Where do the world’s most stressed women live?

July 12, 2011

A recent study released by the Nielsen Company that examines the consumer and media habits of women in emerging and developed countries has found that women in India are the most stressed – and they spend differently.

The Women of Tomorrow Study, which examined 6,500 women across 21 different nations from February through April 2011, found that an overwhelming 87% of Indian women said they felt stressed most of the time, with 82% claiming they had no time to relax.

Indian women are not alone. The vast majority of Mexican (74%) and Russian (69%) women surveyed also reported feeling stressed.

List of 21 countries surveyed in order of most stressed women:

1. India (87%)
2. Mexico (74%)
3. Russia (69%)
4. Brazil (67%)
5. Spain (66%)
6. France (65%)
7. South Africa (64%)
   Italy (64%)
8. Nigeria (58%)
9. Turkey (56%)
10. U.K. (55%)
11. U.S.A. (53%)
12. Japan (52%)
    Canada (52%)
    Australia (52%)
13. China (51%)
14. Germany (47%)
15. Thailand (45%)
    South Korea (45%)
16. Malaysia (44%)
    Sweden (44%)

Media noted from the survey that despite being the most stressed, Indian women were also the most likely to spend disposable income on themselves. Over three quarters said they would splurge on health and beauty products, while 96% responded that they would buy clothes.

Across the board, women in developing economies spent more of their additional cash on clothes, health and beauty items, groceries and education for their children. Women in the developed economies surveyed dedicate more of their cash to vacations, savings and paying off debt.

“Women across the globe are achieving higher levels of education, joining the workforce in greater numbers and contributing more to the household income,” said Susan Whiting, vice chair of Nielsen, in a release that accompanied the survey. “Women are increasing their spending power, and with that they gain more control and influence over key household decisions. As a result the women of today and tomorrow are powerful consumers and understanding their habits and attitudes is critically important for marketers and advertisers.”

Nielsen’s survey found that worldwide, women play multiple roles that contribute to their stress levels, but that the social infrastructure allowing them to navigate these roles differed between emerging and developed markets. As a result, women in emerging markets tended to be more stressed than women in the developed world, with women in India, Mexico and Nigeria feeling the most time-pressured.

So why exactly are women in emerging markets more stressed than women in developed countries? The Economic Times suggests that, in the case of India, companies and workplaces have developed whilst society has remained static, meaning that women must juggle a modern career and busy home life as well as conforming to traditional standards.

Although times appear to be changing – women surveyed in emerging economies saw the financial stability, education and access to technology for their daughters improving faster than their counterparts in the developed world.

With time-pressured but empowered women controlling household budgets, how should marketers go about getting them to loosen their purse strings? The key, it seems, is social media.

Irrespective of their global location, women are more prolific users of social networking than men. Women talk 28% more and send 14% more texts than men every month, and also visit more Internet community sites than their male counterparts. More than half of women in both developed and emerging countries say that computers, mobile phones and smart phones have changed their lives for the better.

“To connect with women, strategies should be social and relevant,” said Whiting, noting that women’s increased use of social networking meant that they followed brands more than men.

Nielsen’s results show that older forms of advertising still hold sway. In 17 of the 21 countries surveyed, television was rated the number one source for finding out about new products and stores. Yet around the world, over 70% of women in developed and over 80% of women in emerging markets completely or somewhat trust word-of-mouth recommendations over all other advertising mediums.

Patricia Kluge 'Richest' divorcee goes bankrupt

Easy come easy GO as the saying goes. This is what happens when Whores get their hands on hard earned money. How can anyone blow off $1,000,000,000,000, One Billion Dollars?
This shows poor judgement on the ex husbands part on picking a proper wife, why pick a former Porn Star when your a Billionaire? 


June 22, 2011


Patricia Kluge, the saucy winemaker and one-time pin-up girl who became known as "the wealthiest divorcee in history," filed for personal bankruptcy protection this week. Kluge came into a reported $1 billion after splitting from media mogul John Kluge in 1990. The one-time star of UK adult film "The Nine Ages of Nakedness" also got her hands on Albemarle House, a 45-room mansion on 3,000 acres in Virginia. But after living high-on-the-hog as a socialite hosting extravagant events for royalty, moguls and celebrities -- followed by a failed attempt to remake herself as a Virginia vintner -- Kluge, 62, crashed financially. She and husband William Moses have about $46 million in liabilities, according to their lawyer, Kermit Rosenberg. Earlier this year, Kluge moved to auction off her home and its contents. Donald Trump snapped up her Kluge Estate Winery & Vineyard in April after it defaulted on millions in loans. Kluge's remaining assets are now under control of a trustee who will dole out payments to creditors beginning July 15.
Patricia Kluge was once known as "the wealthiest divorcee in history." Those days are over. Kluge, who had formerly been married to the late billionaire Paul Kluge, recently filed for bankruptcy protection, citing debts somewhere between $10 million and $50 million and assets between $1 million and $10 million.

News of Kluge's fall from financial grace stirred up a frenzy of Web searches. Over the course of an hour, online lookups for "patrica kluge" spiked as did interest in "patricia kluge bankruptcy" and "patricia kluge broke." A lawyer for Kluge and her husband, William Moses, remarked that the couple is "getting on with their lives, trying to discharge their debts and start over."

We doubt the couple will be out on the street selling pencils anytime soon. Still, Patricia Kluge's present straits represent  a remarkable reversal for a woman who, at one time, was one of America's richest and most extravagant socialites. A buzzy article from the AP explains that the Kluges once hosted parties for "royalty, corporate chieftains, celebrities, and literary figures." She lived in a 23,500-square-foot mansion, owned a winery and, by all accounts, lived the good life.

A little too good, as it turned out. Her financial troubles began to pile up during the economic downturn and creditors started seizing her assets in earnest earlier this year. Kluge and her husband had attempted to renegotiate their loans with various banks, but failed. In April, Donald Trump bought most of Kluge's winery and vineyard from Farm Credit Bank for $6.21 million.

