satisfying their
demands. The prosecution further alleges about nine months
prior to the date of incident which happened to be on 21.5.1986
father of said Devinder Kaur died and on his death the
appellants were forcing said Devinder Kaur to make a
demand for share in the family property and this having not
acceeded to by said Devinder Kaur she was subjected to
harassment and cruelty. It is the further case of the prosecution
that mother of said Devinder Kaur (PW-7) had visited the house
of the appellants on 18.5.1986 when she found said Devinder
Kaur in tears and during her said visit she did not speak to PW-7
since her mother-in-law would not allow her to do so. The
further case of the prosecution is that on 21.5.1986 between 9
and 10 a.m. in the house of the appellants said Devinder Kaur
committed suicide along with her two minor children by
pouring kerosene and burning herself and the children. The
prosecution alleges that A-1 took the burnt bodies of the
deceased to the hospital and information in regard to this
incident was conveyed to the family of Devinder Kaur through
PW-12 (Ajmer Singh). On hearing the said news, PW-7 and
other members of the family rushed to Ambala and on coming to
know that her daughter and grand children were murdered by the
appellants, the mother of the deceased (PW-7) lodged a
complaint at about 4.00 p.m. on 21.5.1986. The bodies in
question were then taken to Landran the village of PW-7 and
cremated there. It is also alleged that no member of the
appellants family attended the last rites of the deceased.
Based on the complaint lodged by PW-7 though originally
a crime under Section 302 IPC was registered against the
appellants, after investigation a chargesheet was filed for
offences under Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34
IPC and during the course of the trial the prosecution examined
as many as 16 witnesses out of whom it relied on the evidence
of PW-7 mother of the deceased, PW-8 the brother of the
deceased, PW-12 a family friend of the deceased and PW-14
the maternal uncle of the deceased to establish the case of
cruelty and harassment meted out to said Devinder Kaur
because of which she was forced to commit suicide by burning
herself along with her minor children. The trial court accepting
the evidence of the said prosecution witnesses found the
appellants guilty as charged while it acquitted accused Nos. 4 to
6 who were the daughters of appellant No.1 on the ground that
the prosecution had not established its case as against these
appellants. In appeal as stated above the High Court has agreed
the findings of the trial court.
Shri Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants contended that the trial court has proceeded on the
mere ipse dixit of the four witnesses examined by the
prosecution to establish the case of alleged cruelty and
harassment meted out by the appellants to the deceased without
really there being any legal material to prove the guilt of the
appellants. He pointed out as per explanation to Section 498A of
the Indian Penal Code, 'cruelty' has been defined which
definition also holds good for establishing the guilt under
Section 306 IPC and in the instant case except the fact that
these witnesses have orally stated that there was some demand
for TV, scooter and fridge as also demand for share in the
property of the deceased father, no acceptable material
whatsoever has been produced by the prosecution to either
establish those facts or to prove that pursuant to the said demand
the appellants in any manner committed any act which would
have driven the deceased to commit suicide or harassed the
deceased in any manner with a view to coerce her to meet the
unlawful demand of the appellants. He submitted that the trial
court did not look into the necessary ingredients of Section 498A
and 306 IPC while coming to the conclusion that the appellants
were guilty of the offence charged. It was the argument of the
learned counsel for the appellants that the trial court obviously
was under an impression that even a legal demand, by itself
without anything more would constitute cruelty which the learned
counsel submits is wholly erroneous. The learned counsel also
pointed out that whatever evidence was produced by the
prosecution to establish the so-called illegal demand was
merely hear say and not even admissible under Section 32 of the
Evidence Act, and none of the witnesses who spoke as to the
demand made by the appellants had any personal knowledge
about the said demand. Therefore, even in regard to the alleged
demand accepted by the trial court the learned counsel
submitted the same cannot be sustained because the same is based
on inadmissible evidence.
Coming to the judgment of the High Court which has
confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial
court, the learned counsel submitted that there has been no
application of mind whatsoever by the High Court which is the
first appellate forum and which is duty bound to re-appreciate
the evidence. He pointed out that a bare reading of the judgment
of the High Court would show that the same is nothing but a
copy of the judgment of the trial court both in regard to the
narration of facts as also in regard to the findings.
Shri Vinay Kumar Garg, learned counsel appearing for the
State however contended that it is clear from the evidence of PWs
7, 8, 12 and 14 that the appellants had made certain unlawful
demands because of which the deceased committed suicide. It is
the contention of the learned counsel that once an unlawful
demand is established nothing more is required to be proved that
pursuant to the demand there was any other action or overt act
of cruelty. On the said basis, learned counsel submitted that the
findings of the courts below being concurrent this appeal is liable
to be dismissed.
Having heard the learned counsel and perusing the records,
we notice that since it is the contention of the appellants that the
High Court being the first court of appeal on facts, has not applied
its mind independently to the facts of the case and it has blindly
copied the findings of the trial court, the appellants have lost the
benefit of right of appeal because of which their case is
prejudiced, we assuming for the time being it to be so, think at this
belated stage a remand is not an appropriate remedy. Therefore,
we will consider the material on record ourselves to re-appreciate
the evidence adduced in this case and determine the guilt or
innocence of the appellants.
The allegations against the appellants of cruelty is primarily
based on the following facts :
(1) That the accused started harassing and ill treating
Devinder Kaur two or three months after the
marriage by demanding Television, Scooter and
Fridge;
(2) The family of the deceased has been paying
money to the deceased in instalments to satisfy
the demands of the appellants. Sometime
Rs.2000/- and sometimes Rs.3000/- were paid for
this purpose;
(3) After the death of the father of the deceased, the
family of the deceased were compelling the
deceased to make a demand for her share in the
family property.
(4) That after the birth of the second child the
appellants did not take back the deceased and the
children from her maternal home for nearly 7
months.
(5) The appellants were not permitting the deceased
to talk to her family members.
(6) When PW-8 brother of the deceased visited her,
the deceased had asked him to arrange funds to
meet the demands of her in-laws and that they
were harassing her because of which she was sad.
In law, the prosecution has to prove the fact that the victim
was subjected to cruelty or harassment, and such cruelty should
be one which comes within the explanation to Section 498A
which defines "cruelty".
In the above background, we will now consider the
evidence led by the prosecution to establish the charge levelled
against the appellants. In this process, we will first examine the
letter written by the deceased to her mother. Though this letter
does not mention the date, there is no dispute that the same was
posted on 20.5.1986 which is evident from the postal seal found
on the envelope which would be a date prior to the incident
leading to the death of Devinder Kaur and the children. The
contents of the letter indicates what transpired during her
mother's visit to her in-laws house and does not anywhere even
remotely indicate any demand made by her in-laws. It only
reflects the attitude of the deceased towards her in-laws and that
she entertained a feeling that her mother was not properly treated
by her mother-in-law during her last visit. The letter also
indicates that while the deceased did not wish that her mother
should visit her in-laws' place, her brother could do so which is
clear from the following statement in the said letter : "Mother do
not worry about me. I have make up my will power. When I go
angry then I also utter a few things. Mother send brother here,
you need not come because they are after your blood." In the said
letter she also complained against her brother's wife accepting a
Shagun of Rs.20/- from her mother-in-law and says that the same
should be returned. A reading of the above letter does indicate
that her relationship with her mother-in-law was not good but at
the same time she herself was prone to get angry at times and was
prepared to retort. In our considered opinion, this letter does not,
in any manner, indicate either there was any unlawful demand
from her in-laws or pursuant to such demand there was any
harassment leading to cruelty.
In this context, it will be appropriate for us to consider the
contents of two other letters brought on record by the defence.
One such latter is dated 10.3.1986 marked at Ext.DA written by
PW-8 to the husband of the deceased (A-2). Of course, this is a
letter written about two months before the death of the deceased.
At this stage, we must note the fact that PW-8 has denied having
written this letter but PW-7 the mother admits the letter being that
of her son PW-8. This letter refers to the arrangement of the
marriage of deceased's brother and requests the appellants to
attend the marriage function. The relevant portion of the letter
reads thus: "You will glad to know that the marriage of Paramjit
has been fixed for 23.3.1986, Sunday. You may keep ready. We
will drop letter. Pay my respect to Maserji and Massiji." It also
asked A-2 to bring his sister (the deceased) and her children. This
letter indicates two facts that as on 10.3.1986 the relationship
between the parties was still cordial and as on that date deceased
and her children were in her in-laws house. The next letter which
is also relied upon by the defence is marked Ex.DB dated
20.2.1986 is from the deceased to her husband (A-2) written
about three months prior to the date of incident. The contents of
this letter show that A-2 was corresponding with her and she was
replying his letter though belatedly because of the illness of her
daughter. She also requested him to reply and indicates that she
was eagerly waiting for his reply. She also indicates in the said
letter that she was planning to come back on Wednesday or
Thursday next. The said letter further indicates that A-2 wanted
her to come back within 4 or 5 days but she had overstayed in her
paternal home. Ex.DA and DB prove one other fact that between
20.2.1986 and 10.3.1986 the deceased and her children had
returned to the matrimonial home and the prosecution case that
for 7 months after the birth of the second child, the deceased was
not brought to her matrimonial home is wholly false. That apart
none of these letters indicate that there was any demand from the
appellants for TV, scooter or fridge.
