Mr. Rebates

Saturday, September 18, 2010

No indulgence to wives for transfer of criminal cases against husbands: SC

Sept 8, 2010

NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court has been very lenient in entertaining pleas of estranged wives for transfer of matrimonial cases to courts close to their place of stay. But in a recent order, it put its foot down saying the concession would not be given to wives for shifting of trial of dowry harassment cases filed by them under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code against husbands and their relatives.

This assumes significance in the wake of last month's judgment of the apex court firmly telling the government to have a relook at Section 498A saying it was being misused by women to lodge false or exaggerated complaints against husbands and their relatives accusing them of cruel behaviour.

In the case at hand, a woman had sought transfer of the criminal case under Section 498A lodged by her against her husband and his relatives from Hyderabad to Indore, where she had moved after leaving the matrimonial home.

Faulting her for not impleading other accused except her husband, a Bench comprising Justices Aftab Alam and R M Lodha said it was not inclined to transfer a criminal case from one state to another solely on the ground that it would be more convenient for the wife to pursue the matter.

"It is true that in cases of dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal rights or maintenance, the Supreme Court shows much indulgence to the wife and ordinarily transfers the case to a place where it would be more convenient to the wife to prosecute the proceedings," the Bench said.

"But a criminal case is on a somewhat different footing. The accused may not be able to attend the court proceedings at Indore for many reasons, one of which may be financial constraints, but the consequences of non-appearance of the accused before the Indore court would be quite drastic," it said.

"Having regard to the consequences of non-appearance of the accused in a criminal trial, we are loath to entertain the petitioner's prayer for transfer. In a criminal proceeding, the right of the accused to a fair trial and a proper opportunity to defend himself cannot be ignored for the convenience of the complainant simply because she happens to be the estranged wife," the Bench said dismissing the transfer petition.

Friday, September 17, 2010

Divorce 'makes middle-class girls reach puberty early'

Sept 17, 2010

Middle-class girls whose fathers do not live at home reach puberty earlier than those from a similar but more stable background, research shows.
They are more than twice as likely to start developing breasts at a younger age - some when they are only seven.
Doctors believe the distress caused by their parents' divorce upsets their hormones, triggering the earlier onset of puberty.
Researchers found that girls from higher-income families whose fathers had left home were two and a half times more likely to start puberty younger than those from stable backgrounds.
But those from poorer households whose fathers didn't live at home were not more likely to enter puberty earlier, the research found.
Experts suggest that middle class girls are more deeply affected by their parents' divorce than those from lower income backgrounds because they tend to lead more isolated lives without support from friends and family.
They often began developing breasts and bodily hair when they were nine, in some cases younger, compared to the average age of ten or 11, researchers at the University of Berkeley, California, found.
It follows recent figures showing girls are starting puberty at much younger ages, including as early as seven.

Experts have attributed this trend to higher levels of obesity changing youngsters' hormonal balance.
The latest study, published in the Journal of Adolescent Health, monitored 440 girls aged six to eight as they developed into adolescents.
It found that those from middle class homes whose fathers were absent were 2.4 times more likely to go through puberty prematurely.
Dr Julianna Deardorff, who led the study, said: 'The age at which girls are reaching puberty has been trending downward in recent decades, but much of the attention has focused on increased body weight as the primary culprit.
'While overweight and obesity alter the timing of girls' puberty, those factors don't explain all of the variance in pubertal timing.
'The results from our study suggest that familial and contextual factors - independent of body mass index - have an important effect on girls' pubertal timing.'

Hiding a prior divorce from husband also amounts to cheating: Gujarat high court

Aug 30, 2010

The Gujarat high court recently gave two significant judgements in cases lodged by an NRI couple after their divorce. Justice Akil Kureshi of the high court ruled that if a woman conceals her previous marital status (including a marriage that had ended in a divorce), it amounted to cheating. In such a case, the husband can file a police complaint against his wife, the court said.
The judge also held that a woman can file a criminal complaint against her husband if he does not return her belongings after their marriage had ended in a divorce in a foreign country.
According to the case details, Mitesh and Tanya, who are currently citizens of the US, originally hail from Kheda district. They had got married with the consent of their respective families but their marriage soon ran into trouble and they divorced in the US in 2007. But the bad blood between the two did not end there.
Tanya filed a complaint in Nadiad under the dowry act among others, alleging that Mitesh had not returned her belongings which amounted to Rs20-Rs 25 lakh. These were given to her by her father at the time of the marriage but they were still with Mitesh's family, Tanya claimed. She demanded that Mitesh and his family return her belongings as she had divorced Mitesh in the US.
Mitesh had also filed a complaint at the same police station alleging that Tanya had cheated him as she had not disclosed the fact that prior to their marriage she was married to another boy and had divorced him too.
In his judgement, Justice Kureshi gave the green signal for filing of a police complaint against Tanya for not disclosing to Mitesh the details of her previous marriage and divorce. But the court turned down Mitesh's plea that Tanya's police complaint against him and his family for not returning her belongings be quashed.
The court also refused to entertain Tanya's argument that even if Mitesh's allegation was accepted as true, it did not constitute an offence as her previous marriage had been annulled by the competent court in the US.
On the other hand, Mitesh in his complaint had argued that Tanya had concealed details of her previous marriage even in the marriage form. This amounted to cheating and forgery, he said.
"Tanya had made a false declaration saying that she was unmarried, after which he had agreed to marry her," Mitesh declared in his complaint.
In her complaint demanding the return of her belongings, Tanya stated Mitesh and his family had not returned what belonged to her. As per the terms of their divorce settlement, the two parties were supposed to return each other's property, she stated, adding that Mitesh was now saying that he and his family did not have any of Tanya's belongings.

Incomplete 'Phere' breaks marriage bond

Sept 16, 2010

In a bizarre ruling, a family court in Kanpur district of Uttar Pradesh annulled the 12-year-old marriage of a couple on the basis of five ‘Phere’ (steps) and same gotras.
It was a shocking verdict for girl's father, who is fighting the legal battle since 22 August 2001.
In the 100-page ruling, the judge pronounced the verdict against Neeru, citing reduced Phere and same gotras. The judge said that as per the Article 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, the marriage was not completed due to reduced Phere and same gotra. As per the Hindu Marriage rituals seven Phere are compulsory. Surprisingly, the marriage was cancelled by the family court for just short of two Phere.
The 'Saat Phere' is an important ritual performed during the wedding in which the bride and the groom circumambulate a sacred fire, known as agni, seven times.
However, Neeru claimed that the 'Saat Phere' ritual was properly performed at a time of marriage.
Reacting on the decision, the Neeru's lawyer described it as a big mistake committed by the family court. He said that there were four evidences had been produced before the court.
The pundit, who performed the marriage, deposed twice before the magistrate and he confirmed completion of 'Saat Phere'. Four other witnesses were also produced before the court and marriage video was also played twice in the court, the lawyer said.
However, lawyer is keen to challenge the lower court order in Allahabad High Court but demoralized Neeru refused to fight the legal battle anymore.
The verdict was real stunning for Neeru and people of the city as well. Neeru’s father is completely broken after the verdict and gave up the hope of any justice. A tearful Neeru was also disappointed with the verdict and said she don’t wish to challenge the verdict.