Of course, Kluge is hardly the first one-time millionaire to fall on tough times. Barbara Hutton, heiress to the Woolworth fortune, married many men, including actor Cary Grant. Thanks to a life of bad investments, extreme generosity, and terrible financial advice, Hutton lost nearly all of her fortune. She died in 1979 at the age of 66, with approximately $3,500 to her name.

In 2010, Johnson and Johnson heiress Casey Johnson died cut off from the famliy fortune and owing more than $100,000 to debtors. And history is full of athletes and entertainers who had millions only to lose it all to bad investments. M.C. Hammer, anyone?

As for Kluge, all is not lost. According to The Hook, she still has a job at the winery she built. She's not the owner anymore, but at least she's employed.

Police: Philadelphia woman used Facebook to make $1K offer for killing of her baby's father

June 14, 2011

PHILADELPHIA - Police in Philadelphia say a 20-year-old woman posted on Facebook an open offer of $1,000 to kill the father of her child and a man responded that he'd do the killing.

Investigators say London Eley posted a message last month saying, "I will pay somebody a stack to kill my baby father."

Authorities say 18-year-old Timothy Bynum, of nearby Darby, offered to do the killing and Eley provided an address and description of her ex-boyfriend, who contacted police.

Officers who searched Bynum's home say they found a .22-calibre handgun.

Eley is charged with solicitation to commit murder and Bynum is charged with attempted murder and conspiracy. Neither has posted bail.

Bynum's mother tells the Media her son is innocent and she's hiring him a lawyer.

Death upheld for Kuwait woman for wedding carnage

June 12, 2011

KUWAIT CITY – Kuwait's supreme court on Sunday upheld a woman's death sentence for setting ablaze her husband's wedding tent, killing 57 women and children.

Nasra Yussef Mohammed al-Enezi, 24, was condemned to death by a lower and appeals courts for the apparent act of revenge against her husband for taking a second wife.

Under Islamic laws, men in Kuwait can take up to four wives at a time.

The ruling against Enezi is final unless the emir commutes the sentence to a life term. Death sentences in the oil-rich Gulf state are carried out by hanging.

Enezi, who has two mentally-ill children from her husband, denied the charges throughout the trial and her defence lawyers argued there was no material evidence to convict her.

The August 15, 2009 inferno engulfed the women-and-children-only tent in minutes and triggered a stampede. The final death toll was 57, including Saudis and stateless Arabs.

If Enezi is hanged, she would be the first Kuwaiti woman to be executed in the Gulf state's history. Three foreign women have been hanged.

Kuwait has executed a total of 72 people since it introduced the death penalty some four decades ago. Most of those condemned have been convicted murderers or drug traffickers.

The last execution in the emirate dates back to mid-2007 although dozens of convicts are on death row.