It is in this background, the prosecution primarily relies on
the evidence of PWs.7 and 9, that is, the mother and brother to
establish the prosecution case.
We will now examine whether such allegations stand
proved by the evidence of these two witnesses.
PW-7 the mother in her evidence states that her daughter
was married to A-2 about 4 years prior to the date of her evidence
and the accused started harassing and ill treating the deceased two
to three months after the marriage by demanding TV, scooter and
fridge. She also says that the deceased was asked by the accused
to arrange for funds and pursuant to such demand she had been
sending money in instalments of Rs.2000/- sometimes and some
other time Rs.3000/-. She further says that when her elder son
PW-8 visited the house of the accused he had to assure them that
he would arrange for their every demand item by item after the
crop matured for harvesting. She then makes an omnibus
statement that Devinder Kaur (the deceased) was being harassed
by her husband Kirpal Singh accused, by father-in- law Sakatar
Singh, by mother-in-law Joginder Kaur and by her sister's-in-
law, namely, Palvinder, Jasvinder and Kulvinder. She also makes
a statement that the accused person had demanded the deceased
to stake a claim for a share in her father's property which the
deceased refused to do.
In the cross-examination when she was asked how she came
to know of these demands of the appellants for TV, scooter,
fridge and money, she stated that she came to know the same
from the letters written by her daughter but she failed to produce
those letters because of which an adverse inference will have to
be drawn. Further nowhere in her entire evidence she has stated
that the deceased at any point of time had personally told her
about these demands. In the absence of such material, more so
because of the fact this witness herself does not say that the
deceased told her orally about these demands, and the alleged
letters having not been produced, this part of her evidence will
have to be treated as not based on personal knowledge but as an
opinion of hers, and as such the same is inadmissible in evidence.
Therefore, the prosecution cannot rely upon such evidence to
base a conviction. Even the demand of the in-laws in deceased's
father's property was not told to PW-7 by the deceased but PW-7
was allegedly told about this by Ajmer Singh PW-12, but PW-12
does not support PW-7 in this regard. That apart in the cross-
examination when it was pointed out to her that she had not
mentioned in her previous statement about this demand for
inheritance in deceased father's property, she stated that she had
told the Investigating Agency, but the same was not found in the
said statement of hers. It is also clear from her evidence in the
cross-examination that she had not even told the Investigating
Agency about the demand for money in instalments as spoken to
by her in her examination-in- chief. It is to be noticed further that
even though she in her examination-in-chief stated that when
PW-8 visited the deceased a few days before the incident in
question and the deceased had complained to PW-8 about the
demand by her in-laws, PW-8 in his evidence does not support
PW-7 in this regard. From the above it is clear
that the evidence of PW-7 is of no assistance to the prosecution
to establish the fact that there was any demand, much less an
unlawful demand at all by the appellants on the deceased.
The trial court, in our opinion,
seriously erred in placing reliance on inadmissible part of PW-7's
evidence and ignoring the omissions and improvements established
by the defence in the course of cross examination of PW-7.
We will now consider the evidence of PW-8 who is the
brother of the deceased who in his evidence has stated that the
accused had started harassing and mal-treating the deceased for
more dowry and that they were complaining that she had not
brought anything significant in the dowry and they expected TV,
scooter and fridge in the dowry. While considering this part of his
evidence, it is necessary to note that he in the latter part of his
evidence has stated that these demands were made by the accused
persons after his father died which was on 21.7.1985 (20 days
before the birth of second child of the deceased Devinder Kaur
which was on 10.8.1985). Whereas PW-7 in her evidence had
stated that the demands for TV, Scooter and Fridge was made two
months after the marriage of the deceased. We have noticed that
the marriage of the deceased took place sometime in the year
1982 and the deceased died on 21.5.1986 and father of the
deceased had died 9 months prior to the death of the Devinder
Kaur which was on 21.7.1985. If the statement of PW-7 in regard
to these demands for TV, Scooter and Fridge is true the same was
sometime in the year 1982 itself, whereas as per PW-8 the said
demand was after August, 1985, that is, after the death of the
father. This contradiction in regard to the timing of the demand is
a material contradiction which goes to the root of the prosecution
case and the same is not considered by the trial court. This
witness then states that none of the appellants, including A-2 the
husband of the deceased, visited the deceased for nearly 7 months
after the birth of her second child. This allegation which indicates
neglect or a mental torture of the deceased by the indifferent
attitude of A-2, in our opinion, is per se unbelievable because of
the letter Ex.DA to which we have already referred wherein this
witness himself wrote to A-2 requesting him and other members
of the family to attend the wedding of his brother Paramjit. This
letter was addressed on 10.3.1986 and in the said letter he
specifically says to convey his respect and love to his sister and
children and to bring them to the wedding which means by that
time the deceased was already in her in-laws house and the
allegation of PW-8 that the deceased was not taken back from her
maternal home for 7 months after the delivery of the second child
by A-2 stands falsified. Then again this witness is not very sure
whether various demands made by the appellants were towards
dowry or towards the birth of a male child because in one part of
his examination he states : "The reason for their in-difference was
that on the birth of the male child, they should be given
something by the parents of Devinder Kaur. We asked the
accused party to have patience and that we would give something
after the crop ripens and the harvests done". From this part of the
evidence of PW-8, we get an impression that demand for TV,
scooter and fridge was because of the birth of a male child and
not as a part of dowry. This discrepancy between the evidence of
PW-7 and PW-8 is also not considered by the courts below. It is
to be seen from the evidence of this witness that he was on
regular visiting terms with his sister and practically every Sunday
or alternate Sunday he used to visit her. We find it extremely
difficult to accept the post death allegation of these witnesses for
the unlawful demands when the relationship between them was
such that the appellants were invited for every function in the
house of PW-7 and they attended those functions. PW-8 was a
regular visitor to the house of the accused and inspite of all that
the appellants would indulge in such activity of cruelty and
harassment which would compel the deceased to commit suicide.
From the above discussion of the evidence of this witness, we are
unable to come to the conclusion that the prosecution has
established the allegation of demand made by these appellants.
The next witness whose evidence requires consideration by
us is PW-13, Kulwant Singh, a family friend. He in his evidence
stated that during his life time the father of the deceased used to
tell him that the deceased Devinder Kaur was sad and unhappy
after the marriage and she was being harassed and ill-treated on
account of bringing insufficient dowry. He also stated before the
court that the deceased's father used to tell him that the accused
were demanding more dowry that is TV, scooter, fridge etc. The
defence had objected to this answer of the witness on the ground
that this witness was trying to prove the statement of a deceased
person. This objection was overruled by the Court on the ground
that the witness was deposing about the fact from his knowledge
which he had acquired in his routine life. We do not agree with
the trial court that what was being spoken to by this witness in
regard to harassment and ill treatment on account of insufficient
dowry by the witness was a fact which he had known personally,
because he was actually referring to the statement of the deceased
father of Devinder Kaur and not to a fact based on his personally
acquired knowledge. After the said objection was raised, this
witness tried to import some personal knowledge by stating that
he had an occasion to meet the deceased Devinder Kaur at Banur
in Rajpura Tehsil of Patiala Distt. where per chance he met the
deceased when deceased mentioned to him that she was on way
to her in-laws but was not sure what was in store for her there.
This witness also says that the deceased further mentioned that
after the death of her father and after mutation of her father's
property was sanctioned, the bitterness between the sides had
increased. We have no doubt that this is a statement made by the
witness only to improve upon his earlier inadmissible statement. This is clear from the answer given by this witness in the cross-
examination when he states that the police did not enquire from
him in the hospital at the time of death of Devinder Kaur nor he
had volunteered to mention any of the above facts stated by him
in his examination-in-chief to the police at that time. It is also
relevant to note that his statement was recorded by the police for
the first time on 25.7.1986 nearly two months after the incident. He also admits in the cross-examination that he does not
remember the day, date or the month when father of the deceased
mentioned to him about the ill treatment of his daughter. Even the
fact of the deceased Devinder Kaur meeting this witness at Banur
in Rajpura Tehsil is also highly doubtful because in the cross-
examination he states that at the time when he met the deceased
at the said place she was accompanied by her brother Jaspal
Singh PW-8, but PW-8 does not corroborate this fact. Therefore,
in our opinion, to base a conviction on the evidence of this
witness would be highly dangerous.