Mentally disturbed woman, locked in house for 2 yrs, rescued

Sept 17, 2010

New Delhi, Sep 17  A 28-year-old mentally disturbed woman, who had been locked in her house in central Delhi by her family for the past two years, was today rescued by police and an NGO. Police and representatives of NGO Sudinalay went to the house in Daryaganj this morning after an unidentified person made a telephone call to the latter. They found the woman locked inside a room in the fourth floor, a senior police official said.
Police and the NGO found the room was "very unhygienic" and the woman was looking "very frail", the official said. The moment they opened the door, the woman asked for water and complained that she had not had food or water for the past three-four days, he said.
She also told them that she has been locked in a room by her family because they did not want her condition to come in the way of her younger sister''s marriage. She has two brothers and three sisters.
Her family told police that the woman was not cooperating in her treatment and they had no option but to lock her up, the official said. The family claimed that they took her to Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied Sciences (IBHAS) in 2008 for the first time and continued her treatment there till January 2009.
However, they claimed, they stopped the treatment after that as she did not cooperate. Police took her to IBHAS where she is undergoing treatment.
A case was registered under relevant sections of Mental Health Act.

Eight of 16 CJIs were 'corrupt', says ex-law minister

Sept 16, 2010

New Delhi, Sep 16  Former Union Law Minister Shanti Bhushan Thursday told the Supreme Court that at least eight of the 16 chief justices of India (CJIs) were 'definitely corrupt'.
In an affidavit filed Thursday, senior counsel Shanti Bhushan said that six of the CJIs were 'definitely honest' and he could not comment on the remaining two judges.
The senior counsel sought to be impleaded in a case in which his son Prashant Bhushan is facing contempt proceedings.
Sixteen CJIs that Shanti Bhushan has mentioned in his affidavit are: Justice Rangnath Mishra, Justice K.N. Singh, Justice M.H. Kaina, Justice L.M. Sharma, Justice M.N. Venkatachalliah, Justice A.M. Ahemadi, Justice J.S. Verma, Justice M.M. Punchhi, Justice A.S. Anand, Justice S.P. Bharucha, Justice B.N. Kirpal, Justice G.B. Pathak, Justice Rajendra Babu, Justice R.C. Lohati, Justice V.N. Khare and Justice Y.K. Sabharwal.
Shanti Bhushan in his affidavit said that two former CJIs had personally told him that their immediate predecessors and immediate successors were corrupt judges. He said that the names of those four CJIs were included in the list of eight corrupt CJIs.

Thursday, September 16, 2010

‘Hubby’s lover no cause for mental cruelty’

The question which arose for adjudication before the bench was a tricky one — “If a husband was living with another woman besides his wife, whether the same would amount to ‘cruelty’ within the meaning of Section 498A”.    

This decision was given by a bench of Justices Altamas Kabir and A K Patnaik while allowing the appeal of a woman who was accused by a wife of causing her mental cruelty by living with her husband after their marriage fell apart. Significantly, the bench set aside the decisions of the Jharkhand trial court and the high court, both of which had held that the girlfriend was liable to face trial in the mental cruelty case.     No case under Section 498A could be slapped against the other woman — “be it the husband’s girlfriend or concubine” — even if it was found that she lived with him after estrangement from his wife, the court said. At best, it could be a ground for seeking divorce, the court held.

New Delhi: The other woman in a husband’s life could universally be the major source of marital discord but the wife cannot accuse the girlfriend of causing mental cruelty to her under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, the Supreme Court has ruled.

Man gets two-year jail term for harassing wife

  This case should be Appealed to High Court.

Sept 16, 2010

Anand Parmar and his parents had thrown Sohagini out of the house for giving birth to girl child and bringing less dowry

The metropolitan court convicted a man and four members of his family for abandoning his wife after she gave birth to a girl child. Metropolitan magistrate D S Trivedi on Monday awarded a two-year imprisonment and Rs 1,000 fine each to woman’s in-laws in the dowry harassment case.

Those convicted for harassing Sohagini Parmar were her husband Anand, father-in-law Natwar, mother-in-law Ela Parmar, brother-in-law Pratik Parmar and sister-in-law Riben Parmar — all residents of Saras Society in Ranip.

Sohagini, an MA LLB with a diploma in clinical psychology, used to reside at  Shyamal Bunglows in Chandkheda. She married Anand on April 20, 2003. Her father gave the couple jewellery and wedding gifts worth Rs 2 lakh. Little did they know that her marriage would run into trouble in just three months.

According to the complaint filed, the husband had an affair in college which he continued even after marriage. He would frequently bring his paramour home and act indecorously with her in front of Sohagini. He also demanded a Santro car as dowry as he was ‘English-educated’.

Anand, who used to work in Surat, came home only on weekends. He told Sohagini that he had married her due to societal pressure and that he never liked her. Her father-in-law and mother-in-law started inflicting physical and mental torture on her. She bore it all to save her marriage. However, problems worsened after she gave birth to a daughter in 2005. When she gave her in-laws the news of the child’s birth, they reprimanded her because they wanted her to produce a son.

Sohagini returned to her in-laws with her daughter but she was not permitted to enter the house. The in-laws threatened to kill her if she returned. A crestfallen Suhagini filed a complaint with the women’s police station on May 8, 2008.  And and his parents were arrested under IPC 498(a), 323, 506(2), 504 and 114 of the CrPC.

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CRL.) No.4758 of 2009)