Anybody who is planning to write a WILL, judgement from SC

Supreme Court of India

Anybody who is planning to write a WILL please read following judgement from SC on how the WILL is interpreted and how it can be drafted so that there is no scope of someone else challenging it. 
PETITIONER:
C. N. ARUNACHALA MUDALIAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
C. A. MURUGANATHA MUDALIAR AND ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
14/10/1953
BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
JAGANNADHADAS, B.
CITATION:
1953 AIR 495 1954 SCR 243
CITATOR INFO :
E 1965 SC1730 (10)
RF 1967 SC 591 (8)
R 1975 SC 431 (9)
R 1987 SC 518 (7)
ACT:
Hindu law-Gift-Property gifted by father to son-Whether ancestral property in the hands of son-Construction of will- Presumptions.
HEADNOTE:
Property gifted by a father to his son could not become ancestral property in the hands of the son simply by reason of the fact that he got it from his father. The father is quite competent when he makes a gift, to provide expressly either that the donee would take it exclusively for himself or that the gift would be for the benefit of his branch of the family and if there are express provisions to that effect in the deed of gift or will, the interest which the son would take in such property would depend on the terms of the grant.
If there are no clear words describing the kind of interest which the donee is to take, the question would be one of construction and the court would have to collect the intention of the donor from the language of the document taken along with the surrounding circumstances in accordance with the established canons of construction. The material question in such cases would be whether the grantor really wanted to make a gift of the properties to his son or the apparent gift was only an integral part of a scheme to partition the same.
There is no presumption that he intended either the one or the other, as it is open to the father to make a gift or partition his properties as he himself chooses. Muddun v. Ram (6 W.R. 71), Nagalingam v. Ramachandra (I.L.R. 24 Mad. 429), Bhagwat v. Mst. Kaporni (I.L.R. 23 Pat? 599), Jugmohan Das v. Mangal Das (I.L.R. 10 Bom. 528), Parsottam v. Jankibai (I.L.R 29 All. 354), Amarnath v. Guran (A.I.R. 1918 Lah. 394). Lal Ram Singh v. Deputy Commissioner, Partabgarh (64 I.A. 265) referred to. Where a testator who had 3 sons, after giving certain properties to his wife and other relations, provided that the properties in Schedules A,B and C of the will which were his self acquired properties shall be taken by his eldest, second and third son respectively, and that the sons shall enjoy the properties allotted to them with absolute rights and with powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, sale etc. from son to grandson hereditarily:
LB(D)2SCT-2(a)
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Held, that as the will expressly vested the sons with abso- lute rights with full powers of alienation, the property be- queathed to them was not ancestral property in their hands vis a vis their own male issue.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 191 of 1952.
Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 21st May, 1951, from the Judgment and Decree dated the 13th December, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rao and Somasundaram JJ.) in Appeal No. 529 of 1946 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 20th February, 1946, of the Court of Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore in O.S. No. 138 of 1945.
P.Somasundaram (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the appellant.
B.Somayya (K. R. Chowdhury, with him) for respondent No. 1.
1953. October 14. The Judgment of the Court was deli- vered by
MUKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on special leave, is directed against a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated December 13, 1949, affrming, with slight modification, those of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, passed in O.S. No. 138 of 1945.
The suit was commenced by the plaintiff, who is res- pondent No. I in this appeal for specific allotment, on partition, of his one-third share in the properties described in the plaint, on the allegation that they were the joint properties of a family consisting of himself, his father, the defendant No. 1, and his brother, the defendant No. 2, and that he was entitled in law to one-third share in the same. It appears that the plaintiff and defendant No. 2, who are two brothers, are both sons of defendant No. I by his first wife who predeceased her husband. After the death of plaintiff's mother, the defendant No. I married again and his second wife is defendant No. 3 in the suit. The allegations in the plaint, in
245
substance, are that after the step-mother came into the house, the relation between the father and his sons became strained and as the father began to assert an exclusive title to the joint family property, denying any rights of his sons thereto, the present suit had to be brought. The properties in respect of which the plaintiff claims partition are described in Schedule B to the plaint. They consist of four items of agricultural land measuring a little over 5 acres in the aggregate, one residential house in the town of Erode and certain jewellery, furniture and brass utensils. In addition to these it is averred in paragraph I I of the plaint that there is a sum of about Rs. 15,000 deposited in the name of the first defendant in the Erode Urban Bank Limited; that money also belongs to the joint family and the plaintiff is entitled to his share therein.
The defendant No. I in his written statement traversed all these allegations of the plaintiff and denied that there was any joint family property to which the plaintiff could lay a claim. His case was that items I and 2 of Schedule B lands as well as the house property were the self-acquired properties of his father and he got them under a will executed by the latter as early as in the year 1912. The other items of immovable property as well as the cash, furniture and utensils were his own acquisitions in which the sons had no interest whatsoever. As regards the jewels mentioned in the plaint, it was said that only a few of them existed and they belonged exclusively to his wife the defendant No. 3.
The defendant No. 2, who is the brother of the plaintiff, supported the plaintiff's case in its entirety. The defendant No. 3 in her written statement asserted that she was not a necessary party to the suit and that whatever jewellery there were belonged exclusively to her. After hearing the case the trial judge came to the con- clusion that properties bequeathed to defendant No. I by his father should be held to be ancestral properties in his hands and as the other properties were acquired by defendant No.
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1 out of the income of the ancestral estate, they also became impressed with the character of joint property. The result was that the Subordinate Judge made a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff and allowed his claim as laid in the plaint with the exception of certain articles of jewellery which were held to be non-existent. Against this decision, the defedant No. I took an appeal to the High Court of Madras. The High Court dismissed the appeal with this variation that the jewels- such of them as existed-were held to belong to defendant No. 3 alone and the plaintiff's claim for partition of furniture and brass utensils was dismissed. The High Court rejected the defendant No. 1's application for leave to appeal to this court but he succeeded in getting special leave under article 136 of the Constitution.
The substantial point that requires consideration in the appeal is whether the properties that the defendant No. I got under the will of his father are to be regarded as ancestral or self-acquired properties in his hands. If the properties were ancestral, the sons would, become co-owners with their father in regard to them and as it is conceded that the other items of immovable property were mere accretions to this original nucleus, the plaintiff's claim Must Succeed. If, on the other hand, the bequeathed properties could rank as self-acquired properties in the hands of defendaant No. 1, the plaintiff's case must fail. The law on this point, as the courts below have pointed out, is not quite uniform and there have been conflicting opinions expressed upon it by different High Courts which require to be examined carefully.
For a proper determination of the question, it would be convenient first of all to refer to the law laid down in Mitakshara in regard to the father's right of disposition over his self-acquired property and the interest which his sons or grandsons take in the same. Placitum 27, chapter 1, section I of Mitakshara lays down:
"It is settled point that property in the paternal or ancestral estate is by birth, though the father has independent
247
power in the disposal of effects other than the immovables for indispensable acts of duty and for purposes prescribed by texts of law as gift through affection, support of the family, relief from distress and so forth; but he is subject to the control of his sons and the rest in regard to the immovable estate, whether acquired by himself or inherited from his father or other predecessors since it is ordained, 'though immovables or bipeds have been acquired by man himself, a gift or sale of them should not be made without convening all the sons'."
Mitakshara insists on the religous duty of a man not to leave his family without means of support and concludes the text by saying: "They who are born and they who are yet unbegotten and they who are still in the womb, require the means of support. No gift or sale should therefore be made."
Quite at variance with the precept which seems to restrict the father's right of disposition over his self- acquired property in an unqualified manner and in the same way as ancestral lands, there occur other texts in the commentary which practically deny any right of interference by the sons with the father's power of alienation over his self-acquired property. Chapter 1, section 5, placitum 9 says:
"The grandson has a ri ght of prohibition if his un- separated father is making a donation or sale of effects in- herited from the grandfather: but he has no right of inter- ference if the effects were acquired by the father. On the contrary he must acquisce, because he is dependent." The reason for this distinction is explained by the au- thor in the text that follows: "Consequently the difference is this: although he has a right by birth in his father's and in his grandfather's property; still since he is dependent on his father in regard to the paternal estate and since the father has a predominant interest as it was acquired by himself, the son must acquiesce in the father's disposal of his own acquired property."
