Mr.Rebates

Mr. Rebates

Saturday, November 6, 2010

Woman loses custody battle, files plea under DV Act


AHMEDABAD: The Gujarat high court has advised a woman to file a complaint under the domestic violence laws to obtain custody of her three children from her husband. The woman has been thrown out of her matrimonial home.

However, the court did not grant custody of the children to the mother with the observation that the eldest daughter had showed willingness to stay with her father, and there was no reason cited why the mother only should have the custody of fiveyear old twins. As per the case details, Geeta Desai, a resident of Maninagar, and her husband Labhubhai from Mehsana district were fighting for custody of their three children.

Geeta was allegedly thrown out of her matrimonial home in March this year and the children stayed with her husband. Geeta filed an application in the metropolitan court, which issued a search warrant for the children and upon their production, ordered that they should be handed over to the woman.

The husband immediately moved city sessions court, which asked the man to keep the kids but to present them before the magistrate on October 14, when the court would decide the issue on the basis of evidence. After this order, the husband approached the high court and after hearing the case, Justice Akil Kureshi quashed the sessions court order and held that the husband would have custody of all three kids. The judge talked to the daughter and tried to know her wish. But he observed that it was not possible to know the wish of the five-year old twins.

However, the high court observed that as the case was related to custody of children of tender age, their welfare is of paramount consideration, and no technicality of procedural law would prevent the court from ensuring the well-being of the children.

Man, family sentenced for dowry demands

Nov 4, 2010

MANGALORE: The Third Judicial Magistrate First Class court here sentenced a person to six-months imprisonment for harassing his wife for dowry and fined him Rs 2,000. The judge Renuka Devidas Raikar directed Ashraf the husband to undergo imprisonment and also sentenced five other relatives including his father, mother, sisters and brother-in-law to undergo one-month imprisonment and fined them Rs 1,000 each.

The co-accused sentenced in this case is Umarabba, Bi Fatima, Khairulla, Jameela, and Rafique. The Ullal police station had registered a case against Ashraf and others under Sections 323, 506, ad 509 of IPC. The Ullal PSI A D Nagaraj had filed the chargesheet before the court and assistant public prosecutor Judith Crasta appeared on behalf of the state in this case. The fine amount, the judge directed, should be paid to the victim.


B.C. woman wants 'fake' husband deported (Canada)

June 14, 2010


A 22-year-old Victoria woman claims she was misled by a man from India who, she says, married her to get into Canada and dropped her after he obtained his visa.
"He used me to get here. It's because of me he's here," said Kara Dhaliwall. "His family thinks Canadian people are stupid.… They think money can buy you a ticket into Canada."
She says she believes her husband, Neeraj (Sunny) Kanda, now lives in the Vancouver area without her. Because of that, the bride and her mother want him deported.
"If you love someone, you don't come here and not even make contact once you are here," Dhaliwall said.
"She is devastated," said Dhaliwall's mother, Jevan. "On her part it was true — from her heart — but on her husband's side, it was all about getting to Canada."

Wife allegedly threatened

Dhaliwall has filed complaints with police and immigration authorities, alleging that since her husband arrived, his friends and family have threatened her and offered her a payoff to keep quiet.
"His father told me … 'I'll give you $15,000.' And then I'm like, 'No, I don't want money, I just want him to contact me,'" said Dhaliwall.
"Then he said, 'OK, $20,000.' I'm like, 'I don't want money, don't you understand?' And he's like '$25,000, and then I'll give you another $10,000 and another $10,000 after a month.'"
Kara Dhaliwall and her mother, Jevan, want her husband deported. (CBC) CBC News tried to reach Kanda, 25, at a residence in suburban Richmond where Dhaliwall tracked him down, but received no response. A man at the home, who would not identify himself, said Kanda's B.C. lawyer would answer any questions.
However, lawyer Dennis McCrea didn't provide any information. Instead, he wrote: "Be wary of publishing anything that is libellous of my clients."
Dhaliwall is a third-generation Canadian of South Asian heritage. She met Kanda while travelling in Punjab last year. She said she didn't like him at first, but he pursued her and she fell in love.
His family held a lavish wedding for the couple in India in September.
Dhaliwall came back to Canada to arrange spousal sponsorship for her husband. She said his family sent her to business associates in B.C., who sent her to an immigration consultant who completed the required paperwork.
Dhaliwall travelled to India to see her husband over Christmas, then came back home again. Kanda's visa was approved in India in April, but Dhaliwall said he hasn't called her since.

Cut off contact

"She was on the phone to everybody.… She just kept calling Sunny's cellphone, but it was now turned off," said her mother.
Dhaliwall learned from border authorities that Kanda arrived in Vancouver soon after he received his visa. He listed her address as his place of residence, but she said she has seen him only once since he arrived — when she followed him from his new residence to a parking lot — and he avoided her.
"I felt like killing myself," Dhaliwall said tearfully. "I felt used."
Soon after Kanda arrived, Dhaliwall and her mother said friends of her husband's family began calling, demanding the bride accept a payment from her father-in-law and sign papers agreeing the marriage wasn't real. Jevan Dhaliwall said she heard the calls and they were threatening.
"'Kara, you know you need to sign these papers. That's Sunny's father's wishes. You need to meet with us,'" Dhaliwall quoted the callers as saying, "'You're a bitch. We're going to kill you. You are dead as far as Sunny is concerned.'"
Kanda's wife says he is staying at this Richmond, B.C., home with friends of his family. (CBC) "Then one of them said, 'I didn't just build the boat. I own the boat.'"
Police have since arrested one person for allegedly uttering threats. Saanich, B.C., police confirmed charges are pending.
"He's here as her husband. Nothing else. We are not signing any papers or any payoff," said Jevan Dhaliwall.

Internet postings discovered

Her daughter said she later discovered several postings on an Indian social networking site that appear to be written by her husband, boasting the marriage was all a sham.
"I don't care. Immigration and police can't do anything. My uncle is getting a lawyer … if I lied to get in to Canada, once I get the visa no one can take it again," says one posting next to a picture of Kanda.
"My dad and my uncle tell me not to worry, lots of people lie and fraud with Canada.… If she put a case, then we will get a lawyer and try and make it her fault … I don't care, I like Canada. India is too hot."
An internet posting, which appears to be from Dhaliwall's husband, says 'immigration and police can't do anything.' (CBC) "We are the biggest fools," said Jevan Dhaliwall. "That's how I feel right now … seeing what he's done to her. So [Canada] has to send him back. He does not deserve to be here."
"I haven't heard a single story where people were sent back," said Raj Chouhan, a B.C. MLA who said the Dhaliwall case is just one of hundreds he has heard over the years.
"These people in India use the innocent Canadians to seek admission to Canada, and the government of Canada has a responsibility to stop it," Chouhan said.

'Disgusting,' says minister

"There's always money at some point involved in this," federal Immigration Minister Jason Kenney told CBC News. "It's just so disgusting. It's an industry, actually."
Kenney estimated there are thousands of fake weddings involving Canadians every year. However, he said once the spouses are in Canada it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that fraud occurred.
"How do you get an actual criminal conviction — proving that someone entered into the marriage and filled out immigration forms in bad faith — when they never get together and the other person says, 'We fell out of love, it was never meant to be'? How do you prove they were lying in a court of law?" asked Kenney.
Immigration Minister Jason Kenney said he's open to ideas on how to improve the system. (CBC) The minister said he's considering suggestions from victims' advocates who want Canada to adopt a probation period for arriving spouses, as in the U.S. and Australia. Under those systems, sponsored spouses don't get legal status in their new country until they have lived with their spouses for a significant period.
"I agree ... that something has to be done to prevent this exploitation. Not only of individuals like her [Dhaliwall], but of our broader immigration system.
"I'm open to ideas."
Kenney did not say what, if anything, his department can do about Dhaliwall's situation now.
Dhaliwall said that no matter what her husband tells authorities, the fact remains he is not in Canada to be her husband and that should be enough to justify deportation.
"It's obvious. It's black and white. He didn't come to me when he got here."

4 in 10 1st marriages end in divorce: report (Canada)


The Ottawa-based Vanier Institute has published a study on Canadian families based on the 2006 census.

The traditional definition of family is changing in Canada, with four in 10 first marriages ending in divorce, according to a new study.
For the first time in Canadian history, there are more unmarried people than legally married people age 15 and over in this country, says the study from the Vanier Institute of the Family released Monday in Ottawa.
It was based on data from the 2006 census, and some of the information has been reported in the years since.
"Marriage is still a vitally important part of the experience of families in the fabric of our country and most young people do aspire to marriage," said Clarence Lochhead, executive director of the Vanier Institute, adding that even people who have divorced or separated will end up partnering up again.
"We just have to come to grips with the diversity that actually is within our experience. Then we need to find ways to address and take on the challenges that face families, but do it in an inclusive way that makes sense for the reality and not some ideal notion of what a family is or ought to be."
According to Statistics Canada, about 38 per cent of all marriages taking place in 2004 will have ended in divorce by 2035. The total divorce rate was down slightly from its peak of about 41 per cent in the mid 1980s, but slightly higher than the rate of about 37 per cent recorded in the mid 1990s.
Newfoundland and Labrador had the lowest rate of divorce at 21.6 per cent — while Quebec had the highest at 48.4 per cent.
The highest proportion of married people was in Newfoundland and Labrador where 54.3 per cent were married, while Quebec had the lowest proportion of married couples with only 37.5 per cent of adults falling in this category.
For the first time in Canada, there were more couples without children than with children, and this was true throughout the country, with families with children representing a minority of families in all provinces and territories.
For married families with children, 18.6 per cent of children live with only one parent. Common-law families are growing faster than any other type of family with one in 10 Canadians living in such relationships and 14.6 per cent of children living with common-law parents.
The 2006 census was the first to report on same-sex marriages and 16.5 per cent of same-sex couples now marry.
The recent economic downturn has proven to be a stressor for families. The higher cost of living means most families now require two income earners to achieve an average standard of living.
More families are also struggling with debt and poverty. Men are also working longer hours and spending less time with their families.

Friday, November 5, 2010

India still low in human development index, in top 10 on income growth

Nov 5, 2010

The Human Development Report (HDR) 2010, released by the UNDP today, highlighted India as among the 10 countries that showed the fastest progress in human development, in terms of income-related measures, between 1970 and 2010. In fact, in an indication of the changing geography of economic growth, eight out of the top 10 improvers are from East, Southeast and South Asia (China was first). Botswana and Malta are the only two countries from outside these regions that figure in the list. 

However, oddly, the Report clubs India along with 20 other countries where a potential for exposure to “civil war” imposes limitations on “freedom from fear”. While Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Colombia are categorised as countries with “major civil war” threats, India is put into a league with Burundi, Mali, Sudan, Myanmar, Iran and Israel among others in a “minor civil war” threat category (for those with civil conflicts that have resulted in fewer than 1,000 deaths). 

India, otherwise, is ranked as a “Medium Human Development” country, and is 119th of 169 territories listed in the 2010 report. Norway, at the top, has a Human Development Index (HDI) value of 0.938; India’s is 0.519. The Report points out that India’s ranking has improved by only a single spot between 2005 and 2010. In other words, while income-related factors have done well, India has performed relatively poorly on the other indicators.
Neighbouring China and Nepal have been highlighted as the countries that have made the greatest progress in improving their HDI value. China is ranked 89 and has a middle-level HDI of 0.663. Nepal, at 0.428 is ranked low, at 138. Yet Nepal is the second-best performer in terms of improving the non-income aspects of human development, despite its record of civil insurgency. The Report ascribes this to a “major public policy push”. Free primary education from 1971 and secondary education in 2007 meant enrolment and literacy soared; health improved through “the extension of primary healthcare through community participation, local mobilisation of resources and decentralisation.” Pakistan, meanwhile, has been ranked 6 places below India, with an HDI of 0.490.
The 2010 report introduced the inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI), described as measuring human development after accounting for inequality in the distribution of health, education and income. While the average loss in the HDI value when adjusted for inequality is about 22 per cent, India loses about 30 per cent of its HDI value, from 0.519 to 0.365. The Report says 40 per cent of this loss is because of inequality in education, while over 31 per cent is inequality in health. Income inequality slices off only about 15 per cent. 