SUNITA JHA                           ... APPELLANT



1.   Leave granted.
2.   This Appeal is directed against the judgment
and order dated     29th April,   2009, passed   by a
learned Single Judge of the Jharkhand High Court
in Criminal Revision No.410 of 2007 dismissing
the same and affirming the order of the Trial
Court rejecting the prayer of the Appellant for
being discharged from the case.
3.   One     Asha    Rani         Pal,     the     Respondent          No.2
herein,     filed        a    complaint          case     against       her
husband, Mukund Chandra Pandit, and the Appellant
herein,     being     Complaint           Case    No.404     of     2005,
before     the     Sub-Divisional          Judicial        Magistrate,
Dumka, Jharkhand, under Section 498A IPC.                              The
learned      Magistrate           by      his     order     dated       6th
February,        2006,       took      cognizance       against         the
Appellant and other accused and issued process
for the accused to appear before him on 5th April,
2006.      Pursuant to the said order, the Appellant
appeared     before       the     learned        Magistrate       on   10th
July,    2006,     when      the     prosecution        examined        two
witnesses, namely, PW.1 Kanhai Pal, father of the
Respondent No.2 and PW.2 Mukti Pal.                        No further
evidence     was    led      by     the   complainant/Respondent
No.2    and    on    13th    November,      2006,        the   learned
Magistrate      closed       the    pre-charge       evidence         and
posted    the       case    for    arguments       on    framing      of
4.     On 9th March, 2007, the Appellant filed an
application       for      discharge,      inter    alia,      on     the
ground that the complainant had not been examined
as a witness in the case.                  During the arguments
on the said application, it was contended that
the Appellant could not be made an accused under
Section 498A IPC since she was not a relative of
Mukund Chandra Pandit and that the allegations
made    against      her    did    not   make      out    a    case   of
cruelty under the aforesaid Section.                     However, by
his    order    dated       9th   March,    2007,        the   learned
Magistrate rejected the Appellant's application
for discharge on the ground that there was prima
facie evidence for framing of charge against the
accused, including the Appellant, under Section
498A IPC.
5.     Aggrieved by the said order, the Appellant
moved the Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi by way
of Criminal Revision No.410 of 2007. As indicated
hereinabove, a learned Single Judge of the High
Court    by     his    order   dated    29th   April,     2009,
dismissed the Revision Application on the ground
that    since    the   Appellant     was   living   with   the
accused husband of the complainant, she must be
deemed to have become a family member of Mukund
Chandra Pandit for the purpose of Section 498A
6.     The case of the Appellant before us is that
the High Court erred in law in holding that the
Appellant became a member of the family of Mukund
Chandra Pandit merely because she was living with
him in his house allegedly as his wife.                    Mr.
Gaurav    Agrawal,       Advocate,     appearing    for     the
Appellant, contended that Section 498A IPC was
very clear as to who could be charged under the
said Section.       For the sake of convenience, the
said Section is reproduced hereinbelow :-
    "498A. Husband or relative of husband
    of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. -
    Whoever,       being      the   husband       or     the
    relative      of    the   husband   of    a    woman,
    subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
    punished with imprisonment for a term
    which    may    extend     to   three    years       and
    shall also be liable to fine.
    Explanation. - For the purpose of this
    section, "cruelty" means-
    (a)    Any    willful     conduct   which      is     of
    such a nature as is likely to drive the
    woman    to    commit     suicide   or    to       cause
    grave injury or danger to life, limb or
    health (whether mental or physical) of
    the woman; or
    (b) Harassment of the woman where such
    harassment is with a view to coercing
    her or any person related to her to
    meet    any        unlawful     demand    for        any
    property or valuable security or is on
      account of failure by her or any person
      related to her to meet such demand."
7.    It will be seen from the aforesaid provisions
that it is either the husband or the relative of
a husband of a woman who subjects her to cruelty,
who   could       be   charged    under     the    said   Section.
Such provision could not apply to a person who
was   not     a    relation      of   the    husband      when     the
alleged offence is said to have been committed.
It was contended that the Appellant was in no way
related to the husband and was not his wife as
held by the High Court so as to bring her within
the   ambit       of   Section   498A      IPC    and   the   charge
framed against her was, accordingly, invalid and
liable to be quashed.            Reliance was placed by Mr.
Agrawal     on     the   decision     of    this    Court     in    U.
Suvetha v. State [(2009) 6 SCC 757], wherein the
aforesaid question was directly in issue.                        This
Court took up for consideration the question as
to the persons who could be charged under Section

498A IPC having particular regard to the phrase
"relative of the husband" occurring in the said
Section.         This    Court    categorically        held     that
neither     a    girlfriend       nor   a     concubine       is     a
relative of the husband within the meaning of
Section 498A IPC, since they were not connected
by blood or marriage to the husband.
8.   The        other     question       which        fell         for
determination was if a husband was living with
another woman besides his wife, whether the same
would amount to "cruelty" within the meaning of
Section    498A.    It    was    held   that    if    such    other
woman was not connected to the husband by blood
or   marriage,      the    same    would    not      attract       the
provisions of Section 498A I.P.C., although it
could be an act of cruelty for the purpose of
judicial    separation      or    dissolution        of   marriage
under     the    marriage       laws,   but     could     not       be
stretched to amount to "cruelty" under Section
498A IPC.                                                                 8
9.    While construing the provisions of Section
498A IPC in the given circumstances, this Court
observed       that     Section     498A     being      a     penal
provision deserved strict construction and by no
stretch of imagination would a girlfriend or even
a concubine be a "relative", which status could
be    conferred       either   by   blood    connection         or
marriage or adoption.             If no marriage has taken
place,   the    question       of   one    being    relative    of
another would not arise.
10.      Mr. Agrawal urged that the High Court had
misconstrued the provisions of Section 498A vis-
`-vis    the    Appellant      in   relation       to   the   said
Section and the impugned order of the High Court
was, therefore, liable to be set aside along with
the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate rejecting the Appellant's prayer for
discharge from the complaint case filed by Asha
Rani Pal.
11. An       attempt    was    made         on     behalf    of   the
complainant, Asha Rani Pal, to justify the order
passed by the learned Magistrate as also the High
Court on the ground that the Appellant must be
deemed to have acquired the status of wife of
Mukund Chandra Pandit by her conduct and the fact
that they had been living together as husband and
12. We have considered the submissions made on
behalf of the Appellant and the complainant wife.
It    may    be    indicated    that        the    husband    Mukund
Chandra Pandit has not been made a party to these
proceedings.         However, having regard to the view
which       we    are   taking,       his        presence    is   not
necessary for disposing of the present appeal.
13.                Section     498A     IPC,        as      extracted
hereinabove, is clear and unambiguous that only
the husband or his relative could be proceeded
against under the said Section for subjecting the
wife    to       "cruelty",    which    has        been     specially
defined in the said Section in the explanation
thereto.        The    question        as    to   who     would     be    a
relative       of   the      husband        for   the     purpose        of
Section 498A has been considered in detail in U.
Suvetha's      case        (supra).         We    are     entirely       in
agreement with the views expressed in the said
case and we agree with the submissions made on
behalf of the Appellant that the learned Judge of
the High Court committed an error in bestowing
upon     the    Appellant        the     status      of    wife     and,
therefore, a member of Mukund Chandra Pandit's
family. The doctrine of acknowledgement would not
be available in the facts of this case.                                  No
doubt,    there       is    direct     allegation         against    the
Appellant of cruelty against the Respondent No.2,
Asha Rani Pal, but as indicated in U. Suvetha's
case     (supra),          the    same       would        enable     the
Respondent No.2 to proceed against her husband
under Section 498A I.P.C. and also against the
Appellant under the different provisions of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, but not under Section

498A I.P.C.
14. The    Appeal,    therefore,     succeeds                     and            is
allowed.      The   judgment   of   the      learned                  Single
Judge of the Jharkhand High Court impugned in
this Appeal is set aside and the cognizance taken
against the Appellant on 6th February, 2006, by
the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate,
Dumka, under Section 498A IPC, is hereby quashed.
                                        (ALTAMAS KABIR)
                                        (A.K. PATNAIK)
New Delhi
Dated: 13.09.2010

'Rude and aggressive' - why girls are harder to manage as teenagers than boys

Sept 15, 2010

Girls are harder to manage as teenagers than boys, a study of parents has revealed.
Mood swings and fall-outs with friends coupled with peer pressure and image hang-ups emerged as the main flashpoints within the family.
While boys can be harder to communicate with over teenage issues such as puberty, acne and sex, parents still rated them easier to handle. 