The next witness relied upon by the prosecution to establish
its case is PW-14 Gurbux Singh who is the maternal uncle of the
deceased. He in his evidence states that after two or three months
of the solemnization of the marriage, Devinder Kaur started
complaining that she was being harassed. This was confirmed to
him by his brother-in-law, who was the father of the deceased
Devinder Kaur. This statement again in our opinion is not
admissible because he has no personal knowledge about the
harassment meted out to the deceased Devinder Kaur but he was
only repeated what his brother-in-law had stated to him. Then
again there is a contradiction in regard to the timing of the
demand which according to the information of this witness was
two months of the marriage, while PW-8 specifically stated such
demands started coming in after the death of his father about
which we have already expressed our view herein above. PW-14
also states in his evidence that with the passage of time he learnt
that the accused had asserted for a share also in the property of
his brother-in-law which again is mere hear say notice of which
cannot be taken for basing a conviction. In the cross-examination
this witness stated that he had mentioned in his statement to the
police about the aforesaid three demands made by the accused,
but when confronted with his previous statement, it was noticed
by the court that no such statement was made. He also admits in
the cross-examination that he had no occasion to visit the in-laws
of Devinder Kaur in Ambala after her marriage and he did not
receive any letter or other message from Devinder Kaur or from
her father or her mother or any other relation of the deceased
intimating that Devinder Kaur was being harassed on account of
demand for more dowry. This admission clearly goes to show
that whatever he spoke in the examination-in-chief about the
demand made by the accused was not based on his personal
knowledge but on what he heard from others. He further admits
in his cross-examination that in the statement before the police he
did not say that Devinder Kaur committed suicide under pressure
of the accused because of the demand of dowry. In our opinion,
such evidence which is not based on personal knowledge of the
witness cannot be the foundation for basing a conviction.
Having discussed the oral evidence led by the prosecution,
we will now consider certain circumstances relied by the trial
court to hold the appellants guilty of the offences charged. These
circumstances have already been discussed briefly by us
hereinabove but since the trial court has placed considerable
reliance on these circumstances, we think it appropriate to deal
with the circumstances once again somewhat elaborately. One
such circumstance taken note of by the trial court is based on an
allegation made by PWs.7 and 8 that A-2 did not go to the
parental house of the deceased Devinder Kaur after her second
delivery for nearly 7 months which circumstance according to the
trial court, indicated the indifference of A-2 towards the deceased
because of the fact that the family of the deceased did not fulfil
his and his family's demands. In our opinion, a perusal of the
evidence led by the prosecution in this regard itself shows that
this is a non-existent circumstance. The second child was born on
10.8.1985. According to the evidence of PWs.7 and 8, A-2 did
not come to their house for 7 months after the birth of this child
which would mean that till about March, 1986 A-2 did not visit
his in-laws nor did he take his wife and children to his own
house. This statement is clearly disproved by the documentary
and other oral evidence found in the record. Ex. P.28, a letter written by deceased Devinder Kaur to A-2 which itself shows that
A-2 wanted her and the children to come back to the house of A-
2 at the earliest but she could not come because of the illness of
her first child. She indicated in the said letter that she would
come as soon as the child gets well. Thus a reading of this letter
Ex.P.28 shows that it is not because of A-2 that her stay was
prolonged in her mother's house. Ex. DA a letter written on
10.3.1986 by PW-8 to A-2 shows that by then deceased and her
children were already in the house of A-2 and PW-8 wanted A-2
and his family along with the deceased and her children to attend
the wedding of his younger brother which was fixed for
23.3.1986. If really deceased Devinder Kaur and their children
were still in the house of her mother the question of PW-8
requesting A-2 to bring them for the wedding and conveying his
love and respect to them would not have arisen. As a matter of
fact it has come in evidence that the entire family of A-2 along
with the deceased had attended the wedding of the younger
brother of PW-8. Thus it is clear from the prosecution case itself
that the allegation of neglect as made out in the evidence of
PWs.7 and 8 is wholly incorrect.
Next circumstance relied by the trial court as noted
hereinabove is that the accused had made a demand for a share in
the property of deceased Devinder Kaur's father. Like the earlier
circumstance we have dealt with this somewhat briefly while
discussing the oral evidence but at the cost of repetition we think
it necessary to further discuss this aspect once again. The material
in support of this allegation is found in the evidence of PWs.7, 8,
13 and 14. While discussing their evidence we have noted that
even according to the prosecution none of these witnesses except
PWs.8 and 12, had ever been told by Devinder Kaur personally
about this demand. So far as PW-7 is concerned she stated that
she came to know of this demand through PW-12 Ajmer Singh
but Ajmer Singh has not supported PW-7 in this regard. PW-7
had not stated to the Police also in her previous statement about
this part of the demand. Therefore it is clear that this witness is
trying to improve her case for the first time in the court. Similar
is the evidence of PW-14 Gurbax Singh, the uncle of the
deceased who also makes a reference to this demand which he
allegedly came to know from the father of the deceased. This
witness too has not stated before the Police that such a demand
was made by the accused when his statement was recorded by the
Police. Therefore, even this witness has unabashedly tried to
improve his evidence before the court. So far as PW-13 Kulwant
Singh is concerned he too did not have any personal knowledge
of this demand and says in his evidence that he came to know of
this demand through deceased Devinder Kaur herself at Banur in
Rajpura Tehsil when he met her during a chance meeting there.
This witness says that at that point of time PW-8 the brother of
the deceased was also present but PW-8 does not support this
evidence of PW-13. That apart this witness was present at the
time when the dead bodies were brought to the hospital and when
the Police arrived and registered a case but did not volunteer any
statement to the Police. His statement was recorded only on
25.7.1986 nearly 2 months after the incident hence in our opinion
it is not safe to place any reliance on his evidence also. It is of
some importance to note here PW-8 the brother of the deceased
in his evidence does not state anything about this demand for a
share in his father's property. Therefore in our opinion this
allegation of pressurising the deceased into demanding a share in
her father's property, the prosecution has failed to establish.
Hence this circumstance also does not support the prosecution
case.
The next circumstance relied by the trial court is the fact
that these accused persons did not attend the funeral of the
deceased after their bodies were released from the hospital. From
their absence at the time of the funeral, the trial court has drawn
an inference against the appellants which according to the court
indicated the guilty conscience of the appellants. The trial court
herein failed to take note of the fact that in the first information
report lodged with the police by the family of the deceased the
appellants and other members of the family who have since been
acquitted, were accused of murdering the deceased and her
children. A case in this regard was also sought to be registered.
PW-14 who is the maternal uncle of the deceased and also a
retired senior IAS Officer in his evidence stated : "My statement
before the police then was that Devinder Kaur and her two
children had been murdered by the accused by setting fire to
them. This was the information which was given to me that day."
In such a situation when a murder charge is levelled against an
accused, it is hardly possible to expect the accused to be present
at such funeral. Therefore, this circumstance also cannot be taken
as an incriminating circumstance or a circumstance which
corroborates the other evidence led by the prosecution against the
accused.
It is based on these erroneous inferences drawn on unproved
facts and placing reliance on statements of interested witnesses
whose evidence has not stood the test of cross-examination, the
trial court came to a wrong conclusion as to the guilt of the
accused persons. It is to be noted that 3 letters Ex. P-28, DA and
DB which though not very proximate in time clearly show that
there was no demand as has been alleged by the prosecution by
the accused and the contents of the said letter clearly show that
the allegation made after the death of Devinder Kaur of dowry
demand or harassment leading to cruelty is unsubstantiated. For
all these reasons we are of the opinion that the trial court
committed serious error in coming to the conclusion that the
prosecution had established its case against the appellants.