The Report also highlights variations within India, comparing the level of “multi-dimensional poverty” — in which the poor also lack access to health and education — across regions and castes. Delhi is comparable to Iraq or Vietnam, while Bihar is like war-torn Sierra Leone. Meanwhile, 81 per cent of Scheduled Tribes are multi-dimensionally poor, compared to one-third of upper-caste households, who collectively are at the HDI level of middle-income Honduras. The “intensity and incidence” of poverty, the Report says, is greater in South Asia than in any other region. 

The Report makes a case for extending the domain of economic policy to all forms of well-being, including political participation. The NREGA, in a section authored by Jean Dreze and Reetika Khera, finds a mention. Interestingly, the Report tackles the “income-first” approach of China, an intellectual challenge to HDI-based thinking, head-on. It points out that early in China’s reform period “public social services deteriorated and in some places even collapsed.” It goes on to argue that in the last decade, China has changed focus. In 2002, Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom, an attack on China-style policies, was translated into Chinese; and, when healthcare was being reformed in 2005, a crucial expert-group at the ministry of health was asked to read the book, the most prominent exposition of the Sen-Haq thesis that human capabilities and opportunities are what matter.

Human development: India at a dismal 119!

The Indian Government has all her priorities incorrect, the government spends more time pleasing the Feminazi Fascists with all the new Male Biased laws, so naturally the rest of society will suffer. India can never be a developed nation as long as she surrenders to the Feminazi Fascists.
Every nation will improve the quality of life for all citizens when Draconian Family Laws don't exist.

Nov 4, 2010

The robust economic growth notwithstanding, India has garnered a lowly 119th rank in the United Nation's Human Development Index due to poor social infrastructure, mainly in areas of education and healthcare.

In the 'Human Development Report 2010' by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that covered 169 countries and territories, India's position is way below China (89th spot) and Sri Lanka (91).

Chief Economic Advisor Kaushik Basu said that country's goal was to improve overall human development and not merely ensure economic growth.

"The ultimate growth is human development, not only economic growth," Chief Economic Advisor Kaushik Basu said.

He, however, added that economic growth and rise in income levels were necessary for carrying out human development initiatives like providing access to education and health, gender equality, poverty eradication and so on.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

Asha Bhosale's daughter-in-law moves family court for divorce

Nov 2, 2010

A a family court in suburban Bandrahas ordered Hemant Bhosale, music director and son of playback singer Asha Bhosale, to pay Rs 25,000 per month as interim maintenance to his wife Sajidah alias Rama Bhonsale who has sought divorce on the grounds of cruelty.

The order was delivered recently by the court which is hearing Sajidah's divorce petition alleging that she was ill-treated since her marriage in 1985.

"He humiliated me and finally deserted me in 2003 for an English woman," Sajidah, who retired as an airhostess from Air-India last year, said in her petition in which she claimed monthly maintenance of Rs five lakh.

However, Sajidah has not made any allegations against her mother-in-law.
Sajidah said she had to buy a flat in suburban Andheri by obtaining loan while her husband was supporting an English woman at their bungalow in Panchgani hill station near Pune and in Scotland where he has a property spread over 59 acres.

Sajidah claimed that her husband had sold many properties in Scotland and England and got substantial amount. She said she had spent all her savings and had nothing left.

Hemant Bhosale, 61, argued that Sajidah was not entitled to maintenance as she was earning and had a good income. He said he did not own any property in Mumbai and added that the Panchgani bungalow belonged to his mother.

However, Bhosale said, he owned a property in Scotland jointly with an English woman and it was bought to facilitate the education of their only daughter who is now in her 20s.

Sajidah is represented by her lawyer Flavia Agnes while Bhosale's lawyer is Shilpi Shyamani.

Online RTI Certificate Course launched

RTI = Right to Information

The Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Government of India (GoI) has launched an ‘Online Certificate Course on RTI’ for various stakeholders on, both, the demand and supply sides of the RTI implementation regime.

This Online Certificate Course on RTI is launched in association with the Centre for Good Governance, Hyderabad.

This Online Certificate Course is aimed at:

Public Information Officers (PIOs)
Assistant Public Information Officers (APIOs)
Appellate Authorities
Officials assisting the above designated officers or other public officials
Citizens
Representative of Civil Society Organisations (including Media Organisations)
Any other person(s) who could be a direct / indirect stakeholder

OBJECTIVES 

The objectives of this Online Certificate Course on RTI are:
Reaching out to those who have not had an opportunity to participate in any training / sensitisation initiatives on RTI Act, 2005
Bringing greater clarity on RTI among designated implementing officials (i.e. APIOs / PIOs / FAOs)
Ensuring appreciation for RTI Act, 2005 and its mandate among the officials designated under it and also among the citizens
Facilitating timely delivery of information by PIOs
Having better informed citizens, civil society and other stakeholders

PROPOSED OUTCOMES

The outcomes proposed for this initiative are:
A sound knowledge of the provisions of the RTI Act, 2005 among the people taking this course
Good understanding of the roles and responsibilities of organisations / persons concerned with implementing the law and with enforcing the rights under this law
Proper appreciation of rights / obligations – as applicable – for effective use of this right
Reliable guidance on following the right process / procedure to implement the provisions of this Act and to benefit from this Act
Good understanding of remedies available when an implementing organisation fails to comply with this Act
Testing the understanding of ‘Information Providers’ and ‘Information Seekers’ using this tool for implementing this Act or exercising their right under it
A certificate for learners of this course on its successful completion – as an incentive
For more details : http://rtiocc.cgg.gov.in/
If you enjoyed this post, make sure you subscribe to my RSS feed!

Related posts:
  1. Filing of RTI applications online now possible New Delhi, July 29 Filing queries under the Right to...
  2. NRI can file Online RTI To make it easy for Non Resident Indians (NRI) to...
  3. Say no to any amendments in the RTI Act    14TH Nov 2009 – A CALL FOR PUBLIC ACTION (Say...
  4. Can a woman put a nonfather name or No name on birth certificate ??????? This is Every divorced or separated women dream, to delete...
  5. Abuse of caste certificate angers HC I get an allergy on hearing these routine questions in...

Wife held for techie suicide

Oct 29, 2010

A software engineer working for IBM hanged himself at his Baguiati home, a complaint by his father prompting police to arrest his wife and her mother on abetment charge.

Gopal Chandra Saha, 28, was found hanging in a room after he apparently locked up his wife in another room following a tiff.

Neighbours broke into the flat early on Thursday after hearing someone bang on a door. After rescuing Gopal’s wife Joyita from the locked room, they broke open another door and found the husband hanging from a ceiling fan.

The police said Gopal returned from work late on Wednesday and blasted his wife for not taking his calls. “His wife’s phone had apparently been busy when he tried to reach her. He accused her of chatting with her lover,” a police officer said.

Joyita, 23, and her mother Hena Banerjee, 47, were arrested following a complaint by Gopal’s father Tushar. “The duo have been booked under IPC Section 306 (abetment to suicide). They will be produced in Barasat court on Friday,” said North 24-Parganas police superintendent Rahul Srivastava.

Tushar, who lives in North Dinajpur, stated in his complaint that his son had come to know about his wife’s affair and asked her several times to end the relationship. “But she refused. Her mother knew about the affair and backed her. The two drove my son to suicide.”

Gopal, an MTech in electronics and communication from Calcutta University, had got married to the woman from Bagnan in Howrah six months ago. He had been working at IBM’s New Town facility as an application developer since 2007.
Top

Honour killing: I killed my daughter, confesses father


ROHTAK: The scourge of honour killing took another toll in Haryana as a father has turned out to be the killer of the girl who was found dead near her house on October 18 in Dairy Mohalla colony of Rohtak. The victim, Vratika, 20, was a student of MA (English) in Maharshi Dayanand University here and was having an affair with a boy.

The Rohtak police said that girl's father Randhir Singh, who works as an insurance agent in Delhi, has confessed to have strangulated her daughter to death on the night of October 17 when he found the girl talking to her boyfriend over mobile phone. To mislead the police and create a different scene, the accused first tore girl's clothes and then threw her body in the backyard of the house from the housetop.

Shockingly, the deceased's family had suspected the role of her uncle Chand Ram (Randhir's elder brother) in the death of girl, alleging that she could have been raped before being killed. Though the police registered a case of rape and murder under section 302 and 376 IPC against Chand Ram and unidentified accomplices on the basis of their statement, they continued with the probe and interrogated the girl's father.

Rohtak SSP B Satheesh Balan told TOI that father spotted his daughter talking to someone over mobile phone at the terrace of the house when he went out of his room to answer the nature's call around 11pm. He went upstairs and inquired as to what she was doing, she lied that she was listening to music on phone. However, he got suspicious and checked details of the phone. "The girl then disclosed her love affair and expressed her wish to marry the same boy which enraged the father. He strangulated her and flunged her from the terrace to her death", police official informed on the basis of disclosure made by the accused.

"Randhir Singh has disclosed that his wife woke up on hearing a thud sound as the girl plunged to her death but he said that a brick has fallen. He even did not reveal the incident to other family members and went to join duty the next day", informed the city police station SHO Ramesh Alwadi, adding that they were doubtful about the role of father from the beginning who broke down after being confronted with certain proofs.



Our society has become sick: SC on dowry deaths

 What the Supreme court of India has said is correct, if you commit the crime be ready to spend some time behind bars.
But according to there own figures, I am quoting, "The bench had a point. Data compiled for 2008 by National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) showed that there were 8,172 dowry deaths in the country but only 33.4% of the cases resulted in conviction. For the same year, there were 81,344 cases of cruelty towards women by husbands and relatives and the conviction rate was even lower at 22.4%."
What these figures show is that out of 8172 Dowry Deaths 33.4% resulted in convictions, that means 66.6% or 5443 of the cases were Falsely accused. As for Cruelty cases 77.4% or 63123 falsely accused.
No one really knows where the Supreme court got her figures from and how accurate they really are, most likely the figures are even higher.

True enough a murder is murder no matter how someone dies, the same goes for someone who is falsely accused as the figures show, what is the cost to them and their respect in society, the Supreme Court provides no compensation for these innocents who die a even worst death.


Nov 2, 2010


NEW DELHI: Shaken by the large number of women being killed for dowry, the Supreme Court said Indian society has become sick. "The hallmark of a healthy society is the respect it shows to women. Indian society has become a sick society. This is evident from the large number of cases coming up in this court and also in almost all courts in the country in which young women are being killed by their husbands or by their in-laws by pouring kerosene on them and setting them on fire or by hanging/strangulating them," an anguished bench of Justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Mishra said in a recent judgment.

"What is the level of civilization of a society in which a large number of women are treated in this horrendous and barbaric manner? What has our society become," asked the Bench before upholding life term for the husband and mother-in-law of a woman killed for dowry.

The bench had a point. Data compiled for 2008 by National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) showed that there were 8,172 dowry deaths in the country but only 33.4% of the cases resulted in conviction. For the same year, there were 81,344 cases of cruelty towards women by husbands and relatives and the conviction rate was even lower at 22.4%.

Advocating harsh punishment for those who murder women for dowry, the bench said crimes against women could not be classified as ordinary ones committed in a fit of anger or for property. "They disrupt the entire social fabric, hence call for harsh punishment," it said.

"Unfortunately, what is happening in our society is that out of lust for money, people are often demanding dowry and after extracting as much money as they can, they kill the woman and marry again and then again, they commit the murder of their wife for the same purpose," the Bench said, making a rather sweeping generalisation of the nature of the crime.

The bench went on to analyse causes behind this abnormal behaviour. "This is because of total commercialization of our society, and lust for money which induces people to kill their wives. The time has come when we have to stamp out this evil from society with an iron hand," it said.

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Fatherless Daughters


Growing up female with a bad reputation is less frowned upon with today's 'raunch culture' of young women than it used to be. Young women today are so much more advanced than young men of the same age. With the diminishing of the patriarch figure in the family and the dominance of women's views in marriage and relationships the way young women behave has changed dramatically over the past 10 years.

Still if a young woman grows up with a bad reputation whether she deserves it or not, it tends to hang around in that environment. Cause and effect! Young women in this category think that if a good looking male shows interest in her then that's enough for her to notch up another sexual partner. Problem is this is soul-less sex and this breeds soul-less women with duplicitous behavioral patterns. It can be easily proven that young women growing up with a mindful father are far less likely to display promiscuous and anti social behaviour. A young woman growing up under the power and control of a single female parent can often be clueless when it comes respectful behaviour towards men and male views. There are a lot of control freak single mothers(divine matriarchs) out there who run and hide when it gets revealed there are three sides to every story. His, hers, and the truth...