Two thirds of parents said girls were harder to raise than teenage boys with almost three quarters admitting they argue more regularly with daughters than with sons, according to the Simple Spotless Skin study of 3,000 mothers and fathers.
A third blamed 'mood swings', 27 per cent said they were 'rude' and 12 per cent admitted their teenage girl was regularly 'aggressive'.
Three quarters said girls have a lot more hang-ups about image than male teens - with the biggest issue being spotty skin, followed by weight.
Study spokesman Tenley Soanes said: 'Teenage years are notoriously difficult for both boys and girls and there's no doubt parents take the brunt of it.
'Issues like weight, spots and quarrels with friends will have caused concern for teenagers 30 years ago so it doesn't come as a surprise that they are still a big worry for teenagers today.
'Some things are inevitable for teens, as it's a time of great change for their bodies. Gaining weight, being moody or getting spots are all things parents will have to tackle.'
Half of parents said their girls suffered from low self-esteem because of problematic skin and one in 10 said their daughter has refused to leave the house as a result of a breakout.
One in 20 mothers said their child had even missed their school prom as a result of skin issues.
The plus point for anyone with a girl approaching her teenage years, is that they are more likely to help around the house.
The study also found a third of parents admitted their teenager's behaviour 'wore them out' and six out of ten have rowed with their partner over the best way to bring up kids.
Four in ten said they have had to sit teenagers down and deal with the issue of acne while 30 per cent have had to discuss weight and dieting issues.
Half have had to deal with the repercussions of bust-ups with friends and 40 per cent have found it necessary to discuss puberty problems.
But girls come off worse again with 75 per cent of parents stating that daughters are more likely to row with their friends than sons.
Eight out of 10 parents believe there is much more pressure on children today to look good and have the 'right image' than when they were young.
Dr Chris Bundy, senior lecturer in Health and Medical Psychology at the University of Manchester, said:  'Females in their teenage years are more prone to mood swings than males, mainly due to the hormone changes their bodies are experiencing.
'Both boys' and girls' behaviour swings between being more child-like one day and adult the next and they get confused too.
'Despite it being traumatic, most parents will probably not escape some kind of teenage upset, but it's the way in which issues are handled that is important.
'Open communication between parents and children is the key so teenagers can approach their parents without them being too embarrassed or telling them off.
'Some of the best advice I can offer parents about bringing up teenage children is to remember everything is a phase and it will pass and not to feel everything has to be resolved here and now.'

Woman Says Citibank Fired Her Because She Was Too Hot (Video)

Jun. 2, 2010

Debrahlee Lorenzana is filing a lawsuit against Citibank because they fired her, she says, for the strangest reason: she's too hot.
She's 5'5'', 125 pounds and well, you've seen her photo.
"Where I'm from," she told the Media, "women dress up—like put on makeup and do their nails—to go to the supermarket... I was raised very Latin. We're feminine. A woman in Puerto Rico takes care of herself."

Her bosses told her that "as a result of the shape of her figure, such clothes were purportedly 'too distracting' for her male colleagues and supervisors to bear," she says.
[Her two male] managers gave her a list of clothing items she would not be allowed to wear: turtlenecks, pencil skirts, and fitted suits. And three-inch heels.
From the Media:
"As a result of her tall stature, coupled with her curvaceous figure," her suit says, Lorenzana was told "she should not wear classic high-heeled business shoes, as this purportedly drew attention to her body in a manner that was upsetting to her easily distracted male managers."
"I couldn't believe what I was hearing," Lorenzana told the Voice. "I said, You gotta be kidding me! I was like, Too distracting? For who? For you? My clients don't seem to have any problem."
As soon as Debrahlee started working at the Citibank branch in the Chrysler Building, she says, everyone there focused on her appearance.
She's working together a lawsuit to charge the bank for creating a sexually discriminatory environment with a lawyer, Jack Tuckner, who agrees that she's smoking hot, but thinks Debarah's case should stand up well with a jury.
"It's like saying that we can't think anymore 'cause our penises are standing up—and we cannot think about you except in a sexual manner—and we can't look at you without wanting to have sexual intercourse with you. And it's up to you, gorgeous woman, to lessen your appeal so that we can focus!"
The conservative shot.
But he also bizarrely told Debarah that she should come to his place (his office) for a photo shoot, because she should have pictures of herself in more conservative clothing to use at her court case ... and then (presumably) told her it was OK to take and let the Voice print the rest of the photos they have of her on their site. Check out more pics of her at the Media -->
Here's the "conservative" shot.
Luckily, she has more evidence than just the conservative photos.
Her case also seems to cite:
  • A meeting during which her two managers told her that her pants were too tight.
  • An email to HR
  • A visit from HR to the Chrysler Building branch
  • Photos Debrahlee took of other female employees dressing equally or more provocatively than she
  • An email to two Citi VPs
And a lot of verbal evidence from a vivacious Puerto Rican woman.
She'll tell the jury that when she looked too hot, they told her to dress down. But when she responded by not wearing makeup, they told her she looked "sickly" and when she left her hair curly instead of straightening it, they told her she should go ahead and straighten it every day.
"I could have worn a paper bag, and it would not have mattered," she told the Voice. "If it wasn't my shirt, it was my pants. If it wasn't my pants, it was my shoes. They picked on me every single day."
Citi can just add this one to the list of sexual-related misconduct lawsuits they have piling up. First there was the blog Fabulis' claim against them, then Dorly Hazan-Amir's, which is pretty ridiculous on Citi's part if true, and that's just in the past four month. We have an email out to a Citi PR rep and will update when we hear back. here is their response:
"We believe this lawsuit is without merit and we will defend against it vigorously. We respect the privacy of all of our employees and therefore cannot comment more specifically on this litigation, this former employee's overall performance, or the reasons for her termination- which an arbitration panel must resolve. Citi is committed to fostering a culture of inclusion and providing a respectful environment in the workplace. We have a strong commitment to diversity and we do not condone, or tolerate, discrimination within our business for any reason."
That's a strong defense! Debrahlee's story sounds like a good movie plot line. What would it be called? Add your ideas in the comments.

15 Shocking Comments Men Allegedly Made In Wall Street Sexual Harassment Cases

Today we learned about the latest allegation of sexual harassment in finance: Citibank employee Debrahlee Lorenzana says she was fired for being too hot.
This is somewhat novel, though, allegations of sexual harassment are nothing new.
Some of the comments that women say they hear from men at the office are just so absurd that we had to compile them all in one place.
Obviously you're someone who likes to blow
Obviously you're someone who likes to blow
One of Dorly Hazan-Amir's male colleagues apparently referred to her, in front of colleagues, as someone who “likes to blow." - Dorly Hazan-Amir's lawsuit against Citi

I want to touch your legs

I want to touch your legs
"I know deep down u are curious how I could feel lol I love touching ur legs when ur near me ur sexy . . . I had a dream about u it was so real lol." - Karen Lo's lawsuit against Thomas Guerriero

Is that a bad thing?