248
Clearly the latter passages are in flat contradiction with the previous ones and in an early Calcutta case(1) a reconciliation was attempted at by taking the view that the right of the sons in the self-acquired property of their father was an imperfect right incapable of being enforced at law. The question came pointedly for consideration before the Judicial Committee in the case of Rao Balwant v. Rani Kishori(2) and Lord Hobhousel who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed in course of his judgment that in the text books and commentaries on Hindu Law, religious and moral considerations are often mingled with rules of positive law. It was held that the passages in Chapter 1, section 1, verse 27 of Mitakshara contained only moral or religious precepts while those in section 5, verses 9 and 10 embodied rules of positive law. The latter consequently would override the former. It was held, therefore, that the father of t joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law has full and uncontrolled powers of disposition over his self-acquired immovable property and his male issue could not interfere with these rights in any way. This statement of the law has never been challenged since then and, it has been held by the various High Courts in India, and in our opinion rightly, that a Mitakshara father is not only competent to sell his self-acquired immovable property to a stranger without the concurrence of his sons(2), but he can make a gift of such property to one of his own sons to the detriment of another(3); and he can make even an unequal distribution amongst his heirs(4).
So far the law seems to be fairly settled and there is no room for controversy. The controversy arises, however, on the question as to what kind of interest a son would take in the self-acquired property of his father which he receives by way of gift or testamentary bequest from him, vis a vis his own male issue. Does it remain self-acquired property in his
(1) Vide Muddun, v. Ram, 6 W.R. 71.
(2) 25 I.A. 54.
(3) Vide Sital v. Madho T.L.R. I All. 394. (4) Vide Bawa v. Rejeah, 10 W.R 287.
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hands also untrammelled by the rights of his sons and grandsons or does it become ancestral property in his hands, though not obtained by descent, in which his male issue be- come co-owners with him? This question has been answered in different ways by the different High Courts in India which has resulted in a considerable diversity of judicial opinion. It was held by the Calcutta High Court(1) as early as in the year 1863 that such property becomes ancestral property in the hands of his son as if he bad inherited it from his father. In the other High Courts the questions Ion is treated as one of construction to be decided in each case with reference to its facts as to whether the gifted property was intended to pass to the sons an ancestral or self-acquired, property; but here again there is a sharp cleavage of judicial opinion. The Madras High Court has held(2) that it is undoubtedly open to the father to determine whether the property which be has bequeathed shall be ancestral or self-acquired but unless he expresses his intention that it shall be self-acquired, it should be held to be ancestral. The Madras view has been accepted by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court(3) and the latest decision of the Calcutta High Court on this point seems to be rather leaning towards it(4). On the other hand, the Bombay view is to hold such gifted property as self-acquisi- tion of the donee unless there is clear expression of intention on the part of the donor to make it ancestral(5), and this view has been accepted by the Allahabad and the Lahore High Courts(6). This conflict of judicial opinion was brought to the notice of the Privy Council in Lal Ram Singh v. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh(7), but the Judicial Committee left the question open as it was not necessary to decide it in that case.-
(1) Vide Muddan v. Ram 6 W.R. 71.
(2) Vide Nagalingham v. Ram Chandra, I. L.R. 24 Mad. 429. (3) Vida Bhagwat v. Mst. Kaporni, I.L.R. 23 Pat. 599. (4) Vida Lala Mukti Prasad v. Srimati lswari. 24 C.W.N. 938.
(8) Vide Jugmohan Das v. Sir Mangal Das. 10 Bom. 528. (6) Vide Parsotam v. Janki Bai, I.L.R. 29 All 354; Amararanth v. Guran, A.I.R. 1918 La],. 394. (7) 64 T. A. 265.
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In view of the settled law that a Mitakshara father has absolute right of disposition over his self-acquired property to which no exception can be taken by his male descendants, it is in our opinion not possible to hold that such property bequeathed or gifted to a son must necessarily, and under all circumstances, rank as ancestral property in the hands of the donee in which his sons would acquire co-ordinate interest. This extreme view, which is supposed to be laid down in the Calcutta case(1) referred to above, is sought to be supported on a two-fold ground. The first ground is the well known doctrine of equal ownership of father and son in ancestral property which is enunciated by Mitakshara on the authority of Yagnavalkya. The other ground put forward is that the definition of "self- acquisition" as given by Mitakshara does not and cannot comprehend a gift of this character and consequently such gift cannot but be partible property as between the donee and his sons.
So far as the first ground is concerned, the foundation of the doctrine of equal ownership of father and son in an- cestral property is the well known text of Yagnavalkya(2) which says:
"The ownership of father and son is co-equal in the acquisitions of the grandfather, whether land, corody or chattel."
It is to be noted that Vijnaneswar invokes this passage in Chapter 1, section 5 of his work, where he deals with the division of grandfather's wealth amongst his grandsons. The father's gradsons, it is said, have a right by birth in the grand estate equally with the sons and consequently are entitled to shares on partition, though their shares would be determined per stirpes and not per capita. This discussion has absolutely no bearing on the present question. It is undoubtedly true that according to Mitakshara, the son has a right, by birth both in his father's and grandfather's estate but as has been jointed out before. a distinction is made in this respect by Maitakshara itself. In the ancestral or grandfather's property
(1) Vide Muddun v. Ram, 6 NY. R. 71.
(2) Vide Yagnavalkya. Book 2. 129.
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in the hands of the father, the son has equal rights with his father; while in the self-acquired property of the father, his rights are unequal by reason of the father having an independent power over or predominent interest in the same(1). It is obvious, however, that the son can assert this equal right with the father only when the grandfather's property has devolved upon his father and has become ancestral property in his hands. The property of the grandfather can normally vest in the father as ancestral property if and when the father inherits such property on the death of the grandfather or receives it by partition, made by the Grandfather himself during his lifetime. On both these occasions the grand father's property comes to the father by virtue of the latter's legal right as a son or descendant of the former and consequently it becomes ancestral property in his hands. But when the father obtains the grandfather's property by way of gift, he receives it not because he is a son or has any legal right to such property but because his father chose to bestow a favour on him which he could have bestowed on any other person as well. The interest which he takes in such property must depend upon the will of the grantor. A good deal of confusion. We think has arisen by not keeping this distinction in mind. To find out whether a property is or is not ancestral in the hands of a particular person, not merely the relationship between the original and the present holder but the mode of transmission also must be looked to; and the property can ordinarily be reckoned as ancestral only if the present holder has got it by virtue of his being a son or descendant of the original owner. The Mitakshara, we think, is fairly clear on this point. It has placed the father's gifts under a separate category altogether and in more places than one has declared them exempt from partition. Thus in Chapter 1. section 1, placitum 19 Mitakshara refers to a text of Narada which says: (1) Vide Mayne's Hindu Law 11th edition, page 336. 252
"Excepting what is gained by valour, the wealth of a wife and what is acquired by science which are three sorts of property exempt from partition-, and any favour conferred by a father."
Chapter 1, section 4 of Mitakshara deals with effects not liable to partition and property "obtained through the father's favour" finds a place in the list of things of which no partition can be directed(1). This is emphasised in section 6 of chapter I which discusses the rights of posthumous sons or sons born after partition. In placitum 13 'of the section it is stated that though a son born after partition takes the whole of his father's and mother's property, yet if the father and mother has affectionately bestowed some property upon a separated son that must remain with him. A text of Yagnavalkya is then quoted that "the effects which have been given by the father and by the mother belong to him on whom they are bestowed"(2). It may be noted that the expression "obtained through favour of the father" (pitr prasada labdha) which occurs in placitum 28, section 4 of Mitakshara is very significant. A Mitakshara father can make a partition of both the ancestral and self-acquired property in his hands any time he likes even without the concurrence of his sons-, but if he chooses to make a partition. he has got to make it in accordance with +the directions laid down in the law. Even the extent of inequality, which is permissible as between the eldest and the Younger sons, is indicated in the text(3). Nothing depends upon his own favour or discretion. When, however, he makes a gift which is only an act of bounty, he is unfetterd in the exercise of his discretion by any rule or dictate of law. It is in these gifts obtained through the favour of the father that Vijnaneswar, following the earlier sages, declares the exclusive right of the sons. We hold, therefore, that there is no warrant for saying that according to the Mitakshara, an