There is certainly enough research material available now to teach us the destructive outcomes from separation and divorce. But more importantly by the adopted uneducated and misinformed views both men and particularly women adhere to which are equally destructive for our youth and their social expectations. Fathers play a critical role in both sons and daughters outcomes, always have and always will regardless of what feminists would have you believe.

Virtual and Actual Men's Rights Organisations outside Europe

Here are a few Men's Rights Organizations around the world, you can post your blog information at there sites and gain valuable information and Networking.
Knowledge is power, lets share it with all the world over.


Virtual and Real Organisations on Men's Rights in General outside Europe
Japan Mauritius New Zealand Peru Philippines
 
 
 

Australia

Australian Men's Party
http://www.ozemail.com.au/~irgeo/amp.htm

Gender War
http://semanticspace.homestead.com/
Kitten News: Man Friendly News, Information and Entertainment
http://www.kittennews.com/vgo4/frameset4a.htm
Male Nirvana
http://www.malenirvana.com/
Men's Confraternity  W.A. Inc.
Mr Mike Ward (Convener)
P O BOX 422, Victoria Park, W.A. 6100, Australia
Tel: +61 (08) 9470 1734
Fax: +61 (08) 9458 5854
Mobile: 041 791 2381(Harry Yuruten)
Email: hayri@bigfoot.com

Men's Family Proaction Group,
PO Box 1935, Aitkenvale DC QLD 4814,
Australia.
Ph.:    07 4779 5069
Men's Rights
http://www.mensrights.rom.cd

Men's Rights Agency
http://www.mensrights.com.au
        (1) P.O. Box 28, Waterford Qld 4133 Australia
Tel: 07 3805 5611
Fax: 07 3200 8769
Email: mra@ecn.net.au
Website: http://www.mensrights.com.au
        (2) 129 Blain Street, QLD 4717,
Australia.
Ph.:    07 4982 7945.

Narcosis
http://www.acay.com.au/~narcosis/13.html

People's Equality Network,
P.O. Box 777, Kew, VIC 3101,
Australia.

Queensland Men's Association,
PO Box 1148, Runaway Bay 4216,
Australia.
Ph.: (07) 5571 7964
Email: qma@ibm.net

Sexist Billboard
http://www.wilsonsalmanac.com/voodoo.html
Tasmanian Men's Rights
http://www.geocities.com/christianj162000/
The "Where the Hell does she get the Time to Write this Crap" Website
http://student.uq.edu.au/~s323363/
 
 

Canada

Alberta Commission on the Status of Men Act
http://www.assembly.ab.ca/pro/bills/ba-bill.asp?SelectBill=219
Alberta Men`s Resource Centre,
Chris Cavanaugh, 53321,10405 Jasper Avenue, Edmonton T5J 3S2,
Canada.
AntiMatriarcat
http://www.egalitariste.org/antimatriarcat.html
Bulletin Board (Canada)
Canada  (416) 856-4980
Canadian Men`s Resource Centre,
Wyatt Cavenaugh, Edmonton,
Canada.
FAX (403) 460-8277
Chevaliers de la verite/ Banque de recherche et statistiques pour l'avancement et le developpement
de la condition masculine
Knights of Truth/Feminist Lies
http://www.MENSONGEFEMINISTE.CA
Coalition pour la défense des droits des hommes du Québec
Case Postale 47645 Montréal Qc, H2H 2S8
Tel: (450) 663-7261
http://www.coalitiondeshommes.org/
coalitiondroitsdeshommes@hotmail.com
Content d'être un gars
Glad to be a guy
http://www.garscontent.com/
Couple Complice
http://www.cooperationhommefemme.com/index.html
Droit a la Dissidence
http://dissidence.ca/
Elliot Lake Men`s Centre,
Gary Romaine or John Bloom, Hwy 108;Elliot Lake,
Canada.
Tel: (705) 461-1331
Entregars
http://www.entregars.com/
Est-ce que l'homme est désavantagé dans la société Québécoise?
http://can.ac/hommequebecois/
Family of Men Support Society,
32 Fallingworth Bay NE, Calgary, Alberta,
Canada T3J 1G3.
Ph: (403) 242-4077.
Email: wayneo@riscan.riscan.com
La Cause des hommes
http://www.la-cause-des-hommes.com/
Les hommes : s'ouvrir à leurs réalités et répondre à leurs besoins
Santé et Services sociaux Québec. No. ISBN : Publication no : 03-011-02
http://www.msss.gouv.qc.ca/documentation/publications.html
OR:
http://ftp.msss.gouv.qc.ca/publications/acrobat/f/documentation/2004/04-911-01rap.pdf
Media Censorship of the Montreal Massacre (Marc Lepine)
Men`s Equalization Inc.,
Mike Branson, Box 2358, Winnipeg R3C 4A6,
Canada.

Men`s Legal Defense Fund, Mark Wickman, 4652 Sherbrooke West, Montreal H3Z 1G3,
Canada. Tel:(514)846-5733

M.E.N.S. Network Society, P.O. Box 280, Station G, Calgary, Alberta, T3A 2G2,
Canada.
Ph.: (403) 251-1531

MERGE (Movement for the Establishment of Real Gender Equality,) (MERGE publishes "Balance".)
Ferrel Christensen, 10011,116 St. Suite 501, Edmonton, Alberta, T5K 1V4
Canada.
Email: fchriste@vm.ucs.ualberta.ca

National Association for Public and Private Accountability (NAPPA)
Rev. D. Baxter
Ph.: (905) 853-0316

National Organisation of Men (NOM)
1604 60 Pleasant Blvd, Toronto M4T 1K1,
Canada.
Ph.:(416) 923 1028
Fax (416) 923 9458
Email: kirby_inwood@bigfoot.com
 
Ontario Centre For Men,
Bruce Barking, P.O. Box 6, Guelph N1H 6J6,
Canada.
Tel:(519) 836-3191
Plan Secret des Féministes pour Dominer L'Homme Québecois
http://egalitariste.org/Plan_secret.html
Réseau Hommes Québec
http://www.rhq.ca/internet/mission.html
Solidarité Hommes
http://www.solidaritehommes.com/
Stoneman Party of Canada
http://www.thestoneman.org/

Toronto Men's Clearinghouse,
c/o Greg Barsoski, 104 Spencer Avenue, Toronto, Ont.,
Canada M6K 2J6

Victoria Men's Centre
http://victoria.tc.ca/Community/MensCentre/
Windsor Men`s Forum,
Bob Cartlidge, P.O. Box 327, Leamington N8H 3W3,
Canada.
Tel: (519) 326-2687
Fax (519) 326-1344
 
 

India

All-India Crime Against Men by Women Front
(Akhil Bharatiya Patni Virodhimorcha)
C/o Mr. Ram Prakash Chugh,
H-712 A, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi-110052,
India.
Tel : 291-2720, 743-8335, 746-1408, 98-101-24368
Fax:(91-11) 7438335-7410982,7413899,3782595
gender-indian
http://www.gender-indian.blogspot.com/
International Men's Day
http://www.mensday.in/
Pirito purush Pati Parishad
(Harrassed Husbands' Collective)
Address : Calcutta
Ph.: 09433094337,(033)-25626404
Email : smazum@yahoo.com
Purush Hakka Sanrankshan Samiti
( Society for the Protection of Men's Rights)
( 27 branches in 13 states of India)
1A1 Nityanand R C Road [Mahul Rd] Chembur
Mumbai 400074
Ph. : 91-22-25549898/99
Email : Satwant@india.com
phss@india.com
Save Indian Family Foundation
http://www.saveindianfamily.org/
 

Japan

Japan Men's Union for Truly Equal Rights,
Yoshiharu Sawada,
2-12-16-106 Honkomagome, Bunkyo, Tokyo,
113-0021 Japan.
http://www.united-links.com/jp/final1.htm
 
 

Mauritius

SOS Papa



New Zealand


Discrimination in Sentencing
http://www.justice.govt.nz./pubs/reports/1999/sentence_in_nz/chapter_11.html
Domestic Violence Centre (New Zealand)

Mensline (Auckland)
Box 74010, Market Road, 95 Great South Road, Remuera, Auckland.
Phone: (09) 522 2500

Mensline (Christchurch)
Phone: (03) 365 4239
Menzshed Aotearoa
http://menzshedaotearoa.org.nz/

New Zealand Equality Education Foundation
New Zealand Men's Sheds
http://menssheds.org.nz/

New Zealand Secret Political Prisoner
http://homepages.ihug.co.nz/~flashjdm/
Petition for a Ministry of Men's Affairs
http://www.thepetitionsite.com/takeaction/455002338
Roles of Men and Women
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~kbirks/gender/issp/issp.htm
Sentencing in New Zealand
http://www.justice.govt.nz./pubs/reports/1999/sentence_in_nz/chapter_11.html
Statistics
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~KBirks/gender/econ/gecon.htm#stats
The Issue of Activism
Theoretical Issues
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Men
http://homepages.slingshot.co.nz/~artpos/manrite.htm
http://homepages.paradise.net.nz/~apostle/manrite.htm
Unofficial Men's Access to Justice Project
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~kbirks/gender/econ/maj.htm
Wizard's View on the Sex War
http://www.wizard.gen.nz/Articles/male-female.html
 
 

Peru


Asociacion por la Defensa de las Minorias
(Minorities Defense Association)
Carlos Vilchez Roman
Email: cendoc@adexperu.org.pe
 

Philippines

Genital Integrity Philippines
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/genitalintegrityphilippines/
 
 

USA

A Voice for Men
http://www.avoiceformen.com/
Act establishing a Commission on the Status of Men (New Hampshire)

ADHD a Fraud ?
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/medicating/backlash/
American Institute For Men,
21986 Cayuga Lane, Lake Forest, CA 92630,
USA.

American Psychological Association's Section for the Study of Men and Masculinity
http://www.apa.org/divisions/div51
American Union of Men
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/aum/
Anti-Feminism
http://www.counterrevolution.net/antifeminism.html
Anti-Feminist Reflections
http://www.unm.edu/~acchavez/
Berkshire Fatherhood Coalition
http://www.berkshirefatherhoodcoalition.com/
Bull's Balls
http://www.thebullsballs.com/
Center for Children’s Justice - Carolinas Chapter
P.O. Box 891
Concord, NC 28025
USA
http://ncsc.childrensjustice.org
Chauvinist Corner
http://members.aol.com/al31415926/index.html
Christian Men's Pro-Family Anti-Feminist Website
http://www.dragg.net/users/vocalofkentucky/misclinks.htm
Civil Rights Organisation
http://mensrights.bizhosting.com
Coalition of Fathers and Families NY
http://www.fafny.org/
Committee to Expose Dishonest and Incompetent Attorneys and Judges
http://www.amoralethics.com/
cyberManbooks.com
http://www.cyberManbooks.com
Deconstruction of Humanity
http://freeyellow.com/members5/fflc/per/deconstr.htm
Female Serial Killers
http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/401/401lect11.htm
Feminazi.Com
http://www.feminazi.com
Feminism defined
http://www.crosswinds.net/~fathersforlife/femterms.htm

Femspeak
http://www.quackgrass.com/articles/03femspk.html
Forum on Men's Rights
http://network54.com/Hide/Forum/45407
Glorious National Order Men Against Women Who Bash Men
http://home.earthlink.net/~mawam
His Side, with Glen Sachs
http://hisside.com/
History of the NH Commission on the Status of Men
http://www.ncfcnh.org/nh_status/history.php
Joe Manthey Show
http://www.mensnewsdaily.com/radio/mantheyshow.htm
Kirby Inwood's Site
http://www.kirbyinwood.com Ladies Against Feminism
http://www.ladiesagainstfeminism.org/
Madison Men's Organisation,
2001 E. Dayton St., Madison, WI53704,
USA.
Ph.: (608) 249-5576  
M.A.L.E (stands for Men Assisting, Leading, and Educating)
Box 380181, Denver, CO 80238-1181,
USA.
Ph.: 303-693-9930
Fax: 303-693-6059  
Man Club
http://www.manclub.org/
Martian Bachelor Science Page
http://Science.MartianBachelor.com/
Masculist Resistance manifesto
http://www.ntcweb.com/forums/laws/messages/173.html
Masculist Trinity
http://www.geocities.com/qim/masculisttrinity.htm
Men Against Discrimination
http://www.madmenunited.org/
Men and Fathers For Justice
http://www.menandfathersforjustice.com/
Men & Fathers Resource Center
807 Brazos St., Suite 315, Austin, TX 78701-2508
USA
Ph.: (512)472-3237
Fax (512)499-8056
Email: dads@fathers.org
Men For Justice
http://www.menforjustice.com/