Is that a bad thing?
This guy is totally innocent, we just like his look.
"I wanna make u cumm like u never had is that a bad thing I know ul love it." - Karen Lo's lawsuit against Thomas Guerriero

"I'm all for this hiring woman thing but..."

"I'm all for this hiring woman thing but..."
"I'm all for this hiring women thing, but not if it's going to cost me three of my men every time you can't do something." - Dorly Hazan-Amir's lawsuit against Citi

Women belong at home cleaning

Women belong at home cleaning
The ultimate Stepford Wife
Maureen Murphy said a Nomura trader told her, "women belonged at home cleaning floors." - Maureen Murphy's and Anna Francis' lawsuit against Nomura (it was thrown out)

I had dream sex with you last night

I had dream sex with you last night
Melanie Berliet's boss sent her a text that said, “Just woke up from a dream. I had you on your belly and took you from behind. You came multiple times.” - Melanie Berliet's story about her semi-sexual relationship with her boss at an unnamed bank.

What do you shave?

What do you shave?
Hayley Tansey said a male colleague told her he wanted to rip off her clothes and “have his way with her” and asked which parts of her body she shaved. - Hayley Tansey's lawsuit against British bank HBOS (it was recently thrown out)

Did you like my porno?

Did you like my porno?
Karen Lo says her boss sent her a porn video and then texted her: "I would of definitly made you blush I was acrazy mood you would of defintly had alot of fun. I was going to record a video and send it to you but I wasn't sure how much you liked the last one you asked for. Did you like the last one?"
- Karen Lo's lawsuit against Thomas Guerriero

You get hot for beards right?

You get hot for beards right?
"You Jewish gals get hot for guys with beards, don't you?" - Dorly Hazan-Amir's lawsuit against Citi

I don't want anybody else, When I think about you I ...

I don't want anybody else, When I think about you I ...
"[Your boyfriend's] lil dick please don't make me touch myself thinking bou u lol at least feel me close." - Karen Lo's lawsuit against Thomas Guerriero

We're starting a pool about how fat you'll get

We're starting a pool about how fat you'll get
Dorly Hazan-Amir's male colleagues allegedly tried to start a pool to bet on how much baby weight she would gain. - Dorly Hazan-Amir's lawsuit against Citi

I wanna take you in the stairwell

I wanna take you in the stairwell
"I wanna take you in the stairwell on the low wat u say . . . I know ul love it. meet me there i wanna touch u already."

You suck at sports

You suck at sports
You can attend this industry conference "When you learn how to play golf" - Dorly Hazan-Amir's lawsuit against Citi

“Wow. And I thought I was the only one still having wet dreams.”

“Wow. And I thought I was the only one still having wet dreams.”
Melanie Berliet's boss sent her a text that said, “Wow. And I thought I was the only one still having wet dreams.” - Melanie Berliet's story about her semi-sexual relationship with her boss at an unnamed bank.


Maureen Murphy said she had a client who called a female banker's breasts "honkers" at Nomura. - Maureen Murphy's and Anna Francis' lawsuit against Nomura (it was thrown out)

Can I watch you while you sleep?

Can I watch you while you sleep?
Hayley Tansey says on a business trip she woke up in her hotel room and found a male colleague standing over her watching her as she slept. - Hayley Tansey's lawsuit against British bank HBOS (it was recently thrown out)

Tawdry Tango

Tawdry Tango
Jessica Franqui's boss allegedly grabbed her on the trading floor, dipped her to the ground and then stood on her. When Franqui complained, Marcus Bolton reportedly said: "They [your breasts] are big, and you probably didn't even feel it."
- Bond Trader Sued In Forbidden Dance

The Craziest 15 Ways Women Say They Were Harassed At Goldman Sachs

Sept 15, 2010

Three women allege that they were the victims of gender discrimination on Wall Street. During their work at Goldman Sachs, they say, the women received unwelcome sexual advances, they were ostracized, overheard inappropriate sexual banter, were not invited to male outings, and were passed up for promotions and bonuses that their male equals received.
One of the victims, Lisa Parisi, called her situation "untenable."
In a lengthy lawsuit filed today in Federal Court against Goldman Sachs, Christina Chen-Oster, Lisa Parisi, and Shanna Orlich share their hurtful stories.

They've trotted out several examples.

Goldman Sachs Sued For Discriminating Against Women

Sept. 15, 2010

Goldman Sachs has been sued in Federal Court for sexual discrimination against women in performance evaluations, compensation, promotions, business opportunities, and professional support, says the Media. The women bringing the lawsuit moved pretty far up the corporate ladder.

A lawsuit in Manhattan federal court said it was filed on behalf of employees Christina Chen-Oster (formerly a VP), Lisa Parisi (a managing director) and Shanna Orlich and seeks class-action status.
No word on who is bringing the lawsuit, and there's nothing about it online yet, but We'll keep you posted as we hear more.
Maybe it has something to do with the "Mommy Track" lawsuit launched against Goldman earlier this year. 

Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Crl. MC No.4073/2009 & 4074/2009          

Date of Reserve: August 03, 2010  
Date of Order:  September 14, 2010

  D.K. Pandey              ...Petitioner         

State & Anr.              ...Respondents   


Crl. M.C. No.4074/2009  14.09.2010

  D.K. Pandey              ...Petitioner         
State & Anr.              ...Respondents   

Ms. Anjali Jha for petitioner.
Mr. Neeraj Jain for respondent.


1.  Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?  Yes.
2.  To be referred to the reporter or not?          Yes.
3.  Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?        Yes.


1.  By this common order, I shall dispose of the above two petitions preferred by the  petitioner against the summoning order dated 26th  February, 2009 passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate in two complaints made by two complainants against the petitioner. 

2.  The complainants  filed a complaint  each  under Section 499,500 IPC against the petitioner since the petitioner had issued a Circular to its all agents  and customers. The circular reads as under:- “Date: 12.11.2008
This is to inform that M/s Gupta Brothers/ M/s R.P. Gupta & Sons, 3676, Gali Shahtara, G.B. Road, Delhi-110 006 are Not our Authorized Dealer.  It has come  to our notice  that  “MIRANDA” make items are being sold at  Higher Discounts  for which we will not be responsible for  Genuineness & Quality  complaint of material. 