(1) Vider C. Placitum 28 of Mitakshara. (2) Vide Yagnavalkya 2, 124.
(3) Vide Mitakshara chapter 1, section 2. 253
affectionate gift by the father to the son constitutes ipso facto ancestral property in the hands of the donee. If this is the correct view to take, as we think it is, it' would furnish a complete answer to the other contention indicated above that such gifted property must be held partible between the father and the sons as it does not come within the definition "self-acquisition", as given by Mitak- shara. In chapter 1, section 4 of his work, Vijnaneswar enumerates and deals with properties which are not liable to partition. The first placitum of the section defines what a "self-acquisition" is. The definition is based upon the text of Yagnavalkya that "whatever is acquired by the coparcener himself without detriment to the father's estate as present from a friend or a gift at nuptials, does not appertain to the co-heirs." What is argued is this, that as the father's gift cannot be said to have been acquired by the son without detriment to the father's estate, it cannot be regarded as selfacquisition of the son within the meaning of the definition given above and consequently cannot be exempted from partition. This argument seems to us to be untenable. Section 4 of the first chapter in Mitakshara enumerates various items of property which, according to the author, are exempt from partition and self-acquisition is only one of them. Father's gifts constitute another item in the exemption list which is specifically mentioned in placitum 28 of the section. We agree with the view expressed in the latest edition of Mayne's Hindu Law that the father's gift being itself an exception, the provision in placitum 28 cannot be read, as requiring that the gift must also be without detriment to the father's estate, for it would be a palpable contradition to say that there could be any gift by a father out of the estate without any detriment to the estate(1). There is no contradition really between, placitum I and placitum 28 of the section. Both are separate and independent items of exempted properties, of which no partition can be made.
(1) Mayane's Hindu Law, 11th edition,paragraph 280,page 344 254
Another argument is stressed in this connection which seems to have found favour with the learned Judges of the Patna High Court who decided the Full Bench case(1) referred to above. It is said that the exception in regard to father's gift as laid down in placitum 28 has reference only to partition between the donee and his brothers but so far as the male issue of the donee is concerned, it still remains partible. This argument, in our opinion, is not sound. If the provision relating to self-acquisition is applicable to all partitions, whether between collaterals or between the father and his sons, there is no conceivable reason why placitum 28, which occurs in the same chapter and deals with the identical topic should not be made applicable to all cases of partition and should be confined to collaterals alone. The reason for making this distinction is undoubtedly the theory of equal ownership between the father and the son ancestral property which we have discussed already and which in our opinion is not applicable to the father's gifts at all. Our conclusion, therefore, is that a property gifted by a father to his son could not become ancestral property in the hands of the donee simply by reason of the fact that the donee got it from his father or ancestor.
As the law is accepted and well settled that a Mitak- shara father has complete powers of disposition over his selfacquired property, it must follow as a necessary consequence that the father is quite competent to provide expressly, when he makes a gift, either that the donee would take it exclusively for himself or that the gift would be for the benefit of his branch of the family. If there are express provisions to that effect either in the deed of gift or a will, no difficulty is likely to arise and the interest which the son would take in such property would depend upon the terms of the grant. If, however, there are no clear words describing the kind of -interest which the donee is to take, the question would be one of construction and the court would have to collect the intention of the donor from the language of the document taken
(1) Vide Bhagwant v. Mst, Kaporni, I.L.R. 23 Pat. 599. 255
along with the surrounding circumstances in accordance with the wellknown canons of construction. Stress would certainly( have to be laid on the substance of the disposition and not on its mere form. The material question which the court( would have to decide in such cases is, whether taking the document and all the relevant facts into consideration, it could be said that the donor intended to confer a bounty upon his son exclusively for his benefit and capable of being dealt with by him at his pleasure or that the apparent gift was an integral part of a scheme for partition and what was given to the son was really the share of the property which would normally be allotted to him and in his branch of the family on partition. In other words, the question would be whether the grantor really wanted to make a gift of his properties or to partition the same. As it is open to the father to make a gift or partition of his properties as he himself chooses, there is, strictly speaking, no presumption that he intended either the one or the other.
It is in the light of these principles that we would pro- ceed now to examine the facts of this case. The will of his father under which defendant No. I got the two items of Schedule B properties is Ex. P-1 and is dated the 6th of June. 1912. The will is a simple document. It recites that the testator is aged 65 and his properties are all his own which he acquired from no nucleus of ancestral fund. He had three sons, the eldest of whom was defendant No. 1. In substance what the will provides is that after his death, the A Schedule properties would go to his eldest son, the B Schedule properties to his second son and the properties described in Schedule C shall be taken by the youngest. The sons are to enjoy the properties allotted to them with absolute rights and with powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, sale, etc. from son to grandson hereditarily. The testator, it seems, had already given certain properties to the wives of his two brothers and to his own wife also. They were to enjoy these properties during the terms of their natural lives and after their death, they would vest in one or the other of his sons. as indicated in the will. The D Schedule property
256
was set apart for the marriage expenses of his third son and an unmarried daughter. Authority was given to his wife to sell this property to defray the marriage expenses with its sale proceeds.
It seems to us on reading the document in the light of the surrounding circumstances that the dominant intention of the testator was to make suitable provisions for those of his near relations whom he considered to have claims upon his affection and bounty. He did not want simply to make a division of his property amongst his heirs in the same way as they themselves would have done after his death, with a view to avoid disputes in the future. Had the testator contemplated a partition as is contemplated by Hindu law, he would certainly have given his wife a share equal to that of a son and a quarter share to his unmarried daughter. His brothers' wives would not then come into the picture and there could be no question of his wife being authorised to sell a property to defray the marriage expenses of his unmarried son and daughter. The testator certainly wanted to make a distribution of his properties in it way different from what would take place in case of intestacy. But what is really material for our present purpose is his intention regarding the kind of interest which his sons were to take in the properties devised to them. Here the will is perfectly explicit and it expressly vests the sons with absolute rights with full powers of alienation by way of sale, gift and exchange. There is no indication in the will that the properties bequeathed were to be held by the sons for their families or mate issues and although the will mentions various other relations, no reference is made to sons' sons at all. This indicates that the testator desired that his sons should have full ownership in the properties bequeathed to them and he was content to leave entirely to his sons the care of their own families and children. That the testator did not want to confer upon the sons the same rights as they could have on intestacy is further made clear by the two subsequent revocation instruments executed by the testator. By the document Exhibit P-2 dated, the Z6th 257
of March, 1914, he revoked that portion of his will which gave the Schedule C property to his youngest son. As this son had fallen into bad company and was disobedient to his father,. he revoked the bequest in his favour and gave the same properties to his other two sons with a direction that they would pay out of it certain maintenance allowance to their youngest brother, or to his family if he got married. There was a second revocation instrument, namely, Exhibit P- 3, executed on 14th April, 1914, by which the earlier revo- cation was cancelled and the properties intended to be given to the youngest son were taken away from the two brothers and given to his son-in-law and the legatee was directed to hand them over to the third son whenever he would feel con- fident that the latter had reformed himself properly. In our opinion, on reading the will as a whole the conclusion becomes clear that the testator intended the legatees to take the properties in absolute right as their own self- acquisition without being fettered in any way by the rights of their sons and grandsons. In other words, he did not intend that the property should be taken by the sons as ancestral property. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of both the courts below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. Having regard to the fact that the question involved in this case is one of considerable importance upon which there was considerable difference of judicial opinion that the plaintiff himself is a pauper, we direct that each party shall bear his own costs in all the courts. Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant: S. Subramanian.
Agent for the respondent No. 1: M.S.K. Aiyangar. LB(D)2SCl00-3
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http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1148062/