Men's Action Network,
P.O. Box 645, Dobbs Ferry, New York 10522,
USA.
914-693-7826

Men's Action Network,
P.O. Box 645, Dobbs Ferry, New York 10522,
USA.
914-693-7826  

Men's Action to Rebuild Society
P.O. Box 270, New York, NY 10024
http://www.mensaction.net/
USA.
Ph.: (212) 874-7900 Ext. 1329
contact@mensaction.net
Men's Book Store
http://www.vix.com/menmag/amazocat.htm
Men's Center Foundation
102 2931 Shattuck Ave., Berkley, CA94707
USA.
Men's Center of Raleigh and Wake County
723 West Johnson St.,
PO Box 6155,
Raleigh, N. Carolina 27628,
USA.
Ph.: (919) 832-0509
Email: switzer@chemdept.chem.ncsu.edu
Men's Commission Hampered
http://www.cmonitor.com/stories/front2002/men_s_commission_2002.shtml
Men's Defense Association
http://www.mensdefense.org/
Forest Lake,
Minnesota
Men's Equality Network,
Randy Lewis, 2150 Jardin Dr., Mt. View, CA 94040,
USA.
(415) 941-4909 voice/answer.
(415) 941-4303 fax/modem  

Men's Hotline
http://www.menhotline.org
(1) attn: Ron Forster,
Program Coordinator, 807 Brazos, STE. 315, Austin, TX 78701,
USA.
Ph.: 512-472-3237.
E-mail: Men@menhotline.org (tfa = Texas Fathers' Alliance).
(2) P.O. Box 12393, Austin, TX 78711,
USA
Men's Issues
http://www.americas-political-poet.com/page4.html
Mensnet (MensNet),
Ron Mazur, P.O.Box 627, Northampton, MA 01061,
USA.

Mensnet (MensNet),
Ron Mazur, P.O.Box 627, Northampton, MA 01061,
USA.

Men's Network,
120 Santa Margarita Ave., Menlo Park, CA 94025,
USA.
415-323-3445
1-800-479-2636 (local to SF Bay Area only)

Men's Project Oakland,
440 Grand Avenue Suite 320, Oakland, CA 94610,
USA.

Men's Resource Center of Wayne, PA,
987 Old Eagle School Road, Suite 719, Wayne, PA 19087,
USA.

Men's Resources Hot-Line: (516) 794-5151
Ed Devine, Texas Representative, 1434 Windmill Lane, Mesquite, Texas 75149,
USA.
Ph.: 214-289-6614 

Men's Rights Inc. (Mr Inc),
Frederic Hayward, P.O.Box 163180, Sacramento, CA 95816,
USA.
Ph. & FAX: 916-484-7333.
Men's Rights Poll
http://monitortalk.csmonitor.com/cs-society/messages?msg=1094.1

MenTalk,
c/o Twin Cities Men's Center, 3255 Hennepin Ave., Suite 45, Minneapolis, MN 55408,
USA.
MenWeb
http://www.vix.com/menmag/
National Center for Men,
P.O. Box 555, Old Beth Page, NY 11804,
USA.
Ph.: 516-942-2020 (East Coast).
408-554-8467 (West Coat).

National Center for Men,
P.O. Box 6481, Portland, OR972286481,
USA.
Ph.: (503) 224-9477

National Coalition of Free Men,
a) Tom Williamson, President, P.O. Box 129, Manhasset, NY 11030,
USA.
Ph.:(office) (516) 482-6378
National Congress for Men,
210 7th Street S.E., Washington DC 20003,
USA.
National Congress for Men, Bay Area Chapter,
P.O.Box 2031, Menlo Park, CA 94025,
USA.
Ph.: (Tracy Thompson): 415-321-2127
FAX: 408-779-0881.
National Congress for Men, Merced Chapter,
Craig and Linda Wlodarczyk, 707 Merced Mall Ste. 56, Merced CA 95348,
USA.
Ph.: 209-722-6302.
National Organization for Men, Inc., Eleven Park Place,
New York, NY 10007, USA.
No Ma'am
http://www.mwcfc.com/nomaam/
New Hampshire Commission on the Status of Men
NH Commission on the Status of Men
c/o Joseph Mastromarino
PO Box 654
Hampton, NH 03843
http://www.nh.gov/csm/index.html
Orlando Men's Council, P.O. Box 462, Winter Park, Florida, USA.
Ph.: 407-629-5868,
Email: hero1000@man.com
Promise Keepers,
P.O. Box 18376, Boulder, CO 80308,
USA.
Ph.: (303) 421-2800
Fax: (303) 421-2918
Redwood Men's Center, 705 College Ave., Santa Rosa, CA
95404, USA.
Rich Zubaty's website
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Oracle/5225/

Stop Feminist Hate and Intimidation (Petition)
United Men's Coalition,
169-47 25 Avenue, Whitestone, NY11357,
USA.
Ph.: (718) 352-2981
Vera's Lies & Deceptions of Neofeminists Homepage
http://falcon.nji.com/~vera/
West Palm Beach Men's Council, 443 Wilder Street, West Palm
Beach, FL 33405, USA.
Women of the Klan – Racism and Gender in the 1920's (Book Review)
http://www.bigglesguy.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/klan.html
See also: http://www.ucpress.edu/books/pages/5625.html

Women Who Lie
http://christianparty.net/lie.htm

Jubilant GOP wins the House, falls short of Senate

Looks like the people are sick and tired of the Obama administrations dirty tricks and spending habits, example giving money to special interest groups like the Feminazi Fascists. Going to be little bit harder to get funds from now on, unfortunatly the Feminazi's have lots of tricks up their sleeves. 

WASHINGTON – Resurgent Republicans won control of the House and cut deeply into the Democrats' majority in the Senate in momentous midterm elections shadowed by recession, ushering in a new era of divided government certain to complicate the final two years of President Barack Obama's term.

House Speaker-in-waiting John Boehner, voice breaking with emotion, declared shortly before midnight Tuesday that the results were "a repudiation of Washington, a repudiation of big government and a repudiation of politicians who refuse to listen to the people."

Obama monitored returns at the White House, then telephoned Boehner with congratulations in a call that underscored the power shift.

Incomplete returns showed the GOP picked up at least 57 House seats — the biggest party turnover in more than 70 years — and led for eight more, far in excess of the 40 they needed for a majority. Among the losers was Rep. Tom Perriello, a first-termer from Virginia for whom Obama campaigned just before the election.
On a night of triumph, Republicans also gained at least six Senate seats, and tea party favorites Rand Paul in Kentucky, Mike Lee in Utah and Marco Rubio in Florida were among their winners. But Christine O'Donnell lost badly in Delaware, for a seat that Republican strategists once calculated would be theirs with ease. And they lost the nation's most closely watched race, in Nevada, where Majority Leader Harry Reid was a winner in an especially costly and brutal campaign in a year filled with them.

The GOP also wrested nine governorships from the Democrats, Ohio and Pennsylvania among them. In New York, Andrew Cuomo won the office his father, Mario, held for three terms. And in California, Edmund G. Brown Jr., was successful in his bid for a comeback to the governor's office he occupied for two terms more than a quarter-century ago.

The biggest win was the House, a victory made all the more remarkable given the drubbing Republicans absorbed at the hands of Democrats in 2006 and again in 2008.

The takeaways came in bunches — five Democratic-held seats each in Pennsylvania and Ohio and three in Florida and Virginia.

Democrats conceded nothing while they still had a chance. "Let's go out there and continue to fight," Speaker Nancy Pelosi exhorted supporters in remarks before television cameras while the polls were still open in much of the country.

But not long after she spoke, Democratic incumbents in both houses began falling, and her own four-year tenure as the first female speaker in history was doomed. She gave no indication of her own plans.
With unemployment at 9.6 percent nationally, interviews with voters revealed an extraordinarily sour electorate, stressed financially and poorly disposed toward the president, the political parties and the federal government.

Sen.-elect Paul, appearing Tuesday night before supporters in Bowling Green, Ky., declared, "We've come to take our government back."

About four in 10 voters said they were worse off financially than two years ago, according to preliminary exit poll results and pre-election surveys. More than one in three said their votes were an expression of opposition to Obama. More than half expressed negative views about both political parties. Roughly 40 percent of voters considered themselves supporters of the conservative tea party movement. Less than half said they wanted the government to do more to solve problems.

Republicans were certain of at least six Senate pickups, including the seat in Illinois that Obama resigned to become president. Rep. Mark Kirk won there, defeating Alexi Giannoulias.

Democratic Sens. Russell Feingold in Wisconsin and Blanche Lincoln in Arkansas were turned out of office. In addition, Republicans scored big in races for Democratic seats without incumbents on the ballot. Former Rep. Pat Toomey won a close race in Pennsylvania, North Dakota Gov. John Hoeven won easily there, and former Sen. Dan Coats breezed in a comeback attempt for the Indiana seat he voluntarily gave up a dozen years ago.

"Republicans will continue to stand up for the American people and for the priorities they voted for today, and we are hopeful that the administration and Democrat leaders will change course," Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell said in a written statement.

Democrats averted deeper losses when Gov. Joe Manchin won in West Virginia — after pointedly distancing himself from Obama — for the unexpired portion of the late Sen. Robert C. Byrd's term, and Attorney General Richard Blumenthal was victorious in Connecticut, dispatching Linda McMahon, former CEO of World Wrestling Entertainment. Sen. Barbara Boxer was elected to a fourth term in California, overcoming a challenge from Carly Fiorina.

The GOP gubernatorial gains came after a campaign in which their party organization spent more than $100 million, nearly double what Democrats had.

Among the incumbents who fell were Ted Strickland in Ohio, defeated by former Rep. John Kasich, and Chet Culver in Iowa, loser to former Gov. Terry Branstad.

In California, former Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. was elected to the office he held for two terms more than a quarter-century ago.

In a footnote to the brutal politics of the campaign, Republican-turned- independent Lincoln Chafee was elected governor of Rhode Island. Obama campaigned in the state in the campaign's final week. But he declined to endorse the Democratic candidate, Frank Caprio, out of what the White House said was respect for Chafee, who had endorsed the president in his own presidential race two years ago.

A Republican takeover of the House would usher in a new era of divided government after two years in which Obama and fellow Democrats pushed through an economic stimulus bill, a landmark health care measure and legislation to rein in Wall Street after the near collapse of the economy in 2008.

Republicans opposed all three of the measures, accusing the president of supporting an ever-expanding role for the government with ever-rising spending.

Paul's triumph in Kentucky completed an improbable rise for an eye surgeon making his first race. He drew opposition from the Republican Party establishment when he first launched his bid, then struggled to adjust to a statewide race with Attorney General Jack Conway.

Rubio, also running with tea party support, was gaining about 50 percent of the vote in a three-way race in Florida, months after he forced Gov. Charlie Crist to leave the Republican Party and run as an independent. Democratic Rep. Kendrick Meek was running third.

But a third tea party-backed candidate, O'Donnell, who went from a virtual unknown to primary winner to fodder for late-night comedians in the span of a few months, lost overwhelmingly to Democrat Chris Coons in Delaware. Republicans had counted on taking the seat from the Democrats early this year, but that was before O'Donnell defeated veteran Rep. Mike Castle in a September primary. Democrat John Carney easily won the seat that was Castle's for nearly two decades.
Not all the Republican newcomers were party crashers.

In New Hampshire, Republican Kelly Ayotte won a Senate seat, defeating Democratic Rep. Paul Hodes. Former Bush administration official Rob Portman won a seat in Ohio, and Rep. Jerry Moran won in Kansas and Rep. Roy Blunt in Missouri.

Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont was re-elected to his seventh term and Barbara Mikulski her fifth. New York Sens. Charles Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand also won, as did Sen. Ron Wyden in Oregon and Boxer in California In Hawaii, Democratic Sen. Daniel Inouye was elected for a ninth time to the seat he has held since 1962.

Republican Sen. Jim DeMint, who won a second term in South Carolina, has been working to establish a nationwide standing among conservatives. He was instrumental in supporting tea party challengers in several primaries this spring and summer at a time the GOP establishment was backing other candidates.
In Alabama, Sen. Richard Shelby was re-elected easily, as were Republican Sens. Tom Coburn in Oklahoma, Richard Burr in North Carolina, John Thune in South Dakota, Johnny Isakson in Georgia and Mike Crapo in Idaho.