There is no need for us to discuss the reasons given by the
High Court independently because we are in agreement with the
argument of learned counsel for the appellants that there has been
no application of mind by the High Court which is evident from a
perusal of the judgment of the said court. The learned counsel has
taken us through paragraphs after paragraphs of the judgment of
the High Court including the conclusions which, in our opinion,
are nothing but paraphrasing of the judgment of the trial court
without any application of mind whatsoever. So much so even
factual errors committed by the trial court have been faithfully
copied by the High Court e.g. the trial court at one place
erroneously recorded that the deceased Devinder Kaur had given
birth to two female children (See P.19 of the trial court) This
error is also copied by the High Court in its judgment (See Page
56 of the High Court). The High Court failed to notice its legal
responsibility of discussing the evidence independently and
recording its findings on the basis of such independent
assessment of its own, because it is the first court of appeal on
facts. The reasons given by us for rejecting the findings of the
trial court, therefore, should ipso facto apply to reject the finding
of the High Court if the same could be called a finding at all.
For the reasons stated, this appeal succeeds. The judgments
and sentences passed by the courts below are set aside. If the
appellants are on bail, their bail bonds shall stand discharged. If
they are in custody, they shall be released forthwith.
PETITIONER:
Sakatar Singh & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
State of Haryana
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/04/2004
BENCH:
N.Santosh Hegde & B.P.Singh.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
SANTOSH HEGDE,J.
The first appellant before us is the father of the second
appellant and the third appellant is the wife of the first appellant.
These appellants and three others who are sisters of second
appellant herein were charged for offences punishable under
Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 IPC before the
Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala who after trial acquitted
accused Nos. 4 to 6 while convicted the appellants herein for
offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC
read with Section 34 IPC. The first appellant Sakatar Singh was
sentenced for offence punishable under Section 306 for four
years RI and a fine of Rs.500/- and in default in payment of
fine to undergo further RI for three months, while he was
sentenced for an offence punishable under Section 498A for
two years RI and a fine of Rs.200/- and in default in payment of
fine to undergo further RI for one month. The second appellant
Kirpal Singh was sentenced for seven years RI for offence
punishable under Section 306 IPC and a fine of Rs.500/- and in
default of payment of fine to undergo further RI for three
months, he was also sentenced to two years RI under Section
498A IPC and a fine of Rs. 200/- and in default in payment of
fine to undergo further RI for one month. The third appellant
Smt. Joginder Kaur was sentenced to undergo three years RI for
offence under Section 306 and a fine of Rs.200/- and in default
in payment of fine to undergo further RI for one month. While
for offence under Section 498A IPC, she was sentenced to
undergo RI for two years and a fine of Rs.100/- and in default
in payment of fine to undergo RI for one month.
The appellants herein preferred an appeal before the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh against the
judgment and conviction of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge,
Ambala being Criminal Appeal No. 322-SB/87 and the said
appeal having been dismissed confirming the conviction and
sentence awarded on the appellants by the Sessions Court the
appellants are now before us in this appeal.
The prosecution case briefly stated is as follows:-
Deceased Devinder Kaur was married to second appellant
Kirpal Singh in the year 1982 and they had two issues from the
aid marriage a girl by name Gurdip Kaur who was two years
old and a boy named Bablu aged nine months on the date of
incident. The accused persons with their unmarried daughters
and said Devinder Kaur with her children were living at
Layalpur Basti in Ambala City. The prosecution alleges within
two months of the marriage of the second appellant to said
Devinder Kaur the appellants and their daughters started making
unlawful demand for TV, scooter and fridge which was not
fulfilled by the parents of said Devinder Kaur. It is also stated
that after the birth of the second child none from the family of
her in-laws i.e. family of the accused had come to see her at her
maternal home situated at Landran because they were not happy
with the family of Devinder Kaur for not satisfying their
demands. The prosecution further alleges about nine months
prior to the date of incident which happened to be on 21.5.1986
father of said Devinder Kaur died and on his death the
appellants were forcing said Devinder Kaur to make a
demand for share in the family property and this having not
acceeded to by said Devinder Kaur she was subjected to
harassment and cruelty. It is the further case of the prosecution
that mother of said Devinder Kaur (PW-7) had visited the house
of the appellants on 18.5.1986 when she found said Devinder
Kaur in tears and during her said visit she did not speak to PW-7
since her mother-in-law would not allow her to do so. The
further case of the prosecution is that on 21.5.1986 between 9
and 10 a.m. in the house of the appellants said Devinder Kaur
committed suicide along with her two minor children by
pouring kerosene and burning herself and the children. The
prosecution alleges that A-1 took the burnt bodies of the
deceased to the hospital and information in regard to this
incident was conveyed to the family of Devinder Kaur through
PW-12 (Ajmer Singh). On hearing the said news, PW-7 and
other members of the family rushed to Ambala and on coming to
know that her daughter and grand children were murdered by the
appellants, the mother of the deceased (PW-7) lodged a
complaint at about 4.00 p.m. on 21.5.1986. The bodies in
question were then taken to Landran the village of PW-7 and
cremated there. It is also alleged that no member of the
appellants family attended the last rites of the deceased.
Based on the complaint lodged by PW-7 though originally
a crime under Section 302 IPC was registered against the
appellants, after investigation a chargesheet was filed for
offences under Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34
IPC and during the course of the trial the prosecution examined
as many as 16 witnesses out of whom it relied on the evidence
of PW-7 mother of the deceased, PW-8 the brother of the
deceased, PW-12 a family friend of the deceased and PW-14
the maternal uncle of the deceased to establish the case of
cruelty and harassment meted out to said Devinder Kaur
because of which she was forced to commit suicide by burning
herself along with her minor children. The trial court accepting
the evidence of the said prosecution witnesses found the
appellants guilty as charged while it acquitted accused Nos. 4 to
6 who were the daughters of appellant No.1 on the ground that
the prosecution had not established its case as against these
appellants. In appeal as stated above the High Court has agreed
the findings of the trial court.
Shri Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants contended that the trial court has proceeded on the
mere ipse dixit of the four witnesses examined by the
prosecution to establish the case of alleged cruelty and
harassment meted out by the appellants to the deceased without
really there being any legal material to prove the guilt of the
appellants. He pointed out as per explanation to Section 498A of
the Indian Penal Code, 'cruelty' has been defined which
definition also holds good for establishing the guilt under
Section 306 IPC and in the instant case except the fact that
these witnesses have orally stated that there was some demand
for TV, scooter and fridge as also demand for share in the
property of the deceased father, no acceptable material
whatsoever has been produced by the prosecution to either
establish those facts or to prove that pursuant to the said demand
the appellants in any manner committed any act which would
have driven the deceased to commit suicide or harassed the
deceased in any manner with a view to coerce her to meet the
unlawful demand of the appellants. He submitted that the trial
court did not look into the necessary ingredients of Section 498A
and 306 IPC while coming to the conclusion that the appellants
were guilty of the offence charged. It was the argument of the
learned counsel for the appellants that the trial court obviously
was under an impression that even a legal demand, by itself
without anything more would constitute cruelty which the learned
counsel submits is wholly erroneous. The learned counsel also
pointed out that whatever evidence was produced by the
prosecution to establish the so-called illegal demand was
merely hear say and not even admissible under Section 32 of the
Evidence Act, and none of the witnesses who spoke as to the
demand made by the appellants had any personal knowledge
about the said demand. Therefore, even in regard to the alleged
demand accepted by the trial court the learned counsel
submitted the same cannot be sustained because the same is based
on inadmissible evidence.
Coming to the judgment of the High Court which has
confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial
court, the learned counsel submitted that there has been no
application of mind whatsoever by the High Court which is the
first appellate forum and which is duty bound to re-appreciate
the evidence. He pointed out that a bare reading of the judgment
of the High Court would show that the same is nothing but a
copy of the judgment of the trial court both in regard to the
narration of facts as also in regard to the findings.
Shri Vinay Kumar Garg, learned counsel appearing for the
State however contended that it is clear from the evidence of PWs
7, 8, 12 and 14 that the appellants had made certain unlawful
demands because of which the deceased committed suicide. It is
the contention of the learned counsel that once an unlawful
demand is established nothing more is required to be proved that
pursuant to the demand there was any other action or overt act
of cruelty. On the said basis, learned counsel submitted that the
findings of the courts below being concurrent this appeal is liable
to be dismissed.
Having heard the learned counsel and perusing the records,
we notice that since it is the contention of the appellants that the
High Court being the first court of appeal on facts, has not applied
its mind independently to the facts of the case and it has blindly
copied the findings of the trial court, the appellants have lost the
benefit of right of appeal because of which their case is
prejudiced, we assuming for the time being it to be so, think at this
belated stage a remand is not an appropriate remedy. Therefore,
we will consider the material on record ourselves to re-appreciate
the evidence adduced in this case and determine the guilt or
innocence of the appellants.