Most wanted man's film on dowry

June 11, 2011

Filmmakers often look at their own lives for inspiration, and Suhaib Ilyasi has found pretty much everything for his debut movie in his own life. Ilyasi, widely known for his show India's Most Wanted, was charged under the Dowry Act (498A) after his wife committed suicide in 2000. A decade later, he is making a movie called 498A The Wedding Gift, and has shot 85% of the movie. 

Says Suhaib, The movie is a project of blood and sweat. People always thought Suhaib Ilyasi was arrested for killing his wife Anju. But the truth is that I was arrested under the charge of demanding `10,000 as dowry. My movie is based on a section of the IPC, 498A, yeh dahej lene waalon ko rokne ke liye banaya gaya tha. But it's being completely misused these days.

He adds, It's an absolutely commercial film. Cinema ke through bahut strong messages diye ja sakte hain. It's a balanced mix. There are songs by Sonu Nigam, Sunidhi Chauhan, Shaan, etc, but the topic is serious. The lead roles are being played by Delhi-boy Harsh Nagar, and Shrishti Gautam, a class X student of Delhi's Sanskriti School. A class X student? Yes. I wanted a young and fresh face. Shrishti agreed she's a younger version of Katrina Kaif, and a wonderful performer. Farida Jalal, Alok Nath, Reema Lagoo and Deepak Tijori are also in the film.

The team is also coming to Delhi to shoot. Says Ilyasi, We are keeping the film low key, but once it's complete, I'd like to show it to LK Advani. Even such a senior politico has experienced this problem. His daughter-in-law has filed a case of dowry against him. We earlier had permission to shoot at the High Court, but it was recalled when a bomb was found outside the court.

Jilted ex-boyfriend puts up abortion billboard

June 7, 2012

ALAMOGORDO, N.M. — A New Mexico man's decision to lash out with a billboard ad saying his ex-girlfriend had an abortion against his wishes has touched off a legal debate over free speech and privacy rights.

The sign on Alamogordo's main thoroughfare shows 35-year-old Greg Fultz holding the outline of an infant. The text reads, "This Would Have Been A Picture Of My 2-Month Old Baby If The Mother Had Decided To Not KILL Our Child!"

Fultz's ex-girlfriend has taken him to court for harassment and violation of privacy. A domestic court official has recommended the billboard be removed.