The president gave a series of radio interviews pleading with Democratic supporters not to sit on the sidelines. "I know things are still tough out there, but we finally have job growth again," he said in one. "It is all at risk if people don't turn out and vote today."

While Obama's name was not on the ballot, his record and policies were. After nearly two years in power, he and congressional Democrats were saddled politically with the residue of the worst recession since the 1930s.
"I will honestly say that I voted for him two years ago," said Sally McCabe, 56, of Plymouth, Minn., stopping to cast her ballot on her way to work. "And I want my vote back."

In Cleveland, Tim Crews, 42, said he measures Obama's performance by the number of paying miles he drives in his delivery van. His miles have tripled to 9,000 a month. Crews said of the economy: "It's moving. I know, because I'm moving it." He voted accordingly.

With so many contested races, and a Supreme Court ruling removing restrictions on political activity by corporations and unions, the price tag for the elections ran to the billions.

Much of the money paid for television advertisements that attacked candidates without letup, the sort of commercials that voters say they disdain but that polls find are effective.

Engaging Men to Protect and Empower Women

During conflict, women are uniquely vulnerable to violence and exploitation. They are at risk
of sexualized violence as a tool of war and of partner and domestic violence always. Victims
of sexual and gender-based violence are often stigmatized and face enormous obstacles
trying to provide for a family with limited social support, resources or education. Women for
Women International (WfWI) believes that women are society’s bellwethers. When women
are empowered in education and employment, society as a whole benefits. When women
are deprived of opportunities and trapped in cycles of victimization, social stability is at risk.

As such, Women for Women International works
to achieve social and economic development
through women’s empowerment. We work with
women survivors of war to provide them with
tools and resources to leverage themselves and
their communities out of poverty. We also work
with traditional, civic and military leaders—
men—to engage them as advocates and allies for
women. To date, we have piloted our Men’s
Leadership Program (MLP) in four countries.

WfWI understands that in order to achieve our ultimate goal—establishing viable civil
societies where men and women work together as partners in peace and prosperity—we
must engage both women and men in our quest for change.

The Men’s Leadership Program

Women for Women International’s Men’s Leadership Program sensitizes male leaders to
crucial women’s rights issues and prepares them to leverage their community influence on
behalf of women. Covering topics on post-war community rebuilding, violence against
women, reproductive and family health, and women’s community participation, MLP session
objectives (below) are tailored to each country’s specific social codes and gender norms.
• Train and educate community and traditional leaders on violence against women and
its impact on the community;

• Enhance the capacity of community and traditional leaders to develop strategies to
address the varied impact of violence against women on the community;
The Women for Women
International Men’s Leadership
Program has trained over 2,100
male community leaders in
Afghanistan, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Iraq, and
Nigeria
During the conflict and war in Afghanistan, relationships between men and women became worse. Men
do not respect women as human beings, and incidents of violence and abuse against women have
increased. Women are used to resolve debts or conflicts between families – men who cannot pay back
their loans will give their sisters or daughters to the lender instead, while the women involved have no
say in the matter. – Sweeta Noori; WfWI-Afghanistan Country Director
• Build awareness of how leaders can be more responsive to issues of concern to
different sectors of their communities/constituencies.
• Help leaders become more aware of the factors affecting the development of their
communities, ranging from economic and political participation of women, to health
issues such as HIV/AIDS.
• Give leaders a forum in which to discuss their ideas for a stronger community where
men and women are equally respected and valued.

Methodology

MLP participants are culled from traditionally
male-dominated, critical sectors of society. These
sectors often include government, religious
groups, police, military, traditional institutions,
and civil society. The leadership roles that these
men hold in their communities allow them to
reach out to other men, spread awareness and
mobilize men to actively advocate for
greater respect for women’s rights, thereby
facilitating community development by engaging
both men and women as partners.

MLP training typically begins with 50 male leaders, known as “Level One” participants, who
are trained by WfWI staff or specially-retained Men’s Leadership consultants. They are
trained on topics including the value of women and girls, female participation in family and
community decision-making, violence against women, and personal and family health.
The second stage of the MLP focuses on training participants on how to further educate men
in their respective constituencies. Upon completing the MLP, each “Level One” participant
commits to training at least 10 to 15 other local men, called “Level Two” participants, on
MLP topics. MLP participants thus become agents of change in their communities.

Functional working groups, the third component of the MLP, allow community and traditional
leaders to develop strategies to promote women’s participation in family and community life
and to stem the tide of gender-based violence. These working groups are comprised of MLP
participants, as well as local men and women community members who come together to
share ideas on how to promote women’s rights, prevent gender-based violence, and protect
victims of rape and sexual violence from stigmatization and exclusion. Working groups
provide a forum for community members at various levels to work together toward viable
solutions to gender inequity and violence against women in their communities.

To date, we have trained over 2,000 male leaders, to great success. Graduates are more
aware of women’s rights, committed to preventing violence against women and supporting
survivors, and more likely to view women as equal partners in the home and community.
Women for Women International believes that when women are well, sustain an income, are
decision-makers, and have strong social networks and safety-nets, they are in a much
stronger position to advocate for their rights. Women’s progress will not be sustained
without the active engagement and support of male traditional, civic, and military
leaders. As we have learned in 16 years of development and humanitarian practice, when
women and men together understand and advocate for women’s rights and participation in
society, dramatic, societal change is possible.

(Judgment) Delhi HC – Shared household is not the matrimonial home - PWDVA

THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment delivered on: 26.10.2010 + FAO (OS) 341/2007

SHUMITA DIDI SANDHU ..... Appellant versus

SANJAY SINGH SANDHU & OTHERS ..... Respondents Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant : Mr Akhil Sibal with Mr Salim Inamdar For the Respondents : Mr Chetan Shrma, Sr Advocate with Mr S.S. Jauhar and Mr P.K. Dey
CORAM:-

HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED

HON'BLE MS JUSTICE VEENA BIRBAL

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest ? Yes BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

1. This appeal raises interesting issues with regard to the concepts of matrimonial home and shared-household and also concerning the right of residence of a wife in the matrimonial home, shared-household or some other place.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and / or order dated 02.07.2007 passed by a learned single Judge of this court in IA Nos.291/2005 and 8444/2005 in CS(OS) 41/2005. The suit had been filed by the appellant against her husband, Mr Sanjay Singh Sandhu (defendant No.1), her father-in-law, Mr Hardev Singh Sandhu (defendant No.2) (since FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 1 of 38 deceased) and her mother-in-law, Mrs Shiela Sandhu (defendant No.3). During the pendency of the suit as also the said applications, the appellants father-in-law (the said defendant No.2) passed away and his legal representatives, being his widow (Mrs Sheila Sandhu), son (Mr Sanjay Singh Sandhu), daughter, Mrs Zoya Mohan and another daughter (Mrs Tani Sandhu Bhargava), were brought on record.
3. In the said suit, the appellant / plaintiff had sought the following reliefs:-
"(a) Grant a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 from committing themselves or through their agents / representatives acts of violence and intimidation against the plaintiff;
(b) Grant a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and their agents / representatives from forcibly dispossessing the Plaintiff out of her matrimonial home without due process of law;
(c) Grant any other / further relief / relief (s) as may be deemed fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case."
4. In IA No.291/2005, the appellant / plaintiff sought an interim order restraining the defendants from dispossessing her from her matrimonial home, which, according to her, was the property at 18-A, Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar-IV, New Delhi. It is her case that she was occupying the first floor of the said property and there was imminent danger of her being dispossessed from the said portion of the said property without following the due process of law. IA No.8444/2005 was filed by the appellant / plaintiff seeking interim orders restraining the defendants from creating any third party rights in the said property. The said applications  were dismissed by the learned single Judge by virtue of the impugned order dated 02.07.2007. The learned single Judge was of the view that the plaintiff could not claim any right to stay in the said property as it did not belong to her husband (defendant No.1), but it belonged to her parents-in- law. Taking note of the statement under Order 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 made by the defendant No.2 that the defendants have no intention to throw out the plaintiff from the first floor of the said property, which is occupied by her, without following the due process of law, the learned single Judge ordered that the said defendants would be bound by the statement. However, the learned single Judge clarified that this would not prevent the defendants 2 and 3 from taking recourse to law for dispossessing the plaintiff.
5. The learned single Judge in paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment and / or order observed as under:-
"There is no dispute that the suit property belongs to the defendant Nos. 2 and 3. The plaintiffs husband, namely, the defendant No.1 has no share and / or interest in the same."
Again in para 9 of the impugned judgment / order, the learned single Judge observed that:-
"The question for prima facie consideration is as to whether the plaintiff has any right to stay in the suit property in which her husband has no right, interest or share and belongs to her father-in-law and mother-in-law. Incidental question for determination is as to whether it could be treated as matrimonial home of the plaintiff?"

6. The learned single Judge, it is obvious from the aforesaid extracts, proceeded on the basis that the said property belonged to defendant Nos. 2 and 3, that is, the father-in-law and the mother-in-law and that there was no dispute with this proposition. Consequently, relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra: 2007 (3) SCC 169, he observed that the ratio of the said Supreme Court decision was clearly that the daughter-in-law has no legal right to stay in the house which belongs to her parents-in-law. The learned single Judge observed that the legal position which emerged was that the husband had a legal and moral obligation to provide residence to his wife and, therefore, the wife was entitled to claim a right of residence against her husband. He further observed that if the house in question where she lived after marriage belonged to her husband, the same could certainly be treated as a matrimonial home. Furthermore, if the house in question belonged to a Hindu undivided family in which her husband was a co-parcener, even that house could be termed as a matrimonial house. But, where the house belonged to the parents-in-law in which the husband had no right, title or interest and the parents-in-law had merely allowed their son alongwith the daughter-in-law to stay in the said house, it would amount to mere permissive possession on the part of the daughter-in-law and would not give her any right to stay in the said house inasmuch as the same would not be her matrimonial home.