The allegations against the appellants of cruelty is primarily
based on the following facts :
(1) That the accused started harassing and ill treating
Devinder Kaur two or three months after the
marriage by demanding Television, Scooter and
Fridge;
(2) The family of the deceased has been paying
money to the deceased in instalments to satisfy
the demands of the appellants. Sometime
Rs.2000/- and sometimes Rs.3000/- were paid for
this purpose;
(3) After the death of the father of the deceased, the
family of the deceased were compelling the
deceased to make a demand for her share in the
family property.
(4) That after the birth of the second child the
appellants did not take back the deceased and the
children from her maternal home for nearly 7
months.
(5) The appellants were not permitting the deceased
to talk to her family members.
(6) When PW-8 brother of the deceased visited her,
the deceased had asked him to arrange funds to
meet the demands of her in-laws and that they
were harassing her because of which she was sad.
In law, the prosecution has to prove the fact that the victim
was subjected to cruelty or harassment, and such cruelty should
be one which comes within the explanation to Section 498A
which defines "cruelty".
In the above background, we will now consider the
evidence led by the prosecution to establish the charge levelled
against the appellants. In this process, we will first examine the
letter written by the deceased to her mother. Though this letter
does not mention the date, there is no dispute that the same was
posted on 20.5.1986 which is evident from the postal seal found
on the envelope which would be a date prior to the incident
leading to the death of Devinder Kaur and the children. The
contents of the letter indicates what transpired during her
mother's visit to her in-laws house and does not anywhere even
remotely indicate any demand made by her in-laws. It only
reflects the attitude of the deceased towards her in-laws and that
she entertained a feeling that her mother was not properly treated
by her mother-in-law during her last visit. The letter also
indicates that while the deceased did not wish that her mother
should visit her in-laws' place, her brother could do so which is
clear from the following statement in the said letter : "Mother do
not worry about me. I have make up my will power. When I go
angry then I also utter a few things. Mother send brother here,
you need not come because they are after your blood." In the said
letter she also complained against her brother's wife accepting a
Shagun of Rs.20/- from her mother-in-law and says that the same
should be returned. A reading of the above letter does indicate
that her relationship with her mother-in-law was not good but at
the same time she herself was prone to get angry at times and was
prepared to retort. In our considered opinion, this letter does not,
in any manner, indicate either there was any unlawful demand
from her in-laws or pursuant to such demand there was any
harassment leading to cruelty.
In this context, it will be appropriate for us to consider the
contents of two other letters brought on record by the defence.
One such latter is dated 10.3.1986 marked at Ext.DA written by
PW-8 to the husband of the deceased (A-2). Of course, this is a
letter written about two months before the death of the deceased.
At this stage, we must note the fact that PW-8 has denied having
written this letter but PW-7 the mother admits the letter being that
of her son PW-8. This letter refers to the arrangement of the
marriage of deceased's brother and requests the appellants to
attend the marriage function. The relevant portion of the letter
reads thus: "You will glad to know that the marriage of Paramjit
has been fixed for 23.3.1986, Sunday. You may keep ready. We
will drop letter. Pay my respect to Maserji and Massiji." It also
asked A-2 to bring his sister (the deceased) and her children. This
letter indicates two facts that as on 10.3.1986 the relationship
between the parties was still cordial and as on that date deceased
and her children were in her in-laws house. The next letter which
is also relied upon by the defence is marked Ex.DB dated
20.2.1986 is from the deceased to her husband (A-2) written
about three months prior to the date of incident. The contents of
this letter show that A-2 was corresponding with her and she was
replying his letter though belatedly because of the illness of her
daughter. She also requested him to reply and indicates that she
was eagerly waiting for his reply. She also indicates in the said
letter that she was planning to come back on Wednesday or
Thursday next. The said letter further indicates that A-2 wanted
her to come back within 4 or 5 days but she had overstayed in her
paternal home. Ex.DA and DB prove one other fact that between
20.2.1986 and 10.3.1986 the deceased and her children had
returned to the matrimonial home and the prosecution case that
for 7 months after the birth of the second child, the deceased was
not brought to her matrimonial home is wholly false. That apart
none of these letters indicate that there was any demand from the
appellants for TV, scooter or fridge.
It is in this background, the prosecution primarily relies on
the evidence of PWs.7 and 9, that is, the mother and brother to
establish the prosecution case.
We will now examine whether such allegations stand
proved by the evidence of these two witnesses.
PW-7 the mother in her evidence states that her daughter
was married to A-2 about 4 years prior to the date of her evidence
and the accused started harassing and ill treating the deceased two
to three months after the marriage by demanding TV, scooter and
fridge. She also says that the deceased was asked by the accused
to arrange for funds and pursuant to such demand she had been
sending money in instalments of Rs.2000/- sometimes and some
other time Rs.3000/-. She further says that when her elder son
PW-8 visited the house of the accused he had to assure them that
he would arrange for their every demand item by item after the
crop matured for harvesting. She then makes an omnibus
statement that Devinder Kaur (the deceased) was being harassed
by her husband Kirpal Singh accused, by father-in- law Sakatar
Singh, by mother-in-law Joginder Kaur and by her sister's-in-
law, namely, Palvinder, Jasvinder and Kulvinder. She also makes
a statement that the accused person had demanded the deceased
to stake a claim for a share in her father's property which the
deceased refused to do.
In the cross-examination when she was asked how she came
to know of these demands of the appellants for TV, scooter,
fridge and money, she stated that she came to know the same
from the letters written by her daughter but she failed to produce
those letters because of which an adverse inference will have to
be drawn. Further nowhere in her entire evidence she has stated
that the deceased at any point of time had personally told her
about these demands. In the absence of such material, more so
because of the fact this witness herself does not say that the
deceased told her orally about these demands, and the alleged
letters having not been produced, this part of her evidence will
have to be treated as not based on personal knowledge but as an
opinion of hers, and as such the same is inadmissible in evidence.
Therefore, the prosecution cannot rely upon such evidence to
base a conviction. Even the demand of the in-laws in deceased's
father's property was not told to PW-7 by the deceased but PW-7
was allegedly told about this by Ajmer Singh PW-12, but PW-12
does not support PW-7 in this regard. That apart in the cross-
examination when it was pointed out to her that she had not
mentioned in her previous statement about this demand for
inheritance in deceased father's property, she stated that she had
told the Investigating Agency, but the same was not found in the
said statement of hers. It is also clear from her evidence in the
cross-examination that she had not even told the Investigating
Agency about the demand for money in instalments as spoken to
by her in her examination-in- chief. It is to be noticed further that
even though she in her examination-in-chief stated that when
PW-8 visited the deceased a few days before the incident in
question and the deceased had complained to PW-8 about the
demand by her in-laws, PW-8 in his evidence does not support
PW-7 in this regard. From the above it is clear
that the evidence of PW-7 is of no assistance to the prosecution
to establish the fact that there was any demand, much less an
unlawful demand at all by the appellants on the deceased.
The trial court, in our opinion,
seriously erred in placing reliance on inadmissible part of PW-7's
evidence and ignoring the omissions and improvements established
by the defence in the course of cross examination of PW-7.