But Fultz's attorney argues the order violates his client's free speech rights.

"As distasteful and offensive as the sign may be to some, for over 200 years in this country the First Amendment protects distasteful and offensive speech," Todd Holmes said.

The woman's friends say she had a miscarriage, not an abortion, according to a report in the Albuquerque Journal.

Holmes disputes that, saying his case is based on the accuracy of his client's statement.

"My argument is: What Fultz said is the truth," Holmes said.

The woman's lawyer said she had not discussed the pregnancy with her client. But for Ellen Jessen, whether her client had a miscarriage or an abortion is not the point. The central issue is her client's privacy and the fact that the billboard has caused severe emotional distress, Jessen said.

"Her private life is not a matter of public interest," she told the Alamogordo Daily News.

Jessen says her client's ex-boyfriend has crossed the line.

"Nobody is stopping him from talking about father's rights. ... but a person can't invade someone's private life."

For his part, Holmes invoked the U.S. Supreme Court decision from earlier this year concerning the Westboro Baptist Church, which is known for its anti-gay protests at military funerals and other high-profile events. He believes the high court's decision to allow the protests, as hurtful as they are, is grounds for his client to put up the abortion billboard.

"Very unpopular offensive speech," he told the Alamogordo Daily News. "The Supreme Court, in an 8 to 1 decision, said that is protected speech."

Holmes says he is going to fight the order to remove the billboard through a District Court appeal.

Malaysian women urge wives to be 'whores in bed'

June 4, 2012

KUALA LUMPUR – A group of Malaysian women launched an "Obedient Wife Club" on Saturday, urging members to be "whores in bed" and obey their husbands to curb social ills like divorce and domestic violence.

Islamic group Global Ikhwan held the club's inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur, giving women tips on how to keep their men satisfied and prevent them straying.

"A good wife is perceived to be prim and proper -- you just take care of the children -- but not much is emphasised on fulfilling sexual needs of the husband. If he needs sex, obey him," Rohaya Mohamad, the club's vice-president told AFP.

Rohaya said 30 percent of the club members were in polygamous marriages while the rest were in monogamous relationships and that the club was open to non-Muslims.

"You must satisfy your husband. A good wife should be a whore in bed," said 46-year-old doctor, whose husband has three other wives.

She said the club boasted 800 Malaysian members so far with another 200 from across the Middle East.

Over 1,000 guests and supporters turned up for the launch in a leafy suburb, held in conjunction with a mass wedding of ten couples, with the brides all members of the new club.

"If the wife is obedient, then the husband feels good and is entertained and this builds a closer relationship and greater love and no one strays," said groom Mohamad Shurahbil Amran, 23.

His bride Umuhani Lokman Hakim, 19, dressed in a golden white Arabic wedding gown, was unforthcoming when asked why she joined the club and would only say: "It is the right thing to do to keep the family together."

The club has come under criticism from Malaysian women's groups who say the onus on keeping a family together is being unfairly placed on women.

"With obedience comes submission, which may lead to domestic violence and marital rape," Women's Aid Organisation head Ivy Josiah told  the Media

."We should really be forming equality in marriage clubs," she added.

Women's rights group EMPOWER said the club was a step back for the progress of the equality movement.

"We cannot go back to caveman days where the man pulls the woman by the hair and takes her to the cave to have his way. We must recognise that women contribute a lot more than just being a sex toy," the group's executive director Maria Chin Abdullah told the Media.

Polygamy is legal for Muslims, who make up more than 60 percent of Malaysia's population, allowing Muslim men to take up to four wives.

In 2010, a study by a Muslim activist group found men in polygamous relationships find it difficult to meet the needs of all their wives and children, and that the result is often unhappy and cash-strapped families.

Malaysian women urge wives to be 'whores in bed'

June 4, 2012

KUALA LUMPUR – A group of Malaysian women launched an "Obedient Wife Club" on Saturday, urging members to be "whores in bed" and obey their husbands to curb social ills like divorce and domestic violence.

Islamic group Global Ikhwan held the club's inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur, giving women tips on how to keep their men satisfied and prevent them straying.

"A good wife is perceived to be prim and proper -- you just take care of the children -- but not much is emphasised on fulfilling sexual needs of the husband. If he needs sex, obey him," Rohaya Mohamad, the club's vice-president told AFP.

Rohaya said 30 percent of the club members were in polygamous marriages while the rest were in monogamous relationships and that the club was open to non-Muslims.

"You must satisfy your husband. A good wife should be a whore in bed," said 46-year-old doctor, whose husband has three other wives.

She said the club boasted 800 Malaysian members so far with another 200 from across the Middle East.

Over 1,000 guests and supporters turned up for the launch in a leafy suburb, held in conjunction with a mass wedding of ten couples, with the brides all members of the new club.

"If the wife is obedient, then the husband feels good and is entertained and this builds a closer relationship and greater love and no one strays," said groom Mohamad Shurahbil Amran, 23.

His bride Umuhani Lokman Hakim, 19, dressed in a golden white Arabic wedding gown, was unforthcoming when asked why she joined the club and would only say: "It is the right thing to do to keep the family together."

The club has come under criticism from Malaysian women's groups who say the onus on keeping a family together is being unfairly placed on women.

"With obedience comes submission, which may lead to domestic violence and marital rape," Women's Aid Organisation head Ivy Josiah told  the Media

."We should really be forming equality in marriage clubs," she added.

Women's rights group EMPOWER said the club was a step back for the progress of the equality movement.

"We cannot go back to caveman days where the man pulls the woman by the hair and takes her to the cave to have his way. We must recognise that women contribute a lot more than just being a sex toy," the group's executive director Maria Chin Abdullah told the Media.

Polygamy is legal for Muslims, who make up more than 60 percent of Malaysia's population, allowing Muslim men to take up to four wives.