3.  It is not in dispute that neither Gupta Brothers nor M/s R.P. Gupta & Sons are authorized dealers of the petitioner. However, respondents/complainants in their complaint contended that the respondents were very reputed dealers in the market and this circular  harmed  their reputation because the circular gave an impression that the tools being sold by the complainants /respondents were  not genuine or of good quality. 
4.  Section 499 IPC Explanation 10 reads as under: 

Section 499. Defamation
Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or
by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes
any imputation concerning any person intending  to harm, or
knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will
harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the
cases hereinafter expected, of defame that person.
Tenth Exception-Caution intended for good of person to
whom conveyed or for public good:  --It is not defamation to
convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against
another, provided that such caution be intended for the good
of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in
whom that person is interested, or for the public good.”
5.  The first part of circular being truthful thus cannot be considered as a publication for harming the reputation of the respondents. The second part of the circular is a caution issued by the petitioner to the customers that they would not be responsible for genuineness and quality of the items sold at higher discounts. It is obvious that the petitioner wanted to convey to the public that if anybody was giving  higher  discount, there was probability  that the material sold  was not of genuine quality and the petitioner company would not be responsible for the quality. 

6.  The learned MM while passing summoning order had only discussed that the complainant was a company of repute. He did not discuss how the issuance of circular amounted to defamation of the complainants company. While passing summoning order, it is obligatory on the part of learned MM to consider the material and evidence placed on record in the light of offence allegedly committed and analyze it so as to come to a conclusion whether  the commission of offence in terms of provisions of law was disclosed or not. Just reproducing a part of the evidence and stating that he was satisfied that there was sufficient material on record to summon the accused,  only shows non-application of mind.  Such an order is a mechanical order since the trial court did not apply mind whether the ingredients of the offence were  prima facie  satisfied or not  in  view of the explanations given in the section itself. It is the duty of the court to consider if the alleged act falls under any of the explanation or not. The learned MM in this case abdicated  this obligation of analyzing the material in the light of  provisions of Section 499 IPC. 

7.  I find that the complaints were a gross misuse of  judicial process and the petitioner was within its right to issue a caution notice /circular to the customers and general public and to inform them that the complainants/ respondents were not their authorized dealers and then to caution that if their brand of  tools were being sold at higher discounts then  public  should take caution about the genuineness and quality. 

8.  In the result, the petitions are allowed and the summoning order dated 26th February, 2009 passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate in two complaints made by two complainants against the petitioner are hereby set aside. 
9.  The petitions stand allowed.    

September 14, 2010                SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J

Even a mutual consent divorce by family court can be set aside by HC if either party challenges

Bench: B P Dharmadhikari




Sau. Sushama w/o Pramod Taksande,

Aged 30 years, Household,

r/o. C/o. Shri Wasudeo Shendre, Rani

Laxmibai Ward, Pandharkawada,

Tahsil Kelapur, District Yavatmal. … APPELLANT. VERSUS

Shri Pramod s/o Ramaji Taksande,

Age 42 years, occupation Businessman,

Karanji Road, Tahsil Kelapur,

District Yavatmal. … RESPONDENT. ———————-

Mr. R.D. Bhuibar, Advocate for Appellant.

Mr. Anjan De, Advocate for Respondent.


Date of Reserving Order. – 04.02.2009

Date of Pronouncement. – 17.03.2009 2


1. The appellant before this Court is wife and she challenges judgment dated 6.12.2008 delivered by the District Judge -I, Pandharkawada, affirming the judgment dated 6.10.2008 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pandharkawada (Kelapur). The Civil Judge, has in H.M.P. No.24/2008 presented under section 13[B] of Hindu Marriage Petition, dissolved marriage between the parties because of consent and the custody of two sons with father Pramod was continued as wife agreed not to seek the custody. It is also recorded that wife waived her right of maintenance. This order was challenged by wife in Regular Civil Appeal No. 68/2008 inter-alia contending that her signature on said petition and accompanying affidavits were obtained under false pretext and she was compelled to place her signature upon it. She contended that both the parties were residing together and there was no separation for a period of one year which is a mandatory requirement. The Lower Appellate Court has considered this ground and in paragraph no.7 found that petition was presented on 4.4.2008, parties were directed to remain present on 6.10.2008 and from pleadings it appeared that both parties were not ready to continue 3
their marital tie. In their affidavits, both state that they were residing separately from February, 2007 and hence both were residing away from each other for more than one year before the presentation of the Section 13[B] petition. The Appellate Court also found that the affidavit of wife demonstrated that they were residing separately from one year before filing of the petition. It also noted that Advocate for husband submitted that, wife was residing at house of her brother at Karanji itself and this submission was not “refuted” by appellant i.e. wife. In view of this consideration the appeal came to be dismissed.

2. I have heard Advocate Shri Bhuibar, for appellant Wife and Advocate Shri Anjan De, for respondent husband in this background.

3. On 04.02.2009 following three questions were framed and after hearing the parties, the appeal was closed for orders/ judgment. “(1) Whether in present facts and circumstances, there is compliance with provision of Section 23[1][bb] of the Hindu Marriage Act ?
(2) Whether the petitioner Wife could have challenged the judgment and order in
H.M.P.No.24/2008 in Appeal ?
(3) Whether the petitioner-Wife has indulged in perjury?”
Then it was felt that an attempt for re-conciliation should have been made even in High Court, accordingly, in consultation with both the Advocates sought time for the said purpose till 02.03.2009 and ultimately both of them expressed their inability and stated that efforts undertaken for re-conciliation failed. The matter was therefore again heard on 02.03.2009 and on that date Advocate Shri De for respondent invited attention to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 25 of C.P.C. to urge that if this Court finds it necessary, a limited issue or question can be framed and finding upon it can be called from the Trial Court. The appeal was finally closed for judgment on 02.03.2009.

4. Advocate Shri Bhuibar, has contended that the requirement of law in this respect is very clear and the Civil Judge, Senior Division has to record a satisfaction under Section 23[1][bb] so as to avoid such contentions and arguments from being raised. He invites attention to the fact that address of both the parties mentioned in the marriage petition is same and their affidavits also mention very same address. There is nothing on record to show that they were residing away from each other and the petition itself did not demonstrates that parties were staying separately for more than one year. He relies upon two judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1998 SC 764– 5
Balwinder Kaur .vrs. Hardeep Singh , Sureshta Devi .vrs. Om Prakash– 1991 (1) Mh.L.J. 324, to urge that the Lower Courts have failed to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the law. AIR 1987 Punjab 191 Smt. Krishna Khetarpal .vrs. Satish Lal, is being pointed out to show that the present appeal is maintainable. Lastly it is argued that in view of the document filed along with the reply by the present respondent/husband need for counseling couple was apparent and Civil Judge, Senior Division has not held any conciliation proceeding in the matter. The learned counsel therefore, prayed for allowing the Second Appeal.