7. The learned single Judge also noted that there was a serious dispute as to whether the property could, at all, be termed as a matrimonial home. He referred to the pleadings from which it, prima facie, appeared that the appellant / plaintiff lived in the said property from the date of her marriage in 1994 till 1996 when she moved out to Defence Colony as her relations with the defendants had become strained. Interestingly, her husband (defendant No.1) also joined her and started residing with her in Defence Colony, which was a rented accommodation. In 1999, the appellant / plaintiff and her husband (defendant No.1) returned to the said property and resided in the first floor. Serious allegations have been hurled by the plaintiff as well as the defendant No.1 against each other with regard to their chastity. There is also an allegation that the defendant No.2 married another lady sometime in 2004 and that she had moved into the said property. It was alleged that because of these incidents, the appellant / plaintiff left the property in 2004. Of course, she re-entered the first floor of the said property on 10.10.2004 at 2.30 a.m. It is because of this circumstance, that the learned single Judge was prima facie of the view that there was some credence in the allegations of the defendants that the appellant / plaintiff had forced her entry into the said property on 10.10.2004 at an odd hour. Another circumstance which may be noted is that the appellant / plaintiff had also taken a flat in Mumbai for the period December 1999 to November 2000 and that the lease of the flat was in her name and she had stayed there for three-four months and her husband had also joined her. It is because of these circumstances that the learned single Judge was of the view that there FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 5 of 38 was a serious dispute as to whether the suit property could, at all, have been termed as a matrimonial house, particularly when the appellant / plaintiff had left the said property in the early part of 2004 and had, prima facie, forcibly entered the same on 10.10.2004.
8. Anyhow, the main thrust of the reasoning adopted by the learned single Judge was that the daughter-in-law (appellant/plaintiff) cannot claim any right to stay in the said property inasmuch as the said property belonged to her parents-in-law. This conclusion is based on the said decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Batra (supra).
9. Mr Akhil Sibal, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff raised three points of attack insofar as the impugned decision is concerned. His first and main point was that the learned single Judge had proceeded on the basis that there was no dispute that the property belonged to the defendants 2 and 3. He submitted that the plaintiff had nowhere admitted the defendants 2 and 3 to be the sole and exclusive owners of the said property. Consequently, the learned counsel submitted that since the very premise was wrong, the conclusion based on such premise was obviously erroneous. He also submitted that because the said premise was faulty, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Batra (supra) would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
10. The second point of attack was that the learned single Judge had erred in holding that the appellant / plaintiff, could not, as a matter of law, FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 6 of 38 claim any right in the property of the mother-in-law. He submitted that the plaintiff / appellant had a right of residence and that this proposition was not correct. The third point of attack was that since the learned single Judge had decided that in law, the appellant / plaintiff could not claim any right in the property of the mother-in-law, the suit as such had virtually been dismissed without returning any conclusive findings or recording any satisfaction on the factual aspects at all. He, therefore, submitted that this was a fit case for remand, after the impugned order was set aside.
11. Elaborating on the first aspect of the matter, that the appellant / plaintiff had not admitted the defendant Nos. 2 and 3, jointly or the defendant No.3 by herself, to be the exclusive owner(s) of the said property, Mr Sibal drew our attention to the pleadings of the parties and, in particular, to the written statements filed on behalf of the defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3. Referring to para 3 of the written statement of the defendant No.1, Mr Sibal pointed out that the stand taken is that the said property belonged to defendant No.3 (the mother-in-law). However, in paragraph 17 of the same written statement, a somewhat different statement has been made to the following effect:-
" The suit property lawfully belongs to the parents of the defendant No.1 and the plaintiff has no claim whatsoever in the said suit property."
Again, in para 21 of the written statement of the defendant No.1, it is stated as under:-
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 7 of 38 " the matrimonial house of the parties will be the
residence of the husband i.e. defendant No.1 and not the house / property of the parents of the husband i.e.
defendant No.2 and 3 to whom the suit property belongs. The suit property is the self acquired property of the defendant No.2 and 3 and no person except the defendant No.3 has any right, title or interest in the suit property. The matrimonial home of the plaintiff thus will be the house in which her husband i.e. defendant No.1 resides who has his residence in Dehradun and not in the suit property."
12. Mr Sibal submitted that from the aforesaid averments made in the written statement, the defendant No.1 has taken conflicting stands. At one place, the defendant No.1 has stated that the property belongs to his mother (defendant No.3) and not to the plaintiff and at other places he has stated that it belongs to his parents, i.e., both defendant Nos.2 and 3.
13. Referring to the written statement of the defendant No.2, Mr Sibal submitted that the defendant No.2 claimed the said property to have been built from his personal earnings and also on the basis of the loan which he had taken from LIC. He referred to the following averments in paragraph 6 of the written statement:-
"6. That the correct facts in brief imperative for the proper adjudication of the present matter are that the house at 18A, Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar was built from the
personal earnings of defendant No.2 and also the loan which he had taken from LIC. The defendant No.2 was
living on the ground floor with his wife, defendant No.3 and three unmarried children. The plaintiff and the
defendant No.1 got married in the year 1994. After the marriage, the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 lived with defendants no.2 and 3 in the ground floor of their house. Thereafter, in the year 1996, the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 left the said premises at Lajpat Nagar and took a separate residential premises for their living in C-461, FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 8 of 38 Defence Colony, New Delhi which remained their
residential premises till 1999. The said house was taken on lease by plaintiff and defendant No.1 and all the payments for rent and were duly reflected in defendant No.1s Bank statement for the said period. Thereafter plaintiff and defendant No.1 had been living at different places from time to time. For the last few years plaintiff and defendant no.1 started living in defendant No.1s house in Dehradun or at times at the First Floor of the suit property with permission of defendants no.2 & 3. Whenever they stayed at Lajpat Nagar House even though they maintain separate kitchen. Defendant No.2 had been paying all electricity and water charges including payment to security guards and other related expenses. For the said reasons the first floor at Lajpat nagar house belonging to defendant No.3 was never considered to be matrimonial home of plaintiff and defendant No.1."
The defendant No.3, in paragraph 11 (preliminary objections) of her written statement, has categorically stated that the suit property is the self acquired property of the defendant No.3 and no person except the defendant No.3 has any right, title or interest in the suit property. In para 2 (parawise reply on merits), the defendant No.3 once again stated that she was the true and legal owner of the suit property and the defendant No.2 and 3 have been in possession of the suit property.
14. In view of the averments made in the said written statements, Mr Sibal submitted that the stand of the defendants is unclear. At one point, they claim that the property belongs to the defendant Nos.2 and 3 and at other points they claim that the property belongs to defendant No.3 exclusively. Thus, according to Mr Sibal, the shifting stands are indicative of the ulterior designs of the defendants to oust the appellant / plaintiff from her matrimonial home.
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 9 of 38
15. He then referred to para 21 of the replication, where, for the first time, the plaintiff raised the plea that the said property was not the self- acquired property of the defendants 2 and 3 and also denied that no person except the defendant No.3 had any right, title or interest in the suit property. It was, therefore, contended by Mr Sibal that there was a dispute with regard to the ownership of the suit property. Continuing further, Mr Sibal referred to the Order X statement made under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the defendant No.2, where once again, the said defendant took a different stand that the property bearing No.18-A, Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar, Delhi had been bought by his wife, Mrs Sheela Sandhu out of her own income and that the perpetual lease deed was executed by DDA in her favour.
16. Mr Sibal also submitted that an application being IA No.8442/2005 had been filed by the appellant / plaintiff under order 6 Rule 17, CPC seeking amendment of the plaint. One of the amendments sought was the introduction of para 12-B, wherein the plaintiff proposed to allege that the defendant No.3, in collusion with the other defendants, had transferred part of the above said property in the name of defendant No.4 falsely claiming this to be her absolute property, knowing fully well that the said property was the joint ancestral property and by making false averments regarding possession and consideration. In other words, the appellant / plaintiff sought to take, inter alia, the plea of joint ancestral property by virtue of the said amendment application. Mr Sibal said that that application is pending and is yet to be disposed of. He submitted that the learned single FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 10 of 38 Judge ought to have disposed of the application for amendment prior to passing the impugned order. This, according to him, is another reason as to why the impugned order ought to be set aside and the matter be remanded to the learned single Judge for a fresh consideration.
17. There was also some controversy with regard to a status quo order dated 08.01.2005. But, we need not go into that aspect of the matter. The main thrust of the arguments advanced by Mr Sibal was that the foundation on which the learned single Judge had premised his conclusions was itself faulty inasmuch as the learned single Judge, assumed that there was no dispute that the suit property belonged to the defendants 2 and 3 in which the appellants / plaintiffs husband had no share or interest. He submitted that he has been able to show, prima faice, that there was a dispute as to whether the defendants 2 and 3 or the defendant No.3 alone was the exclusive owner of the said property and that the issue as to whether it was a joint family property also needed to be looked into. Therefore, the decision in the case of S.R. Batra (supra) would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, because, in the Supreme Court decision, the position with regard to ownership, being that of the mother-in- law, was undisputed.
18. Referring to the following decisions, Mr Sibal submitted that the property in question was the matrimonial home of the appellant / plaintiff and she had a right to reside therein and, therefore, she was entitled to an FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 11 of 38 order restraining the defendants from dispossessing her and / or creating any third party interest therein:-
1) Kavita Gambhir v. Hari Chand Gambhir & Another: 162 (2009) DLT 459;
2) Appasaheb Peerappa Chandgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chandgade and Ors.: 2007 (1) SCC 521;
3) Komalam Amma v. Kumara Pillai Raghavan Pillai & Others: AIR 2009 SC 636;
4) Mangat Mal (Dead) & Another v. Punni Devi (Dead) and Others: 1995 (6) SCC 88;
5) S.R. Batra & Another v. Taruna Batra: 2007 (3) SCC 169; 6) S. Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala: 2009(2) RCR(Civil) 883; 7) P. Babu Venkatesh Kandayammal and Padmavathi v. Rani: [CRL. R.C. Nos.48 and 148 of 2008 and M.P. Nos. 1 of 2008 decided on 25.03.2008].
19. Mr Chetan Sharma, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondent No.3, submitted that the present appeal is merely academic because the learned single Judge has virtually decreed the suit. He submitted that one of the reliefs claimed in the suit was to permanently injunct the defendants from forcibly dispossessing the plaintiff out of her matrimonial home "without due process of law". He submitted that this relief has already been granted by the learned single Judge by virtue of the impugned order, whereby he directed as under:-
"19. In view of the above, insofar as the right of the plaintiff to stay in the suit property is concerned, she cannot claim any such right as the property belongs to her parents-in-law. However, statement of defendant No.2 was recorded by the Court under Order X CPC where he stated that he or his wife had no intention to throw her out of the premises in question without due process of law. FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 12 of 38 Therefore, while dismissing the applications of the
plaintiff, it is ordered that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 shall remain bound by the said statement. This, however, would not prevent the defendants to take recourse to the law for dispossessing the plaintiff."
20. Mr Chetan Sharma further submitted that at the time when IA Nos. 291/2005 and 8444/2005 were being argued and which ultimately came to be disposed of by the impugned order, the appellant / plaintiff did not press for hearing of the amendment application. Consequently, she cannot now be permitted to submit that the said amendment application ought to have been decided prior to the said IA Nos.291/2005 and 8444/2005. He further submitted that the appellant / plaintiff did not press for any additional issue with regard to the title in respect of the said property. Referring to the Supreme Court decision in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal: 2002 (2) SCC 256, Mr Sharma submitted that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of institution of the suit and subsequent events are not to be taken into account unless the three circumstances referred to therein arise. The said three circumstances are:-
(i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted;
(ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and
(iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of
procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise.
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 13 of 38
21. Mr Chetan Sharma fully supported the impugned judgment and contended that there was no infirmity in the same and, therefore, did not call for any interference. He submitted that the case of the appellant / plaintiff was that there was no abandonment of the matrimonial home and that she had a right to live in the matrimonial home even if it belonged to her in- laws. Earlier, the High Court decision in the case of Taruna Batra v. S.R. Batra & Another: 116 (2005) DLT 646 had been relied upon by the appellant / plaintiff as observed in the impugned order itself, but the Supreme Court decision in S.R. Batra (supra) reversed the decision of the High Court and sealed the fate of the appellant / plaintiff. Mr Chetan Sharma also referred to a decision of a learned single Judge of this court in the case of Neetu Mittal v. Kanta Mittal & Others: (2008) 106 DRJ 623 by way of persuasive value to submit that under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, there is no concept of matrimonial home. On the other hand, the concept is of a shared house-hold. In that case, the learned single Judge, after referring to and relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra (supra) held that a daughter-in-law has no right to live in the house belonging to her parents-in-law.
22. Mr Chetan Sharma also submitted that in the present case, the said property cannot be regarded as the matrimonial home because, first of all, the appellant / plaintiff left the house in 1996 when she went to reside in Defence Colony. Her husband, the defendant No.1 also left the said property and resided with her in Defence Colony. Secondly, the appellant / FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 14 of 38 plaintiff resided in Dehradun and, thirdly, she resided in Mumbai and then in 2004, she once again left the said property, only to re-enter the same on 10.10.2004 at 2.30 a.m. He referred to the order X, CPC statement of the appellant / plaintiff, wherein she stated that she had married the defendant on 05.11.1994 and that she had shifted to Defence Colony in June, 1996 and remained there till March, 1999. She then stated that she was forced to leave her matrimonial home in 2004. She also admitted that she took a flat in Bombay during the period December 1999 till November, 2000 and that the lease of the Bombay flat was in her name and that she was in Bombay for three to four months and that her husband had joined her later on. She also admitted to her going to Pakistan in January 2004 and staying there for six days alongwith a number of other persons. Thereafter, she went to Pakistan again on 12.04.2004 to 24.05.2004 with a womens organization. She also admitted that during the period February 2004 till 09.10.2004, no formal complaint was lodged by her.
23. According to Mr Sharma, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, would come into play only when domestic violence takes place. This is not a case of domestic violence as there has been no whisper of any violence during February 2004 to 10.10.2004 when the appellant / plaintiff re-entered the said property at 2.30 a.m. He submitted that apart from this not being a case of domestic violence at all, the appellant / plaintiff having come to learn that the defendant No.3 was interested in disposing of the said property, wanted to put an impediment in FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 15 of 38 the sale so as to extract some money from the defendants. For all these reasons, Mr Sharma contended that the appeal be dismissed.