In 2010, a study by a Muslim activist group found men in polygamous relationships find it difficult to meet the needs of all their wives and children, and that the result is often unhappy and cash-strapped families.

Potential International Child Abduction to India

Wonder if this would have been the case had the Women wanted to take the child to India and the Father opposed her?
Well I am living proof the court will not listen to you, (this was in 2000) the court told me in explicit terms that I was controlling my wife and should allow her to take the children to visit their Maternal grandfather who according to my ex wife was going to die soon, bastard lived for another 10 years. The real clincher was the fact the Ex knew all the loop holes which I was not aware of.
Indian Government is controlled by Feminazi Witches who are only interested in filling their bank acounts

Canadian Court Accepts Morley Expert Opinion 

October, 2010

The Superior Court in Ontario, Canada relied in substantial part on the expert evidence of Jeremy D. Morley as to family law in India in ruling that the father of a four-year-old child living in Ontario should not be permitted to take the child on a family visit to India. Mahadevan v. Shankar, issued October 12, 2010. The child’s mother, who has custody of the child, opposed the trip because of her concerns that the child would never return.

The Court extensively referenced Mr. Morley’s opinion on the matter in its written opinion which dismissed the father’s motion to allow this travel.  The relevant portion of the Court’s findings in relation to Mr. Morley’s expertise is as follows:

“Ms. Junger filed a detailed and helpful affidavit of Jeremy D. Morley, a New York State lawyer specializing in international family law.  Mr. Sherman did not challenge Mr. Morley’s expertise.  That affidavit unequivocally outlined the many challenges, frustrations-and indeed roadblocks-which the Applicant would face in attempting to secure V’s return if the Respondent elected not to return the child from India. 

It was his ‘very firm opinion’ that notwithstanding any order of a court in Ontario, if the father retained the child, ‘it would be exceedingly difficult and perhaps impossible for the mother to secure V’s return home from India.” Any court proceeding in India to secure the child’s return would be exceedingly slow.  Indian courts do not honor Canadian custody orders.  The mother would have to spend considerable money on legal fees to try and secure the child’s return-or even have access to the child in India.  India does not comply with international norms concerning the return of internationally abducted children ‘and it is a justifiably well-recognized safe haven for international child abductors.’  India has chosen not to accede to the Hague Convention. ‘India’s failure to sign the treaty constitutes a strong signal that it does not consider the abduction of children from other countries to be a serious matter.’  Indian courts generally do not enforce foreign custody orders.  The law in India is that foreign custody orders are merely items to consider as part of an overall de novo custody review.  International child abduction is not a crime under Indian law and no Indian legislation contains any helpful provisions to deter international child abductions.  There can be no extradition from India for international child abductions.  The court system in India is extremely slow and inefficient.  The delays are such that an abductor has ample time to create ‘facts on the ground’ in terms of getting the child sufficiently settled into life in India to justify an Indian court in ultimately deeming that it is best to keep the child in India. 

At paragraph 23 of his affidavit, Mr. Morley gives a sobering warning:

‘As a consequence of India’s failure to promptly return internationally abducted children, courts outside of India should be extremely wary about allowing parents to take children for temporary visits to India over the objections of other parents since there is a great likelihood that parents who wrongfully retain children in India will get away with their wrongful conduct scot-free in India.’

While the Respondent’s lawyer did not categorically challenge Mr. Morley’s observations and warnings, Mr. Sherman suggested that any concern could be addressed by the Respondent’s offer to sign a legal document in Canada acknowledging that he would consent to the Indian court sending V back to the mother in the event of a dispute.  Given Mr. Morley’s comments about the danger of Indian courts ignoring orders signed by Canadian judges, it is unclear why Indian courts would be more likely to respect a document signed by a parent. 

And considering Mr. Morley’s warnings about India not being a signatory to the Hague Convention - warnings borne out by the cautionary tale in theVenkatesh case - there are overwhelming reasons to be concerned that if the Respondent retained V in India, there is very little the Applicant could do about it.

The Respondent’s motion is dismissed."

U.S. State Dept. Issues Hague Abduction Convention Compliance Report

Naturally India is one of the lousy countries refusing to sign the Hague Abduction Convention, this is of no use to the Feminazi Witches, had this convention been of use to these Witches, just see how fast they would have made the Government sign it. Read Paragraph 4.

May 12, 2011

The U.S. Department of State (“Department”), Office of Children’s Issues (CI), U.S. Central Authority has issued its report on compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, covering the period from October 1, 2009, through December 31, 2010.

Notable points:

     1.  St.Kitts and Nevis was determined to be not compliant with the Convention.

2.     2.  Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Honduras, Mexico and the Bahamas showed “patterns of noncompliance with the Convention.”

3.     3.  15 countries were “Countries with Enforcement Concerns” in which left-behind parents in the United States have not been able to secure prompt enforcement of a final return or access order during the reporting period. This includes an order resulting from a Hague proceeding; a U.S. custody, access or visitation order; or an access or visitation order by authorities in the country concerned, where the lack of enforcement is because of the absence of prompt and effective enforcement mechanisms, the lack of recognition of comity, or other factors. These countries were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Costa Rica, France, Germany, Honduras, Hungary, Israel, Romania,  South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.

4.    4.  The State Department reported on the appointment of Ambassador Susan Jacobs as the first Special Advisor for Children’s Issues and her efforts to encourage Armenia,  Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, Laos, Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Timor-Leste and Zambia to become parties to the Convention, as well as discussions with Fiji and Thailand,  whose accession the United States has yet to accept under Convention.

5.    5.  The State Department reported on 18 countries where applications for return had remained open for more than 18 months after the date of filing. These are Argentina (three cases), Belgium, Brazil (6 cases), Canada (3 cases), Colombia (2 cases), Costa Rica, Ecuador, France (2 cases), Greece, Honduras (2 cases), Israel  (2 cases), Mexico (82 cases), Netherlands, Peru (3 cases), Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Turkey (2 cases).