We will now consider the evidence of PW-8 who is the
brother of the deceased who in his evidence has stated that the
accused had started harassing and mal-treating the deceased for
more dowry and that they were complaining that she had not
brought anything significant in the dowry and they expected TV,
scooter and fridge in the dowry. While considering this part of his
evidence, it is necessary to note that he in the latter part of his
evidence has stated that these demands were made by the accused
persons after his father died which was on 21.7.1985 (20 days
before the birth of second child of the deceased Devinder Kaur
which was on 10.8.1985). Whereas PW-7 in her evidence had
stated that the demands for TV, Scooter and Fridge was made two
months after the marriage of the deceased. We have noticed that
the marriage of the deceased took place sometime in the year
1982 and the deceased died on 21.5.1986 and father of the
deceased had died 9 months prior to the death of the Devinder
Kaur which was on 21.7.1985. If the statement of PW-7 in regard
to these demands for TV, Scooter and Fridge is true the same was
sometime in the year 1982 itself, whereas as per PW-8 the said
demand was after August, 1985, that is, after the death of the
father. This contradiction in regard to the timing of the demand is
a material contradiction which goes to the root of the prosecution
case and the same is not considered by the trial court. This
witness then states that none of the appellants, including A-2 the
husband of the deceased, visited the deceased for nearly 7 months
after the birth of her second child. This allegation which indicates
neglect or a mental torture of the deceased by the indifferent
attitude of A-2, in our opinion, is per se unbelievable because of
the letter Ex.DA to which we have already referred wherein this
witness himself wrote to A-2 requesting him and other members
of the family to attend the wedding of his brother Paramjit. This
letter was addressed on 10.3.1986 and in the said letter he
specifically says to convey his respect and love to his sister and
children and to bring them to the wedding which means by that
time the deceased was already in her in-laws house and the
allegation of PW-8 that the deceased was not taken back from her
maternal home for 7 months after the delivery of the second child
by A-2 stands falsified. Then again this witness is not very sure
whether various demands made by the appellants were towards
dowry or towards the birth of a male child because in one part of
his examination he states : "The reason for their in-difference was
that on the birth of the male child, they should be given
something by the parents of Devinder Kaur. We asked the
accused party to have patience and that we would give something
after the crop ripens and the harvests done". From this part of the
evidence of PW-8, we get an impression that demand for TV,
scooter and fridge was because of the birth of a male child and
not as a part of dowry. This discrepancy between the evidence of
PW-7 and PW-8 is also not considered by the courts below. It is
to be seen from the evidence of this witness that he was on
regular visiting terms with his sister and practically every Sunday
or alternate Sunday he used to visit her. We find it extremely
difficult to accept the post death allegation of these witnesses for
the unlawful demands when the relationship between them was
such that the appellants were invited for every function in the
house of PW-7 and they attended those functions. PW-8 was a
regular visitor to the house of the accused and inspite of all that
the appellants would indulge in such activity of cruelty and
harassment which would compel the deceased to commit suicide.
From the above discussion of the evidence of this witness, we are
unable to come to the conclusion that the prosecution has
established the allegation of demand made by these appellants.
The next witness whose evidence requires consideration by
us is PW-13, Kulwant Singh, a family friend. He in his evidence
stated that during his life time the father of the deceased used to
tell him that the deceased Devinder Kaur was sad and unhappy
after the marriage and she was being harassed and ill-treated on
account of bringing insufficient dowry. He also stated before the
court that the deceased's father used to tell him that the accused
were demanding more dowry that is TV, scooter, fridge etc. The
defence had objected to this answer of the witness on the ground
that this witness was trying to prove the statement of a deceased
person. This objection was overruled by the Court on the ground
that the witness was deposing about the fact from his knowledge
which he had acquired in his routine life. We do not agree with
the trial court that what was being spoken to by this witness in
regard to harassment and ill treatment on account of insufficient
dowry by the witness was a fact which he had known personally,
because he was actually referring to the statement of the deceased
father of Devinder Kaur and not to a fact based on his personally
acquired knowledge. After the said objection was raised, this
witness tried to import some personal knowledge by stating that
he had an occasion to meet the deceased Devinder Kaur at Banur
in Rajpura Tehsil of Patiala Distt. where per chance he met the
deceased when deceased mentioned to him that she was on way
to her in-laws but was not sure what was in store for her there.
This witness also says that the deceased further mentioned that
after the death of her father and after mutation of her father's
property was sanctioned, the bitterness between the sides had
increased. We have no doubt that this is a statement made by the
witness only to improve upon his earlier inadmissible statement. This is clear from the answer given by this witness in the cross-
examination when he states that the police did not enquire from
him in the hospital at the time of death of Devinder Kaur nor he
had volunteered to mention any of the above facts stated by him
in his examination-in-chief to the police at that time. It is also
relevant to note that his statement was recorded by the police for
the first time on 25.7.1986 nearly two months after the incident. He also admits in the cross-examination that he does not
remember the day, date or the month when father of the deceased
mentioned to him about the ill treatment of his daughter. Even the
fact of the deceased Devinder Kaur meeting this witness at Banur
in Rajpura Tehsil is also highly doubtful because in the cross-
examination he states that at the time when he met the deceased
at the said place she was accompanied by her brother Jaspal
Singh PW-8, but PW-8 does not corroborate this fact. Therefore,
in our opinion, to base a conviction on the evidence of this
witness would be highly dangerous.
The next witness relied upon by the prosecution to establish
its case is PW-14 Gurbux Singh who is the maternal uncle of the
deceased. He in his evidence states that after two or three months
of the solemnization of the marriage, Devinder Kaur started
complaining that she was being harassed. This was confirmed to
him by his brother-in-law, who was the father of the deceased
Devinder Kaur. This statement again in our opinion is not
admissible because he has no personal knowledge about the
harassment meted out to the deceased Devinder Kaur but he was
only repeated what his brother-in-law had stated to him. Then
again there is a contradiction in regard to the timing of the
demand which according to the information of this witness was
two months of the marriage, while PW-8 specifically stated such
demands started coming in after the death of his father about
which we have already expressed our view herein above. PW-14
also states in his evidence that with the passage of time he learnt
that the accused had asserted for a share also in the property of
his brother-in-law which again is mere hear say notice of which
cannot be taken for basing a conviction. In the cross-examination
this witness stated that he had mentioned in his statement to the
police about the aforesaid three demands made by the accused,
but when confronted with his previous statement, it was noticed
by the court that no such statement was made. He also admits in
the cross-examination that he had no occasion to visit the in-laws
of Devinder Kaur in Ambala after her marriage and he did not
receive any letter or other message from Devinder Kaur or from
her father or her mother or any other relation of the deceased
intimating that Devinder Kaur was being harassed on account of
demand for more dowry. This admission clearly goes to show
that whatever he spoke in the examination-in-chief about the
demand made by the accused was not based on his personal
knowledge but on what he heard from others. He further admits
in his cross-examination that in the statement before the police he
did not say that Devinder Kaur committed suicide under pressure
of the accused because of the demand of dowry. In our opinion,
such evidence which is not based on personal knowledge of the
witness cannot be the foundation for basing a conviction.
Having discussed the oral evidence led by the prosecution,
we will now consider certain circumstances relied by the trial
court to hold the appellants guilty of the offences charged. These
circumstances have already been discussed briefly by us
hereinabove but since the trial court has placed considerable
reliance on these circumstances, we think it appropriate to deal
with the circumstances once again somewhat elaborately. One
such circumstance taken note of by the trial court is based on an
allegation made by PWs.7 and 8 that A-2 did not go to the
parental house of the deceased Devinder Kaur after her second
delivery for nearly 7 months which circumstance according to the
trial court, indicated the indifference of A-2 towards the deceased
because of the fact that the family of the deceased did not fulfil
his and his family's demands. In our opinion, a perusal of the
evidence led by the prosecution in this regard itself shows that
this is a non-existent circumstance. The second child was born on
10.8.1985. According to the evidence of PWs.7 and 8, A-2 did
not come to their house for 7 months after the birth of this child
which would mean that till about March, 1986 A-2 did not visit
his in-laws nor did he take his wife and children to his own
house. This statement is clearly disproved by the documentary
and other oral evidence found in the record. Ex. P.28, a letter written by deceased Devinder Kaur to A-2 which itself shows that
A-2 wanted her and the children to come back to the house of A-
2 at the earliest but she could not come because of the illness of
her first child. She indicated in the said letter that she would
come as soon as the child gets well. Thus a reading of this letter
Ex.P.28 shows that it is not because of A-2 that her stay was
prolonged in her mother's house. Ex. DA a letter written on
10.3.1986 by PW-8 to A-2 shows that by then deceased and her
children were already in the house of A-2 and PW-8 wanted A-2
and his family along with the deceased and her children to attend
the wedding of his younger brother which was fixed for
23.3.1986. If really deceased Devinder Kaur and their children
were still in the house of her mother the question of PW-8
requesting A-2 to bring them for the wedding and conveying his
love and respect to them would not have arisen. As a matter of
fact it has come in evidence that the entire family of A-2 along
with the deceased had attended the wedding of the younger
brother of PW-8. Thus it is clear from the prosecution case itself
that the allegation of neglect as made out in the evidence of
PWs.7 and 8 is wholly incorrect.