5. Advocate Shri Anjan De, for respondent husband has placed strong reliance upon the documents filed by the respondent on affidavit along with Civil Application No. 130/2009. The said application is also styled as “submissions”. It is for taking action for perjury and for contempt of Court against the appellant. It is pleaded that the documents accompanying it are obtained under Right to Information Act. The first document is report submitted by the S.D.P.O. Pandharkawada on 20.08.2008 to Assistant Superintendent of Police, at Yavatmal after enquiry into the complaint made by Digamber Ramdas Dhote. He is father of present appellant. The second document is the 6
oral statement recorded by S.D.P.O. The fourth document is statement dated 18.8.2008 of present appellant and in that statement she has that she is married with the present respondent and has two sons from him. She has further stated that she has love affair with police constable Surendra Wasnik, since last one year and she has gone out with him and when ever he used to visit her, he used to present her with Saree or some ornaments out of love. This relationship was not liked by her parents and some others and hence complaint came to be filed against Shri Wasnik, She mentioned that she had applied for divorce before the Court and case would be decided within a month. After grant of divorce from court she was going to reside with Shri Wasnik because of their relations. Her father in law and mother in law had agreed to look after her sons and hence custody of sons would be with them. She has further stated that before moving for divorce she had a talk with Shri Wasnik on mobile phone of her husband and as Shri Wasnik promised that they would reside jointly, she had informed accordingly to her husband who was standing by her side. She further stated that she had tried to contact Surendra Wasnik on mobile in last 2/3 months, but contact could not be established. Document no.5, is statement of her husband [present respondent], which shows that he has corroborated the above position. He has further stated that his wife is deeply in love 7
with Shri Wasnik and they also tried to commit suicide by pouring kerosene and because of this ultimately proceedings for divorce were required to be initiated. Annexure-R2 with this reply is copy of application dated 4.4.2008 filed in the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pandharkawada where both the parties to this appeal pointed out that as the applicant no.2 wife therein wanted to marry Surendra Wasnik, waiting period of 6 months should be relaxed. Annexure- R3 is the affidavit dated 6.10.2008 filed by the present appellant before the said Court in which she has mentioned that they have not been residing together as such from February 2007 and as there was no possibility of reconciliation on 4.4.2008, proceedings for divorce by mutual consent came to be filed. She has further stated that she is not going to claim any maintenance from her husband and also waived her right to custody of children. She has further stated that she was not carrying from her husband and as re-conciliation was not possible, though relatives tried to mediate and resolve, she was voluntarily severing the relationship. She has further stated that she is firm on her decision taken 6 months earlier.

6. In view of this document Advocate Shri De, contends that even after filing of the proceedings for grant of divorce on 4.4.2008 the 8
desire and decision of present appellant to separate from the respondent has come on record and he points out that all these statements are recorded also 4 months thereafter. He states that therefore plea of any mis representation or coercion or pressure is clearly by way of after thought and false affidavit has been filed before this Court. According to him it is nothing but perjury and as it interferes with the administration of justice it also constitutes contempt of Court. He has invited attention to statement of Surendra Wasnik recorded on 19.8.2008 by the S.D.P.O in which Surendra Wasnik has stated that he was not knowing the present appellant and he had even never talked with her. He has further stated that because there was some quarrel or misunderstanding between the said lady and her husband, she filed proceedings in the court of law and as she needed some shelter, she was trying to get into his house. He further stated that he is already married and his wife was working in health department as staff nurse and his son aged about 7 years is taking education in school at Yavatmal. He further mentions that because of service of his wife, his wife and children were residing at Yavatmal only. The S.D.P.O has in brief narrated all these statements and in his report, stated that police constable Surendra Wasnik had conducted himself in a manner not becoming of his status and therefore he deserves tobe punished. It is 9
the contention of Advocate Shri De, that because of change in his statement by Shri Wasnik, as it became clear to appellant that he is not going to marry or reside with her, she might have changed her stand. According to him in present circumstances, there is substantial compliance with provisions of Section 23[1][bb] and entire case law cited above is not relevant. He points out that from orders passed on 9.4.2008 it is apparent that the Presiding Officer has heard both of them and then after perusal of the contents of petition adjourned it to 6.10.2008. He therefeore, states that efforts to conciliate were also made on that date and hence no substantial question of law arise in this Second Appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed.

7. The contention of Advocate Shri De, in Civil Application No.130/2009, is to initiate action against the appellant / wife and to punish her for perjury. The said application is also to be treated as submissions of respondent / husband. The documents prepared by Deputy Divisional Police Officer and report submitted by him to the Superintendent of Police, Yavatmal are relied upon to show that, there was no pressure of any type upon the appellant / wife and her contention that her signature on petition for grant of divorce by mutual consent or that on affidavits were obtained by force, are false. It is also 10
alleged that by making false allegations before this Court, she obtained interim order on 30.01.2009. I find it premature to rely on the said documents at this stage and to return any finding on perjury on this basis. The interim order was passed by this Court on 30.01.2009 after hearing both the sides. The report prepared by police or statements recorded by police are still not put to the appellant, as required by law and hence at this stage it cannot be used against her. Perusal of the statements recorded by police and report prepared on its basis, reveal that the appellant / wife wanted to have relations with police Constable Shri Wasnik and wanted to cohabit with him. The statement also discloses that she had made telephone calls accordingly to the said constable by using mobile instrument of her husband and in presence of her husband. The police constable Shri Wasnik assured to cohabit with her and then only she filed the application for divorce along with her husband. But unless and until all these facts are proved on record, no reliance can be placed upon the same at this stage. The prayer to punish the appellant for perjury is therefore premature. Recourse to Order 41 Rule 25, only for this purpose in present matter is not warranted.

8. The provisions of Section 13[B] of Hindu Marriage Act 11
require the parties to live separately for a period of one year before petition for grant of divorce is presented. Perusal of application as moved by the parties jointly on 4.4.2008 reveals that it does not disclose this fact & does not contain any statement in this respect. On 4.4.2008 the petition was presented and the in charge Court directed it to be placed before the regular Presiding Officer. Both the parties were present before the regular court on 09.04.2008. The said court i.e. Trial Court has recorded that it perused the contents of the petition and heard both of them in person. Thereafter it adjourned the matter to 06.10.2008 for further orders. The order therefore clearly shows that the fact whether parties were residing together or were residing separately has not been specifically gone into by the said Court on 09.04.2008. The petition as filed prima facie shows that both of them were residing at same place. Advocate Shri De, has contended that the appellant was residing with her brother in same village. However, the position is to be verified by the Trial Court on very first date, and this exercise ought to have been undertaken on 09.04.2008 itself. Advocate Shri De, has pointed out that on 4.4.2008 the parties had moved application for waiving the requirement of waiting for 6 months and in it, it has been mentioned that wife had to remarry immediately with Shri Wasnik, Police Constable. This application is supported by separate 12
affidavits of both. Dates given by the Trial Court show that no such exemption was granted by it. However, orders if any, passed upon it have not been brought on record. On 6.10.2008 again wife has filed affidavit and in the said affidavit, she has mentioned that there was difference of opinion between the two since beginning and they were residing separately from February 2007. She has stated that she was reiterating her decision to obtain divorce by mutual consent. It is to be noted that the grievance of the appellant is that her signatures were obtained against her wish by her husband.