24. Let us first deal with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the foundation of the learned single Judges decision that there was no dispute that the suit property belongs to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 was itself faulty and, therefore, the entire decision is liable to be set aside. It is true that the learned single Judge had proceeded on the basis that there was no dispute that the suit property belonged to defendants 2 and 3 and even the question which was taken up for prima facie consideration by the learned single Judge, as would be apparent from paragraph 9 of the impugned order, was founded on the understanding that the appellants husband (defendant No.1) had no right, title or share in the said property and that the said property belonged to the appellants father-in-law and mother- in-law. We have already noticed above that the learned counsel for the appellant was at pains to attempt to demonstrate that the appellant / plaintiff nowhere admitted that the said property belonged to her father-in-law and mother-in-law or to her mother-in-law exclusively. He had also pointed out that there is no admission by the appellant / plaintiff that her husband (defendant No.1) did not have any right, interest or share in the said property. The learned counsel for the appellant had drawn our attention to the written statements filed by the defendants as also the replication filed by the appellant / plaintiff and the Order X CPC statement of the defendant No.2.
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 16 of 38
25. On going through the relevant portions of the said documents, it appears that the defendant No.1 took the stand that the said property belonged to his mother (defendant No.3). However, in the very same written statement, the defendant No.1 had also stated that the said property belonged to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and that it was their self-acquired property. In the very same paragraph (para 21 of the written statement of the defendant No.1), it is again stated that no person except the defendant No.3 has any right in the said property. The defendant No.2 in his written statement stated that the said property was made from his personal earnings and from a loan taken from LIC. However, in his Order X CPC statement, the defendant No.2, took a different stand and stated that the property was bought by his wife (defendant No.3) out of her own funds. The defendant No.3, however, took a clear stand in her written statement that the said property was her self- acquired property and no person except her had any right, title or interest in the same. She stated that while she was the true and legal owner of the said property, her husband (defendant No.2) and she were in possession of the suit property.
26. It does appear from the averments made in the written statements of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 that there is a shift in the stand taken with regard to the ownership of the said property. The defendant No.1 had taken the stand that the property belongs to his mother (defendant No.3) and that no person except the defendant No.3 had any right, title or interest in the same. However, he has also averred that the said property belonged to FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 17 of 38 defendants 2 and 3. A similar ambivalence is discernible in the stand taken by the defendant No.2 in his written statement and his order X CPC statement. However, this much is clear that none of the defendants have stated that the appellants husband (defendant No.1) had any right, title or interest in the said property. There is only some lack of clarity in the pleadings with regard to the exclusivity of ownership of the defendant No.3. In other words, there is a degree of ambiguity, particularly on the part of defendant No. 2 as to whether the defendant No.3 is the sole and exclusive owner of the said property or whether it also belongs to the defendant No.2. However, there is no confusion with regard to the stand that the said property does not at all belong to the appellants husband (defendant No.1).
27. In the replication, as pointed out earlier, the appellant / plaintiff has sought to introduce a new dimension to the case by making an allegation that the said property is not the self-acquired property of the defendant Nos.2 and 3. The appellant / plaintiff had also filed an amendment application under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC to introduce new para 12 B in the plaint where she has taken the plea of joint ancestral property. However, as pointed out above, the appellant did not press for a decision on this application at the time when IA Nos. 291/2005 and 8444/2005 were being argued before the learned single Judge. In any event, the plea of joint ancestral property has been sought to be introduced only by way of an amendment to the plaint after the defendants had filed their written statements. It cannot be said as to whether the amendment, which has been sought, will be allowed by the FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 18 of 38 learned single Judge or not. Therefore, as on the date on which the learned single Judge passed the order, there did not exist any plea of joint ancestral property in the pleadings of the parties. Furthermore, what is important is to examine the stand taken by the appellant / plaintiff in the plaint which unfortunately had not been alluded to by the learned counsel for the appellant. In para 2 of the plaint, it is merely stated that the property bearing No.18-A, Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar-IV, is the matrimonial home of the plaintiff since 1994 and that she is currently residing in the first floor of the said property and the defendants are living on the ground floor due to strained relations between the parties.
28. In paragraph 8 of the plaint, it is alleged:- "The defendant Nos. 2 and 3 permitted the Defendant No.1 to live with "Chinu" in the matrimonial home of the
Plaintiff with ulterior motives of driving the Plaintiff from the matrimonial home."
From the said averment, it is discernible that even as per the appellants / plaintiffs understanding, the said property, which the plaintiff was regarding as her matrimonial home belonged to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and the defendant No.1 only had permission to live in the same.
29. In para 12 of the plaint, it has been averred that the plaintiff feared for her life and was filing the suit to protect her rights "in her matrimonial home". The plea taken was that she feared that she would be "summarily thrown out without due process of law". It was also stated that:- FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 19 of 38 " the defendants are trying to sell the house. They have already taken possession of a house being 201, Jor Bagh, New Delhi for their residence."
30. Two things are clear from the averments made in the plaint. The first is that it is nowhere alleged in the plaint by the appellant / plaintiff that the said property, which the appellant / plaintiff was referring to as her matrimonial home belonged to or was owned by her husband (defendant No.1). In fact, there is no averment in the plaint that the defendant No.1 had any right, title or interest or share in the said property. There is no averment that the property did not belong to the defendant No.3 exclusively. As pointed out above, it can be inferred that the appellant / plaintiff was of the view that the property actually belonged to the defendant Nos. 2 and 3. The other point which emerges from the averments contained in the plaint is that the suit was filed to protect her rights in her matrimonial home as she feared that she would be summarily thrown out without due process of law inasmuch as she had learnt that the defendants were trying to sell the house. It is in this context that the prayer (b) of the plaint, which seeks the grant of a decree of a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from forcibly dispossessing the plaintiff out of her "matrimonial home" without due process of law, gains importance and significance.
31. Thus, looking at the totality of the circumstances and the pleadings as well as the order X, CPC statements, it cannot be said that the learned single Judge was off the mark when he observed that there is no dispute that the suit property belongs to the defendant Nos. 2 and 3. FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 20 of 38 Therefore, the first point of attack that the conclusion of the learned single Judge was founded on a wrong premise, falls to the ground.
32. In order to examine the other points urged by the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the conclusion of the learned single Judge that the appellant / plaintiff could not claim any right in the property of the mother-in-law was erroneous and that the learned single Judge in so holding had virtually dismissed the suit itself without recording any satisfaction on the facts, it would be necessary for us to consider the decisions cited at the bar as also the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). We shall first examine the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangat Mal (supra) wherein a question arose as to whether the right of maintenance of a Hindu lady, includes the right of provision for residence. The Supreme Court held as follows:-
"19. Maintenance, as we see it, necessarily must encompass a provision for residence. Maintenance is given so that the lady can live in the manner, more or less, to which she was accustomed. The concept of maintenance must, therefore, include provisions for food and clothing and the like and take into account the basic need for a roof over the head. Provision for residence may be made either by giving a lump sum in money, or property in lieu thereof. It may also be made by providing, for the course of the lady's life, a residence and money for other necessary expenditure. Where provision is made in this manner, by giving a life interest in property for the purposes of residence, that provision is made in lieu of a pre-existing right to maintenance and the Hindu lady acquires far more than the vestige of title which is deemed sufficient to attract Section 14(1)."
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 21 of 38
33. Next, we refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in B.P. Achla Anand v. S. Appi Reddy and Another: 2005 (3) SCC 313, which is a decision which was relied upon by a learned single Judge of this court in the case of Kavita Gambhir (supra), which in turn, was referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant. In B.P. Achla Anand (supra), in the context of a deserted wife continuing in possession of a property in which her husband was a tenant, the Supreme Court observed that there was no precedent, much less a binding authority, from any court in India dealing with such a situation. However, the Supreme Court noticed that English decisions could be found. The following passage from Lord Denings Book The Due Process of Law was quoted by the Supreme Court:- "A wife is no longer her husband's chattel. She is
beginning to be regarded by the laws as a partner in all affairs which are their common concern. Thus the husband can no longer turn her out of the matrimonial home. She has as much right as he to stay there even though the house does stand in his name. Moreover it has been held that the wife's right is effective, not only as against her husband but also as against the landlord. Thus where a husband who was statutory tenant of the matrimonial home, deserted his wife and left the house, it was held that the landlord could not turn her out so long as she paid the rent and performed the conditions of the tenancy."
34. After considering several other decisions, under English law, the Supreme Court noted the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1983 applicable in England. The preamble of that Act stated that it was an Act to consolidate certain enactments relating to the rights of a husband or wife to occupy a dwelling house that has been a matrimonial home. The Supreme noted that one of the several rights expressly provided for by the Matrimonial Homes FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 22 of 38 Act, 1983 in England was that so long as one spouse had a right to occupation, either of the spouses could apply to the court for an order requiring the other spouse to permit the exercise of that right. The Supreme Court observed as under:-
"32. In our opinion, a deserted wife who has been or is entitled to be in occupation of the matrimonial home is entitled to contest the suit for eviction filed against her husband in his capacity as tenant subject to satisfying two conditions : first, that the tenant has given up the contest or is not interested in contesting the suit and such giving up by the tenant-husband shall prejudice the deserted wife who is residing in the premises; and secondly, the scope and ambit of the contest or defence by the wife would not be on a footing higher or larger than that of the tenant himself. In other words, such a wife would be entitled to raise all such pleas and claim trial thereon, as would have been available to the tenant himself and no more. So long as, by availing the benefit of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and Rent Control Legislation, the tenant would have been entitled to stay in the tenancy premises, the wife too can continue to stay exercising her right to residence as a part of right to maintenance subject to compliance with all such obligations including the
payment of rent to which the tenant is subject. This right comes to an end with the wife losing her status as wife consequent upon decree of divorce and the right to occupy the house as part of right to maintenance coming to an end.
33. We are also of the opinion that a deserted wife in occupation of the tenanted premises cannot be placed in a position worse than that of a sub-tenant contesting a claim for eviction on the ground of subletting. Having been deserted by the tenant-husband, she cannot be deprived of the roof over her head where the tenant has conveniently left her to face the peril of eviction attributable to default or neglect of himself. We are inclined to hold - and we do so - that a deserted wife continuing in occupation of the premises obtained on lease by her husband, and which was their matrimonial home, occupies a position akin to that of an heir of the tenant-husband if the right to residence of such wife has not come to an end. The tenant having lost interest in protecting his tenancy rights as available to him under the law, the same right would devolve upon and FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 23 of 38 inhere in the wife so long as she continues in occupation of the premises. Her rights and obligations shall not be higher or larger than those of the tenant himself. A suitable amendment in the legislation is called for to that effect. And, so long as that is not done, we, responding to the demands of social and gender justice, need to mould the relief and do complete justice by exercising our
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution. We hasten to add that the purpose of our holding as above is to give the wife's right to residence a meaningful efficacy as dictated by the needs of the times; we do not intend nor do we propose the landlord's right to eviction against his tenant to be subordinated to wife's right to residence enforceable against her husband. Let both the rights co- exist so long as they can."
35. However, in B.P. Achla Anand (supra), the appeal filed by Smt. Achla was dismissed because, in the meanwhile, a decree for dissolution of marriage by divorce based on mutual consent had been passed. The Supreme Court noted that it was not the case of Smt. Achla Anand, the appellant, that she was entitled to continue her residence in the tenanted premises by virtue of an obligation incurred by her ex husband to provide residence for her as part of maintenance. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that she could not, therefore, be allowed to proceed with the appeal and defend her right against the claim for eviction made by the landlord.
36. The third decision of the Supreme Court in this line is that of Komalam Amma (supra). In that decision, the Supreme Court took a view similar to that in Mangat Mals case (supra) that maintenance, in the case of a Hindu lady, necessarily must encompass a provision for residence. The Surpeme Court reiterated that the provision for residence may be made either by giving a lump sum in money or property in lieu thereof. It may FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 24 of 38 also be made by providing, for the course of the ladys life, a residence and money for other necessary expenditure.
37. The final decision in this line of cases is that of the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra (supra). The facts before the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra (supra) are somewhat similar to those in the present case and it would, therefore, be instructive to refer to them in some detail. Taruna Batra married Amit Batra and started living with him in the second floor of the house belonging to Amit Batras mother. It was not disputed that the said house at B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi belonged to Taruna Batras mother-in-law and not to her husband Amit Batra. Cross divorce petitions were filed by Taruna Batra and Amit Batra and because of this discord, Smt Taruna Batra shifted to her parents residence. She alleged that later on, when she tried to enter B-135, Ashok Vihar, she found the main entrance locked and consequently she filed a suit for mandatory injunction to enable her to enter the house. However, before any order could be passed in the said suit, Smt Taruna Batra, alongwith her parents, allegedly broke open the locks and entered the said property. Another aspect was that Amit Batra had shifted to his own flat in Mohan Nagar, Ghaziabad before the said litigation had ensued. In the said suit, the trial Judge granted temporary injunction restraining the appellants therein from interfering with the possession of Smt Taruna Batra in respect of the second floor of the said property. In appeal, the Senior Civil Judge, Delhi, by his order dated 17.09.2004, held that Smt Taruna Batra was not residing in the second floor of the premises in question FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 25 of 38 and that her husband Amit Batra was not living in the said property and the matrimonial home could not be said to be a place where only a wife was residing. He also held that Smt Taruna Batra had no right to the properties other than that of her husband and consequently dismissed the temporary injunction application. Thereafter, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was filed before the Delhi High Court whereupon a learned single Judge of this court held that the second floor of the property in question was the matrimonial home of Smt Taruna Batra and he further held that even if her husband Amit Batra shifted to Ghaziabad that would not make the Ghaziabad home the matrimonial home of Smt Taruna Batra. On this reasoning, the learned single Judge of this court, held that Smt Taruna Batra was entitled to continue to reside in the second floor of B-135, Ashok Vihar as that was her matrimonial home. The Supreme Court disagreed with the view taken by the learned single Judge of this court. Referring to an earlier decision in the case of B.R. Mehta v. Atma Devi and Others: 1987 (4) SCC 183, the Supreme Court observed "whereas in England the rights of the spouses to the matrimonial home are governed by the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, no such right existed in India".