Next circumstance relied by the trial court as noted
hereinabove is that the accused had made a demand for a share in
the property of deceased Devinder Kaur's father. Like the earlier
circumstance we have dealt with this somewhat briefly while
discussing the oral evidence but at the cost of repetition we think
it necessary to further discuss this aspect once again. The material
in support of this allegation is found in the evidence of PWs.7, 8,
13 and 14. While discussing their evidence we have noted that
even according to the prosecution none of these witnesses except
PWs.8 and 12, had ever been told by Devinder Kaur personally
about this demand. So far as PW-7 is concerned she stated that
she came to know of this demand through PW-12 Ajmer Singh
but Ajmer Singh has not supported PW-7 in this regard. PW-7
had not stated to the Police also in her previous statement about
this part of the demand. Therefore it is clear that this witness is
trying to improve her case for the first time in the court. Similar
is the evidence of PW-14 Gurbax Singh, the uncle of the
deceased who also makes a reference to this demand which he
allegedly came to know from the father of the deceased. This
witness too has not stated before the Police that such a demand
was made by the accused when his statement was recorded by the
Police. Therefore, even this witness has unabashedly tried to
improve his evidence before the court. So far as PW-13 Kulwant
Singh is concerned he too did not have any personal knowledge
of this demand and says in his evidence that he came to know of
this demand through deceased Devinder Kaur herself at Banur in
Rajpura Tehsil when he met her during a chance meeting there.
This witness says that at that point of time PW-8 the brother of
the deceased was also present but PW-8 does not support this
evidence of PW-13. That apart this witness was present at the
time when the dead bodies were brought to the hospital and when
the Police arrived and registered a case but did not volunteer any
statement to the Police. His statement was recorded only on
25.7.1986 nearly 2 months after the incident hence in our opinion
it is not safe to place any reliance on his evidence also. It is of
some importance to note here PW-8 the brother of the deceased
in his evidence does not state anything about this demand for a
share in his father's property. Therefore in our opinion this
allegation of pressurising the deceased into demanding a share in
her father's property, the prosecution has failed to establish.
Hence this circumstance also does not support the prosecution
case.
The next circumstance relied by the trial court is the fact
that these accused persons did not attend the funeral of the
deceased after their bodies were released from the hospital. From
their absence at the time of the funeral, the trial court has drawn
an inference against the appellants which according to the court
indicated the guilty conscience of the appellants. The trial court
herein failed to take note of the fact that in the first information
report lodged with the police by the family of the deceased the
appellants and other members of the family who have since been
acquitted, were accused of murdering the deceased and her
children. A case in this regard was also sought to be registered.
PW-14 who is the maternal uncle of the deceased and also a
retired senior IAS Officer in his evidence stated : "My statement
before the police then was that Devinder Kaur and her two
children had been murdered by the accused by setting fire to
them. This was the information which was given to me that day."
In such a situation when a murder charge is levelled against an
accused, it is hardly possible to expect the accused to be present
at such funeral. Therefore, this circumstance also cannot be taken
as an incriminating circumstance or a circumstance which
corroborates the other evidence led by the prosecution against the
accused.
It is based on these erroneous inferences drawn on unproved
facts and placing reliance on statements of interested witnesses
whose evidence has not stood the test of cross-examination, the
trial court came to a wrong conclusion as to the guilt of the
accused persons. It is to be noted that 3 letters Ex. P-28, DA and
DB which though not very proximate in time clearly show that
there was no demand as has been alleged by the prosecution by
the accused and the contents of the said letter clearly show that
the allegation made after the death of Devinder Kaur of dowry
demand or harassment leading to cruelty is unsubstantiated. For
all these reasons we are of the opinion that the trial court
committed serious error in coming to the conclusion that the
prosecution had established its case against the appellants.
There is no need for us to discuss the reasons given by the
High Court independently because we are in agreement with the
argument of learned counsel for the appellants that there has been
no application of mind by the High Court which is evident from a
perusal of the judgment of the said court. The learned counsel has
taken us through paragraphs after paragraphs of the judgment of
the High Court including the conclusions which, in our opinion,
are nothing but paraphrasing of the judgment of the trial court
without any application of mind whatsoever. So much so even
factual errors committed by the trial court have been faithfully
copied by the High Court e.g. the trial court at one place
erroneously recorded that the deceased Devinder Kaur had given
birth to two female children (See P.19 of the trial court) This
error is also copied by the High Court in its judgment (See Page
56 of the High Court). The High Court failed to notice its legal
responsibility of discussing the evidence independently and
recording its findings on the basis of such independent
assessment of its own, because it is the first court of appeal on
facts. The reasons given by us for rejecting the findings of the
trial court, therefore, should ipso facto apply to reject the finding
of the High Court if the same could be called a finding at all.
For the reasons stated, this appeal succeeds. The judgments
and sentences passed by the courts below are set aside. If the
appellants are on bail, their bail bonds shall stand discharged. If
they are in custody, they shall be released forthwith.
AP Police has criminal men- Annam Bhoomi Reddy is mis-user of 498A (APSP, 4th Bn Mamnoor)
This is an in-depth analysis and details of how educated father-in-laws (in general) are mis-using 498A (Dowry Prohibition Act), the case explained here are real facts about Assistant Commandant(DSP) Annam Bhoomi Reddy, 4th Bn, AP Special Police(APSP), MAMNOOR, Warangal. An ideal case study, since he is police official and mis-deeds done by him with law-in wrong hands.
4 daughters are alive. First Daughter name D. Sridevi w/o Late D. Rajashekar Reddy (died in encounter with naxalities in year 2003), she works in IG office, Hyderabad, she has two naughty children. Second daughter is Sreelatha my wife, mentally depressed person. Third Sripriya, an arrogant and clueless person. Fourth daughter is Sunitha, a silent person. Bharati is mother of Srilatha, she has symptoms of mental disorder, eats gutka! (gutka is banned in AP)
In April 2003, an engagement is performed between me and Sreelatha. During the marriage looks, Sreelatha looked good, initially found she has somewhat weird about behavior, since not having experience of talking females, thought this is natural. Her mother behavior, was more weird. Asked my parents, why they are like that, their answers was they did not found anything like that. This is arranged marriage by my lecturer M. Satyanaraya,Reader, LB College, Warangal, AP. He is also classmate of A. Bhoomi Reddy and NCC commandant. During college days, I was NCC Cadet Under Officer(CUO), so i trusted, since marriage proposal has been brought by my lecturer. He is cheater.
After the engagement, talks were going on fixing the marriage function hall, date, then call has been received saying Rajashekar Reddy, got killed by naxalities. He is native of Pamarru, Krishna District. I have attended the cremation. Marriage got postponed. I used to get calls from my fiance saying, lets perform marriage as soon as possible. After repeated reminder within 2 weeks, I told my parents and brother-in-law. I have asked my brother-in-law, he said, it is natural, since co-brother is died, she may be asking. They agreed to talk to father-in-law and fix a date. I have noticed, my fiance wrist got scar, that was not there before, i asked, reply was, it got cut during vegetable. And also saw, palm has swollen. I asked, Bhoomi Reddy, he too said the same.
Marriage performed on 20th June 2003 at Warangal, 200 people attended to bless the occassion, they sad news in their family, not many people were called.
On 21st June 2003, my wife is shown to Doctor in Warangal, she was suffering from Typhoid. Since i have been employed by Hyderabad based Company and father-in-law, then used to work in Hyderabad, we started saying together. After 10 days marriage, i received call saying, my wife has consumed thyroid tablets (her sister got thyroid deficiency),in my absence, asked the reason, her mother explained that she thinks her marriage was the reason, for the sister's husbands dead, unlucky.
On 15th July 2003 (i.e 25 days after marriage), my wife set ablaze., in my absence, Madhapur police station registered case Cr. No. 128/2003, my in-laws mis-guided Madhapur police and magistrate by saying incident was accident, believing that police closed Cr.No. 128/2003, whereas incident was suicide attempt, my wife attempted suicide due to her ill mental condition. This time too, i have asked the reason, got to know that she has been suffering from mental disorder, for several years before the marriage about 1999. Not sure, how she could manage study till B.Sc.
Later found,Dr. Khan, a psychiatrist prescription, dated 9th June 2003 (i.e. 11 days before my marriage) consulted before the marriage, please see prescription left-side. Got disbelieved and this is un-imaginable cheating.
On 19th June 2004 (i.e. exactly 1 year after marriage) my criminal minded father-in-law instructed to lodged false dowry harassment cases U/s 498A, DP 3,4 and 506 cases, Case #415/2004 Banjara Hills police station. My wife immature and mentally ill innocently followed instruction given by criminal mined father-in-law. My father-in-law is Assistant Commandant in Andhra Pradesh Special Police (APSP), presently working in 4th Bn, Mamnoor, Warangal. My father-in-law influenced Srilatha Reddy (my wife), B. Sudharshan Reddy and P. Sudhakar SI of Banjara Hills, Hyderabad and filed false case. They arrested even before the written complaint is given. Written complaint given at 6PM, whereas they arrested at 5PM. This is mis-use of law & order by A. Bhoomi Reddy (used his police position) and supported by B. Sudharshan Reddy and P. Sudhakar, as 498A arrest requires investigation, here before the complaint was given, I was arrested.