9. The judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sureshta Devi .vrs. Om Prakash (1991 Mh.L.J. 324), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, it is open to the parties to even unilaterally withdraw through consent at any time. In paragraph No. 9 the Hon’ble Apex Court has noted that parties have to make joint motion not earlier than 6 months after the date of presentation of petition and such much enables the Trial Court to find out the genuineness of the averments in the petition and also to find out whether the consent was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. The Trial Court can make such enquiry as it thinks fit, including examining parties for that purpose and if it is satisfied that consent of the parties were not obtained by force, 13
fraud or undue influence and that they mutually agreed for dissolution of marriage, the Trial Court must pass a decree of divorce. In Balwinder Kaur .vrs. Hardeep Singh (supra) in paragraph No.15, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that Section 23 of Hindu Marriage Act mandates that Court before granting decree of divorce has to satisfy itself that grounds for claiming relief exists and petitioner is not taking advantage of his own wrong or disability. Court has to make an effort to bring about re-conciliation between the parties. I find that the provisions of Section 23[1][bb] require the Court to satisfy itself that consent for divorce under section 13[B] has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. This application of mind has to be on very first date when the court adjourns the matter for conciliation or for statutory period and must reveal itself in the court order then passed. The said order must also disclose that the court had satisfied itself that the matter fulfilled all requirements of law relevant at that stage. The earlier order & impugned judgment delivered by the Trial Court or by the Lower Appellate Court does not show that any such satisfaction was reached or recorded by the Trial Court. The final order passed on 16.02.2008 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, reveals that even the date from which the parties were staying separately has not been mentioned any where in it, and the compliance with Section 23[1][bb] 14
is also not recorded. It only mentions in paragraph no.4 that dispute between the parties could not be settled by their relatives. In paragraph No.5 it has been mentioned that the petition was jointly presented on 04.04.2008 and statutory period of 6 months was given to parties to find out genesis of settlement between them and thee was no fruitful settlement. Thus there was no endeavor by the Court below to find out whether any conciliation was possible or not. The said judgment of trial Court was then questioned by wife by filing Appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the Court of District Judge at Pandharkawada. In appeal memo in paragraph no.13 it has been specifically averred that there was no separation and the averment in the application before the trial Court were false. It is also pleaded that false affidavit was prepared and wife was compelled by the husband to put her signature on it. These contentions are not considered by the Lower Appellate Court. It appears that the Advocate who was jointly representing the husband and wife before the Trial Court appeared on behalf of respondent to oppose the appeal of wife. The lower Appellate Court should not have permitted such appearance, particularly in view of the ground of compulsion or force by the wife. Appellate Court has found that in affidavit dated 6.10.2008 both the parties mentioned that they were residing separately from February 2007 and hence condition 15
precedent required under section 13[B] was satisfied. The contentions of appellant / wife that her signature was obtained by pressurizing her or then the averment in their affidavit were false, are ignored and the fact that statutory requirement of recording satisfaction in this respect cast upon the Trial Court by section 23 is not fulfilled, is also ignored. Thus the appeal came to be dismissed only by accepting the disputed affidavit as sufficient compliance.

10. Both the judgments are therefore delivered mechanically without any application of mind to the provisions of Law in the matter. The obligation cast upon court by legislature while dissolving marriage by consent is overlooked and its object has been defeated in this case. The institution of marriage is sacred and marriage tie is not to be easily broken. The requirement to verify the voluntary nature of consent, provision of a period of separation, duty to attempt to conciliate and waiting period of 6 months in court all show the seriousness with which the parties as also the courts of law have to evaluate the facts. Here, both the courts have acted mechanically thereby defeating the statutory protection extended to week spouse by law. The judgments are therefore unsustainable.

11. Advocate Shri De, however has also raised contention that as divorce has been obtained by mutual consent, the decree is consent decree and hence appeal is not maintainable. In Smt. Krishna Khetarpal .vrs. Satish Lal (supra), the Hon’ble Division Bench of that High Court has considered the identical challenge in paragraph nos. 3 to 6 and concluded that appeal against such decree is maintainable. It has been held that Section 28[1] of Hindu Marriage Act provides a right of appeal and all original decrees made by the Trial Court under the said Act are appealable. The decree of divorce by mutual consent is one such decree & hence, also appealable. It has been observed that appeal under section 96 of C.P.C. is on different footing and Section 96[3] prescribing a bar of appeal against consent decree has no application. In paragraph no.5, it is observed that a decree for divorce by mutual consent is not based merely on mutuality of the consenting parties, but the courts involvement in the decision making is inextricably a part of such decree. Possibility of an error, legal or factual, in such decision cannot be ruled out, and therefore, appeal under section 28 has been provided for. Another Division Bench of that High Court in the case of Charanjit Singh Mann .vrs. Neelam Maan (AIR 2006 P & H 201), has in paragraph no.25, cited this judgment with approval. AIR 2007 Jharkhand 34 –Smt. Hina Singh .vrs. Satya Kumar Singh, is again the 17
judgment of Division Bench of Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court wherein provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. are considered and ultimately in paragraph no.3 it has been held that appeal against decree of divorce by mutual consent is maintainable. In view of these judgments which correctly & clearly clinch the issue, I find that appeal against such consent decree is maintainable.

12. Legislature has cast obligations upon Court entertaining the proceedings under section 13[B] to record a finding that consent for divorce has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. Thus legislature has visualised that there may be a case in which consent for divorce may be obtained and decided to provide a safeguard against abuse of this provision. Hence obligation has been cast upon the court to verify the same, and to record a satisfaction that the consent given by the parties is free and voluntary. Thus having visualized abuse of such provision for grant of divorce by mutual consent by use of force, fraud etc., it cannot be accepted that legislature did not provide for a remedy to the spouse aggrieved in such matters. To hold that remedy of appeal is not available to such aggrieved spouse, will be rendering nugatory the exercise of obligation cast upon the trial court by the Legislature. I therefore find that the arguments of Advocate Shri De about tenability 18
of appeal against such consent divorce decree are liable to be rejected.

13. In view of this consideration, it has to be held that the appeal as filed by the appellant / wife before the Lower Appellate Court and before this Court is legally maintainable and question no.2 needs to be answered accordingly in affirmative in her favour. Question no.3 about indulgence in perjury by the appellant wife cannot be answered at this stage in absence of sufficient material, as it is found to be premature. No remand or calling of report from trial court in that respect is necessary as even otherwise the trial court has to look again into the voluntary nature of wife’s consent. Question no.1 is answered in favour of the wife by holding that there is no compliance with provisions of Section 23[1][bb] of the Hindu Marriage Act.

14. In the circumstances, the judgment and decree dated 06.10.2008 delivered by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pandharkawada (Kelapur) in H.M.P. No. 24/2008 is hereby quashed and set aside. Similarly, the judgment and decree dated 06.12.2008 delivered by the District Judge-I, Pandharkawada in Regular Civil Appeal No. 68/2008 is also quashed and set aside. H.M.P. No.24/2008 19
is restored back to the file of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pandharkawada for its further trial in accordance with law. Second Appeal is accordingly allowed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to cost.