38. A reference was made to the following observations in B.R. Mehta (supra):-
" it may be that with change of situation and complex problems arising it is high time to give the wife or the husband a right of occupation in a truly matrimonial home, in case of the marriage breaking up or in case of strained relationship between the husband and the wife."
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 26 of 38 However, the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra (supra) observed that the aforesaid extract was merely an expression of hope and it did not lay down any law and that it was only the legislature which could create a law and not the court. The Supreme Court further held:-
"17. There is no such law in India, like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, and in any case, the rights which may be available under any law can only be as
against the husband and not against the father-in-law or mother-in-law.
18. Here, the house in question belongs to the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra and it does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt. Taruna Batra
cannot claim any right to live in the said house.
19. Appellant No. 2, the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra has stated that she had taken a loan for acquiring the house and it is not a joint family property. We see no reason to disbelieve this statement."
39. Thereafter, the Supreme Court considered the provisions of the said Act and particularly the concept of a "shared household" under Section 2(s) of the said Act as also the provisions of Sections 17 and 19(1) thereof and repelled the argument that since Smt Taruna Batra had lived in the property in question in the past, therefore, the said property was her shared household. The Supreme Court observed as under:-
"26. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived
together in the past that property becomes a shared
household. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the husband's father, husband's paternal grand parents, his maternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 27 of 38 Counsel for the respondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband's relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in the all these houses of her husband's relatives merely because she had stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd.
27. It is well settled that any interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted."
The Supreme Court finally held as under:-
"29. As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a 'shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member, it is the exclusive property of appellant No. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a 'shared household'.
30. No doubt, the definition of 'shared household' in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society."
40. From this line of cases, it is apparent that the concept of maintenance, insofar as a Hindu lady is concerned, necessarily encompasses the provision for residence. Furthermore, the provision for residence may be made either by giving a lumpsum in money or property in lieu thereof. It may also be made by providing, for the course of the ladys life, a residence and money for other necessary expenditure. Insofar as Section 17 of the said Act is concerned, a wife would only be entitled to claim a right of residence in a "shared household" and such a household would only mean the house FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 28 of 38 belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property which neither belongs to the husband nor is taken on rent by him, nor is it a joint family property in which the husband is a member, cannot be regarded as a "shared household". Clearly, the property which exclusively belongs to the father-in-law or the mother-in-law or to them both, in which the husband has no right, title or interest, cannot be called a "shared household". The concept of matrimonial home, as would be applicable in England under the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, has no relevance in India.
41. In the light of the aforesaid principles, the appellant / plaintiff would certainly have a right of residence whether as a part of maintenance or as a separate right under the said Act. The right of residence, in our view, is not the same thing as a right to reside in a particular property which the appellant refers to as her matrimonial home. The said Act was introduced, inter alia, to provide for the rights of women to secure housing and to provide for the right of the women to reside in a shared household, whether or not she had any right, title or interest in such a household.
42. Let us now look at the relevant provisions of the said Act. They are:-
"2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,
(a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 29 of 38 (q) "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the
aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved
person has sought any relief under this Act:
Provided that an aggrieved wife or female
living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner;
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
(s) "shared household" means a household where the
person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether
owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved
person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by
either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of
which the respondent is a member, irrespective of
whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has
any right, title or interest in the shared household."
43. Chapter IV of the said Act deals with the procedure for obtaining orders or reliefs. The said chapter comprises of Sections 12 to 29. Section 12 provides for the making of an application to a Magistrate seeking one or more of the reliefs under the Act. Section 17 relates to the right to reside in a "shared household". Section 18 prescribes the protection orders which the Magistrate may pass on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place. Section 19 contemplates the residence orders that may be passed by the Magistrate on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place. Since the said provisions of Sections 17, 18 and 19 are relevant, they are set out in full hereinbelow:- "17. Right to reside in a shared household. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 30 of 38 relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure
established by law.
18. Protection orders.-The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an
opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie
satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of
domestic violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of the
aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a
child, its school or any other place frequented
by the aggrieved person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form,
whatsoever, with the aggrieved person,
including personal, oral or written or electronic
or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both
the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent or singly by the respondent,
including her stridhan or any other property
held either jointly by the parties or separately
by them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other
relatives or any person who give the aggrieved
person assistance from domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in the
protection order.
19. Residence orders.-(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing
or in any other manner disturbing the
possession of the aggrieved person from the
shared household, whether or not the
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 31 of 38 respondent has a legal or equitable interest in
the shared household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself
from the shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared
household in which the aggrieved person
resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or
disposing off the shared household or
encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his
rights in the shared household except with the
leave of the Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved
person as enjoyed by her in the shared
household or to pay rent for the same, if the
circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be
passed against any person who is a woman.
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional
conditions or pass any other direction which he may
deem reasonably necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person.
(3) The Magistrate may require from the
respondent to execute a bond, with or without
sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic
violence.
(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed
to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be
dealt with accordingly.
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1),
sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the
aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order.
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1),
the Magistrate may impose on the respondent
obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and
resources of the parties.
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 32 of 38 (7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge
of the police station in whose jurisdiction the
Magistrate has been approached to assist in the
implementation of the protection order.
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to
return to the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other property or valuable security to which she is entitled to."
44. Another important provision is Section 23 which empowers the Magistrate to grant interim and ex parte orders on the Magistrate being satisfied that an application, prima facie, discloses that the respondent is committing or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence. The ex parte order may be passed on the basis of affidavits of the aggrieved person in terms of, inter alia, Sections 18 and 19 against the respondent. Section 26 of the said Act prescribes that any relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceedings before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent, whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of the said Act.
45. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the expression "matrimonial home" does not find place in the said Act. It is only the expression "shared household" which is referred to in the said Act. "Shared household" is defined in Section 2(s) to mean a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 33 of 38 or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity. The shared household also includes such a household which may belong to the joint family, of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. The word "household" has not been defined in the said Act, however, Blacks Law Dictionary, 9th Edition defines household in the following manner:- "household, adj. Belonging to the house and family;
domestic.
household, n. (14c) 1. A family living together, 2. A group of people who dwell under the same roof. Cf. FAMILY.
3. The contents of a house."
46. In contrast, the impression that we get by reading Section 2(s), which defines "shared household" is that the "household" which is referred to in the said provision, relates to the property and not just to the group of people who dwell under the same roof or the family living together. Therefore, we are of the view that the word "household" used in Section 2(s) actually means a house in the normal sense of referring to a property, be it a full-fledged house or an apartment, or some other property by any other description. This is also clear because the expression "household" has been referred to as a place where the person aggrieved lives or, at any stage has lived. It also refers to a property whether owned or tenanted or in which the aggrieved person or the respondent has any right, title, interest or equity. Therefore, in order to fall within the meaning of "shared household" as FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 34 of 38 defined in Section 2(s), it is essential that the property in question must be one where the person aggrieved lives, or at any stage, has lived in a domestic relationship, either singly or alongwith the respondent. It also includes such a property whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either of them or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity. It also includes a property which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest therein. The Supreme Court has already observed in S.R. Batra (supra) that the definition of "shared household" in Section 2(s) is not happily worded, but the courts have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society. In this backdrop and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the property in question cannot be considered to be a shared "household" because neither the appellant / plaintiff, nor her husband (defendant No.1) has any right, title or interest or equitable right in the same. The property may belong to defendant No.3 exclusively or to defendants 2 and 3 jointly, but it certainly does not belong to the defendant No.1 or the appellant / plaintiff. The position as it exists today also does not indicate even prima facie that the property in question is the property of a joint family of which the defendant No.1 is a member. Therefore, in our view, the property in question does not fall within the expression "shared household" as appearing in Section 2(s) of the said Act. FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 35 of 38
47. Section 17 of the said Act deals with the right of every women in a domestic relationship to reside in the shared household and, Section 17(2), specifically provides that such a woman shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. In other words, the wife can be evicted or excluded from the "shared household" after following the due procedure established by law and it is not an absolute right of the wife to reside in a "shared household". However, in the present case, we need to go into this aspect of the matter because Section 17 in itself would be inapplicable in view of the fact that the property in question cannot be regarded as a "shared household". The residence orders that may be passed under Section 19 are also subject to the Magistrate / court being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place. All the residence orders also relate to a "shared household". Consequently, Section 19 would also not come in the aid of the appellant / plaintiff.
48. The learned counsel for the appellant had also referred to single Bench decisions of the Kerala High Court and the Madras High Court in the cases of S. Prabhakaran (supra) and P. Babu Venkatesh Kandayammal and Padmavathi(supra) to indicate instances of cases where the Supreme Court decision in S.R. Batra (supra) was distinguished. Those decisions are single Bench decisions and that too of other high courts and are, therefore, of no precedential values insofar as this Bench is concerned. We feel that in view of the prima facie finding that the property in question does not belong FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 36 of 38 to the appellants / plaintiffs husband nor does he have any share or interest in the same, there is no question of the said property being regarded as a "shared household" in terms of Section 2(s) of the said Act. We also find that the expression "matrimonial home" is not at all defined in the said Act and the concept of the matrimonial homes as prevailing in England by virtue of the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967 cannot be applied in India as pointed out in S.R. Batra (supra) and B.R. Mehta (supra). There is no doubt that the appellant / plaintiff has a right of a residence whether as an independent right or as a right encapsulated in the right to maintenance under the personal law applicable to her. But that right of residence does not translate into a right to reside in a particular house. More so, because her husband does not have any right, title or interest in the said house. As noted by the Supreme Court in the case of Komalam Amma (supra) as well as in Mangat Mal (supra), the right of residence or provision for residence may be made by either giving a lumpsum in money or property in lieu thereof. In the present case, we have noted earlier in this judgment that the learned single Judge had recorded that alternative premises had been offered to the appellant / plaintiff, but she refused to accept the same and insisted on retaining the second floor of the property in question claiming it to be her matrimonial home.
49. We must emphasise once again that the right of residence which a wife undoubtedly has does not mean the right to reside in a particular property. It may, of course, mean the right to reside in a commensurate FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 37 of 38 property. But it can certainly not translate into a right to reside in a particular property. In order to illustrate this proposition, we may take an example of a house being allotted to a high functionary, say a Minister in the Central Cabinet and who resides in the same house alongwith his wife, son and daughter-in-law. It is obvious that since the daughter-in-law and son reside in the said house, which otherwise is a government accommodation allotted to the father-in-law, the same could be regarded as the house where the son and daughter-in-law live in matrimony. Can the daughter-in-law claim that she has a right to live in that particular property irrespective of the fact that the father-in-law subsequently is no longer a Minister and the property reverts entirely to the Government? Certainly not. It is only in that property in which the husband has a right, title or interest that the wife can claim residence and that, too, if no commensurate alternative is provided by the husband.
50. In view of the foregoing discussion, no interference is called for with the impugned order and we also feel that the learned single Judge has amply protected the appellant / plaintiff by directing that she would not be evicted from the premises in question without following the due process of law. The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs. BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
VEENA BIRBAL, J
October 26, 2010
dutt
FAO (OS) 341/07 Page 38 of 38

http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/BDA/judgement/26-10-2010/BDA26102010FAOOS3412007.pdf
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1625829/