In the false case, included my whole family, 7 members. Filing false case is total misuse of law and is harassment on me and my family members. I beg for the justice. Now the case is pending before court of the honorable XIII M.M., Nampally, Hyderabad CC 362 of 2007.
After filing false case, my wife returned to marital life (i.e. 2 months of filing false 498A case), realizing her mistake and love towards me. We started living very happily along with beloved wife. My wife gave birth to loving child on 13th April 2007 at Bangalore (i.e marital house) . I have taken care of my wife excellently and hospital expenses were born by me.
Even after living 3 years happily, criminal minded father-in-law did not stop harassing me by false 498-A.
On 11th June 2007 (i.e. 2 months after child birth, and 3 years after filing false 498A) my wife left marital house in Bangalore and started living with her parent in Hyderabad. Reason for leaving house, told to me is, child needs my mother-in-law care and also she told is i have sold her kidney during child birth. Since she is suffering from mental disorder, i did not say anything.
Again my in-laws filled ears of my wife and now my wife is declining to come back to marital house. I was stopped by the check post guard, as per the instructions of my father-in-law (my father-in-law is Asst. Commandant in APSP, 4th Bn).
Searched various 498A sites and how they reacted.
29.08.2007: Through advocate sent issued legal notice Under Sec. 9 HMA to rejoin the conjual society, no response.
16.04.2008: Legal notice from my wife, asking consent for divorce. Demanding 15,00,000 as alimony and 20,000 per month.
05.05.2008: Responded to my wife's notice and asked her to rejoin conjual society
09.06.2008: My wife filed for divorce 493/2008 at LB Nagar, RR Dist (Hyderabad). I have filed counter and stating no-objection for divorce.
25.06.2008: I have filed for divorce at Warangal court
15.04.2009: My wife divorce petition got dismissed, due to no representation. I have kept attending the case regularly.
06.2009: My wife filed for Cr.Pc. 125 Maintenance.
04.2009: Cr 506, 290, 294 filed by my father-in-law, again it is mis-use of law.
In between received threatening calls from Bhujanga Rao, CI, Madhapur. Sateesh Babu, SI, Subhedari, Hanamkonda and also Bharat Kumar SI, Mamnoor (presently my father-in-law is DSP in APSP, Mamnoor) not to attempt to visit to see the child.
Even tried to settle with elders, he never turned up, than filing more number of cases.
Sent e-mail to explaining the harassment am undergoing by mis-use of law to "President of India" Ref: J4/PS/H-Pets/05/08, P2 255396 (no action taken so-far, only communication received till Old Airport PS, Bangalore ), Home Minister, Govt., India (no response). DGP, AP Police (no response), Human Rights Commission, AP (no response), IG APSP (no response), SP Warangal (no response), Chief Minister, AP (no response), Home Minister, AP (no response), Collector, Warangal, Chief Justice, AP (no repose). Till now, no help received.
This reminds me of
"All that is required for evil to prevail is for good men to do nothing. "
Through Assistant Commandant(DSP) APSP position, my father-in-law, filed several cases and harassing. I have been cheated, harassed by criminal Annam Bhoomi Reddy a police man.
My observations and conclusions, through this journey:
--- 498A has been abused by educated father-in-law and females
--- 498A has been abused by police daughters
--- Harassment and extortion is main objectives
--- Law & Order up keepers are un-responsive
--- Profession density-wise police is the highest law breakers
--- Area density-wise police station is the highest law breaking place
--- For every innocent harassed has 10 police criminals behind
Women too can be booked for domestic violence, rules court
Fri, Jun 4 07:10 PM
New Delhi, The Delhi High Court Friday ruled that mother-in-law too can be charged under the Domestic Violence Act.
A division bench of Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ajit Bharihoke said, 'It is common knowledge that in case a wife is harassed by husband, other family members may also join him in treating her cruelly. And such members would invariably include female relatives as well.'
'If restricted interpretation to the Domestic Violence Act is given, the very purpose for which this act is enacted would be defeated. It would be very easy for the husband or other male members to frustrate the remedy by ensuring that the violence on the wife is perpetrated by female members,' the court said.
The court was hearing the appeal filed by Varsha Kapoor, mother-in-law, against a lower court order that had issued her a notice for violation of the provisions of the Act.
Kapoor had challenged the order, saying a woman cannot charge another woman under Domestic Violence Act.
The petitioner also stated that the act is enacted to protect women from men, and therefore, a woman cannot be respondent in a petition filed by another woman.
'We are afraid there is hardly any merit in the argument. Main provision deals with those who are in a domestic relationship with the respondent, whereas proviso deals with aggrieved wife or a female in live-in relationship,' the court said.
New Delhi, The Delhi High Court Friday ruled that mother-in-law too can be charged under the Domestic Violence Act.
A division bench of Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ajit Bharihoke said, 'It is common knowledge that in case a wife is harassed by husband, other family members may also join him in treating her cruelly. And such members would invariably include female relatives as well.'
'If restricted interpretation to the Domestic Violence Act is given, the very purpose for which this act is enacted would be defeated. It would be very easy for the husband or other male members to frustrate the remedy by ensuring that the violence on the wife is perpetrated by female members,' the court said.
The court was hearing the appeal filed by Varsha Kapoor, mother-in-law, against a lower court order that had issued her a notice for violation of the provisions of the Act.
Kapoor had challenged the order, saying a woman cannot charge another woman under Domestic Violence Act.
The petitioner also stated that the act is enacted to protect women from men, and therefore, a woman cannot be respondent in a petition filed by another woman.
'We are afraid there is hardly any merit in the argument. Main provision deals with those who are in a domestic relationship with the respondent, whereas proviso deals with aggrieved wife or a female in live-in relationship,' the court said.
Punjab to set up 3037 e-gram Suvidha centres
Punjab Newsline Network
Friday, 04 June 2010
CHANDIGARH: To ensure citizen centric services to the people in the rural areas, the Punjab Government has decided to setup 3037 e-gram Suvidha centres in the villages across the state at a cost of Rs. 90 crore.
Following the announcement made by the Deputy Chief Minister Sukhbir Singh Badal, an Empowered Committee under the Chief Secretary comprising Administrative Secretaries of various Departments has given in principle approval to implement the scheme with in a stipulated time frame with in a year.
These e-grams centres would ensure the delivery of basic people friendly services viz delivery of old-age pension, registration of pension for handicapped and widows and disabled persons with an easy access.
The decision had also been taken to revamp Community Policing Resource Centres (CPRCs) at the district level and set up 90 Suvidha centres at the sub-division level as well as 300 police station outreach centres at the police station level. A sum of Rs. 27 crore was approved for this purpose.
Punjab would be the first state in India to implement community policing at such a large scale and in an institutionalised manner.
http://www.punjabnewsline.com/content/punjab-set-3037-e-gram-suvidha-centres/20940
These centres would provide counselling services to resolve disputes related to domestic violence, dowry-related and various other crimes related to women.
These centres shall also provide services which shall include copies of FIRs and untraced reports, no objection certificates for armed licences, permission for religious and political processions, verification of tenants, registration of servants etc. These centres would run in partnership with the representatives of the community.
Friday, 04 June 2010
CHANDIGARH: To ensure citizen centric services to the people in the rural areas, the Punjab Government has decided to setup 3037 e-gram Suvidha centres in the villages across the state at a cost of Rs. 90 crore.
Following the announcement made by the Deputy Chief Minister Sukhbir Singh Badal, an Empowered Committee under the Chief Secretary comprising Administrative Secretaries of various Departments has given in principle approval to implement the scheme with in a stipulated time frame with in a year.
These e-grams centres would ensure the delivery of basic people friendly services viz delivery of old-age pension, registration of pension for handicapped and widows and disabled persons with an easy access.
The decision had also been taken to revamp Community Policing Resource Centres (CPRCs) at the district level and set up 90 Suvidha centres at the sub-division level as well as 300 police station outreach centres at the police station level. A sum of Rs. 27 crore was approved for this purpose.
Punjab would be the first state in India to implement community policing at such a large scale and in an institutionalised manner.
http://www.punjabnewsline.com/content/punjab-set-3037-e-gram-suvidha-centres/20940
These centres would provide counselling services to resolve disputes related to domestic violence, dowry-related and various other crimes related to women.
These centres shall also provide services which shall include copies of FIRs and untraced reports, no objection certificates for armed licences, permission for religious and political processions, verification of tenants, registration of servants etc. These centres would run in partnership with the representatives of the community.
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